Leon
Trotsky et al: Recognition of the Tsarist Debts
Excerpts,
October
12, 1927
[Leon
Trotsky, The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1926-1927), New York
1980, p. 433-436]
….
4. There can be no question of recognizing the debts of the tsarist
monarchy in principle. The annulment of those debts was one of the
most important conquests of the October Revolution. This annulment
made it possible to reach the present level of economic development
on the basis of our internal resources. Recognition of the debts
would be a crushing blow to socialist construction and the
proletarian dictatorship, since it would lead to an abrupt worsening
of the material conditions of the industrial workers and of working
people in general, an even greater delay in our already slow
industrialization, and a menacing growth in the power of foreign
capital within our economy. All of this would mean, given other
difficulties, the strangulation of the socialist
revolution in the near future and our country’s enslavement to
foreign capital. Economic defeat of the workers’ state would become
one of the most important factors in the stabilization of world
capitalism.
5.
Individual, practical agreements on the debts, based on the principle
of mutual benefits, are permissible, however. Remaining completely on
the basis of the decree of January 28,1918, certain strictly limited
portions of the old debts can be recognized on the condition that
appropriate economic or political benefits are granted us in return,
in the form of new credits, agreement not to participate in any
military bloc against us, and so on and so forth.
However,
since such partial agreements imply such great responsibility and are
of such tremendous importance, it is necessary to analyze the
circumstances and terms of each such agreement with total clarity.
In
the spring and summer of last year (1926) negotiations were held on
partial recognition of the debts on our part in exchange for the
granting of new credits by France. Our position in these negotiations
was rather favorable. France had not yet managed to deal with the
consequences of its inflation. England was paralyzed by the miners’
strike. In China the Northern March had begun. In expectation of a
good harvest the Soviet Union had increased its pace of economic
construction. Pressed by its contradictions with England and by the
intensifying Serbo-Italian conflict over Albania, the French
government wanted an agreement and urged us to make haste. If the
Politburo had placed its bets on its French card, it could at that
moment have gotten an agreement on terms highly favorable to us.
Not
only was the occasion missed; everything possible was done to land us
in the present exceptionally difficult situation. Our
international policy during this period was a typically
petty-bourgeois policy, that is, a series of vacillations between
overconfidence — when the situation shaped up more favorably —
and readiness to make impermissible concessions, when bourgeois
pressure was intensified.
6.
The first half of 1926 was an especially flourishing time for the
petty-bourgeois theory of socialism in one country.
This
theory, representing the distorted reflection in the minds of Stalin
and Bukharin of the economic recovery period, played a fatal role not
only in regard to economic plans and perspectives but also in our
negotiations with France. Disregard for our world economic ties and
our economy’s dependence on the world market, the Bukharin theory
of the snail’s pace, the assurance that we were already nine-tenths
of the way through building socialism, the baiting of the Opposition
for its “pessimism” and “lack of faith” — all this blended
into a typical melange of petty-bourgeois overconfidence, shot
through with provincial narrowmindedness: the “world market,”
they said, is irrelevant; we don’t need credits; we’ll get by on
our own, etc., etc. In fact, if the main danger was that of “industry
running too far ahead” and the “super-industrialism of the
Opposition,” why even bother to seek agreements, credit, and an
inflow of technology from the rest of the world? Proceeding from this
fundamentally wrong position, at the heart of which lies
petty-bourgeois national narrowmindedness, the Stalinist leadership
in effect broke off negotiations with France at the moment most
favorable for reaching an agreement. …
8.
The defeat of the revolution in China, the weakening of the
Comintern, the bankruptcy of the Anglo-Russian Committee, the break
with Britain, and the immediate threat of war — that was the
situation in 1927 when file Politburo undertook its super-hasty,
exceptional measures to revive the negotiations with France. Under
these conditions our hasty willingness to move toward concessions, in
the eyes of the French bourgeoisie, appeared to be simply an
expression of unsureness, shortsightedness, and weakness on the part
of our leadership. The position of our delegation in the talks was
bound to worsen abruptly. The heart of the matter is that France is
now demanding our recognition of a very substantial portion of the
tsarist debts in return for nothing more than maintaining diplomatic
relations with us. The French government has separated the question
of the debts from that of credits. The correlation between our debt
obligations and possible credits now shapes up in immeasurably less
favorable terms than were possible in 1926. Such a proposition is
unacceptable to us. We must therefore say clearly, “We are
against this particular agreement.”
…
12.
In the event that it is necessary to accept one or another agreement,
which will impose new sacrifices on the land of the Soviets, a
question of tremendous importance arises: Who
will pay? — that
is, the question of our wage policy, our tax policy, and our overall
policy course toward the kulak and poor peasant. Maneuverist
concessions to the world bourgeoisie require not only a correct world
policy but also a revolutionary class policy at home.
The
possibility for maneuvering effectively presupposes an active
and cohesive party controlling its own institutions. We cannot “buy
off” the bourgeoisie by paying millions
and at the same time poison our own party with slander about the
alleged ties of its left wing with a Wrangel officer and a military
conspiracy.
Such
policies can only bring defeat. This is confirmed once again by the
course of the negotiations with France. While rejecting untimely
concessions, which can only lead to an intensification of pressure
against us, we at the same time reject and condemn the policy that
has led us to new international defeats.
G.
Zinoviev, L. Trotsky, I. Smilga, G. Yevdokimov