Leon Trotsky, Richard von Kühlmann, Ottokar Graf Czernin et al:

Session of 9 February

[From the (British) Daily Review of the Foreign Press, 18 February, 1918, p. 900. Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. Washington 1918, p. 162-169]

The following account of the final stages of discussion at Brest on Feb. 9. the Wolff version of which was printed in the Daily Review (Feb. 16) :

Kühlmann. “I opened this session of the Commission which has been agreed upon. The representatives of the Allied Delegations are of the opinion that we have reached the point at which it is necessary to give an account of the negotiations. As we all know, these negotiations have been of a political character. The views of both sides have been explained, before the Christmas postponement, in provisional formulas. The substance of these formulas has since been carefully examined at our debates. During these debates it became possible to state both points of view in greater detail. I shall beg you to-day, when we have to summarize briefly, all that has been done, to forego any repetition of the discussions. I regret to say that up to the present we have not succeeded in bringing together to any great extent the two points of view, in spite of all the debates. My task to-day is to summarize matters, and I shall not indicate which party or which side is to be blamed for the negotiations not having been successfully concluded. I am personally of opinion that any further discussions on either side are in the same position, and can not give us more favorable results than those which have already been secured. It is beyond doubt that we can not proceed with interminable discussions which have no promise of success. But, faithful to my principles, during all the negotiations, I still hope that a free discussion of principles will bring us nearer to our goal, but I shall dispel all doubts and I say that the circumstances at the moment are of such a character that we must reach a decision promptly. And if I am again putting before you the political question in its full complexity, I desire to say that I hope the discussions will take place with the sincere wish to find a way for arriving at an agreement. In putting these questions again before you, I only wish to tell you that I desire to see them all connected up, the one with the other. The commissions have already discussed all the details, and an agreement upon the whole question should not present many difficulties. So far as the economic questions are concerned, the preparatory work of the commissions has not at present sufficiently progressed, but, nevertheless, I hope that in regard to these questions, during the short time which remains at our disposal, we shall reach some satisfactory agreement – satisfactory to both sides.”

Czernin. “For a week we have been discussing whether we shall consider the territorial changes which have to be made in connection with the war as regards the self-determination of nations or not. Further discussions of the same character will certainly bring us no nearer to a settlement. But I would ask you whether such deliberations would not be calculated to bring us nearer to peace? The question now is not as to how these territorial changes are to be designated, changes which must take place, and we need not associate these questions with the conclusion of peace itself. I think that the past discussions have shown the different points of view qualifying the territorial changes which must take place, but they have not indicated that an agreement in these matters is impossible. The Secretary of State von Kühlmann on Dec. 28 clearly stated what changes must take place. They concern Courland and Lithuania, parts of Livonia and Esthonla, and also Poland. Let us put aside the question as to how these proposed changes must be regarded. Let us try and clear up the point as to whether these disputed questions would form an obstacle to the conclusion of peace.”

Trotsky. “We also considered it necessary, after the last interval (I am speaking of the postponement occasioned by us, and not of the postponement occasioned by the Austro-German Delegations), to sum up all our preceding work. The peace negotiations began with our declaration of Dec. 23 and the declaration of Dec. 25, by which the Quadruple Alliance replied to our declaration. These two declarations formulated the object of the negotiations as being based upon the principle of self-determination of peoples. During a short interval, which could be measured by hours, it appeared that this principle, accepted by both sides, would serve as a means for the solution of these national and territorial questions as arising out of the war. But after an exchange of views on Dec. 27, it became clear that the appeal to this principle was of a character calculated only to complicate all other questions. The points of view of one side, namely, our side, as applied by the other side were a direct negation of the very principle itself. Afterwards all the discussions took an entirely academic character, without any prospect of a practical settlement, because the opposite side was striving, with the aid of complicated logical maneuvers, to draw from the principle of self-determination what, in their opinion, was in accordance with the the situation as disclosed by the military maps.

The question concerning the occupied regions, which was the principal theme of all the discussions, was reduced, after a number of sessions, to the question of the evacuation of these regions by the troops in occupation. To this principal question, in consequence of the nature of the discussion, it was only possible to reach a certain amount of clarity, and this only after great diffi-[…] Until the end of the war, so far as Germany was concerned, and so far as we understood it – and we honestly tried to understand it – was as follows: Until the end of the war, so far as Germany was concerned and so far as Austria-Hungary was concerned, there could be no question of the evacuation of occupied territory on any front, owing to military considerations. Our Delegation later understood that the opposite side now had the intention of evacuating these occupied regions on the conclusion of a general peace, when the above-mentioned strategical considerations would have been put on one side. This conclusion, however, also appeared to be wrong. The German and Austro- Hungarian Delegations have refused categorically to make a declaration which could force them to withdraw their troops from the occupied regions, with the exception of the small belt of territory which they proposed to return to Russia. The situation only then became clear. This clarity became, if possible, greater when General Hoffmann, in the name of both Delegations, proposed to us the frontier line which would in future separate Russia from its western neighbors, namely, from Germany and Austria-Hungary, because the separated regions were to be occupied by their troops for an indefinite period, unrestricted by any treaty.

We have already realized during the past discussions that if we were to trace the new frontier of Russia in accordance with the principle of self-determination, then we should have the best guarantee, under present conditions, against military aggression, because all the peoples on both sides of this frontier would be interested in maintaining it. The German conditions and the policy which dictates them, entirely exclude any such kind of guarantees for peaceful relations between Russia on the one side and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. The new frontier proposed by the other side is dictated by military and strategical considerations, and from this point of view must be estimated not only the separation from Russia of Poland and Lithuania, but even the separation of the Lettish countries. If such had been the desire of the peoples of those regions, then no danger would arise for the safety of the Russian Republic. Friendly relations with these States, which had freely formed for themselves an independent existence, would follow as a natural consequence of their origin and of their conditions. In such circumstances questions concerning the strategical character of the new frontiers would have for us no important significance. But these new frontiers which the opposite side propose appear to us in a very different light. Germany and Austria-Hungary, while maintaining their troops in the occupied regions, are linking these regions to their States by railways and by other means, and for us the new frontier must thus be considered not as a frontier with Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, and so on, but as a frontier with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Both these States are seeking military expansion, as is clearly shown by their attitude toward the occupied regions. A new question arises for us, therefore, as to what these independent States mean for the Russian Republic in the future. The dependence of these peoples upon these two States will place very near to Russia the new frontier within their territories proposed by Germany and Austria-Hungary. What are really the military conceptions of the other side when they ask for such a frontier? For the purpose of examining this new question from the point of view of the leading military institutions of the Republic, I shall ask for the views of our military advisers. We have here to meet a fresh difficulty.

We have heard nothing of that part of the new frontier which is to run to the south from Brest-Litovsk. The opposite side was of the opinion that this part of the frontier had to be established in discussion with the Delegation of the Kiev Rada. We have decided that, irrespective of the unestablished political state of Ukrainia, there can be no question of a one-sided tracing of the frontier, based upon an agreement with the Rada alone; we declared that the consent of the Delegation of the Council of the People’s Commissaries was also necessary. Subsequently the political situation of Ukrainia was defined by its entrance into the Federal Russian Republic. The Delegation of the Central Powers, in spite of their declaration that they would examine the international position of the Ukraine after the conclusion of peace, has hurriedly recognized the independence of Ukrainia, and, to wit, at the very moment when Ukrainia entered the Russian Federation. After this date events took place which should have had a decisive influence upon these separate negotiations of the other side with the Kiev Rada. The latter fell under the blow of the Ukrainian Council. The fate of the Rada, inviolable in itself, was accelerated by the fact that the Rada, in its struggle for authority, make attempts, with the help of the Central Powers, to draw the Ukrainian people away from the Russian Federal Republic. We officially informed the opposite side that the Ukrainian Rada was deposed, but, nevertheless, the negotiations with a nonexistent Government have been continued. We proposed to the Austro-Hungarian Delegation, in a private conversation, it is true, but formally, nevertheless, that they should send their representative to Ukrainia with the object of seeing for himself that the Ukrainian Rada no longer existed, and that the negotiations with its Delegation could not have any practical value. We understood that, so far as the Delegations of the Central Powers needed confirmation of facts, they would postpone the signature of the Peace Treaty until the return of their representative from Ukrainia. We have been informed that the signature to the Peace Treaty could not be postponed any longer. Whilst negotiating with the Government of the Federal Russian Republic the Governments of the Central Empires not only, in spite of their former declaration, hurried to recognize the independence of the Ukrainian Republic on Feb. 1, at the very moment when it declared itself to be a part of the Russian Federation, but is signing a treaty with a Government which, as we have categorically declared to the opposite side, does not exist any longer.

Such conduct is creating doubts if there is any sincerity of purpose on the side of the Central Powers for the establishment of peaceful relations with the Russian Federation. We are striving for peace now as in the beginning of the negotiations. The whole conduct of the opposite side, as far as this question is concerned, is creating the impression that the Central Powers were striving to [message defective] for the representatives of the Russian Republic. Only such a peace treaty will be binding for the Russian Federal Republic and its countries as will be signed by our Delegation.

Concerning the question of frontiers, it can be discussed only as a whole, and only in such a way can we reach practical results. We ask the opposite side to complete on our map the frontier line which was submitted to us by General Hoffmann.”

Kühlmann. “If I am not replying to the detailed explanation of the preceding speaker, it is, as I have already stated to-day, with the purpose of according every controversy. Accordingly I shall not reply to the historical review of our negotiations. They have become public; they can be studied and compared. The preceding speaker examined for a long time the question of frontiers. I should not like to start the discussion of this question until I am sure that the proposal which I shall make to the opposite side will be accepted. The preceding speaker has already indicated that the discussion of this frontier is necessitating the participation of military advisers. I shall propose that the question of frontiers should be first submitted to a military subcommission composed of one diplomatic representative and two military specialists – one for the Navy and one for the Army – from each side. I shall not participate personally in this subcommission. I shall send to it one of my diplomatic collaborators. This subcommission could be formed at the present session, and must prepare for our next session, tomorrow, a report concerning the result of its discussions. From the importance and difficulties of all these questions which the subcommission has to clear up it is obvious that the decisions of the suhcommission will have a decisive influence upon our further negotiations.

Our policy as regards the newly created States will always be directed toward the maintenance of friendly relations and nonintervention in their internal life as soon as this war is satisfactorily ended.

[From this point the message continues that given in the Daily Review (Feb. 16).]

That is all that I have to say concerning the frontiers. I hope that by the discussion in the subcommission we shall have a report that will be beyond dispute for our session of to-morrow.

Concerning the explanation of the People’s Commissary for Foreign Affairs of the relations between the Central Powers and the Ukraine, I have only to declare that information which has reached us – and the tendency of which is beyond doubt to us – is in direct opposition to the real facts, and we find it unnecessary to take it into consideration. The point of view of the Central Powers has been repeatedly stated here, and we are of the opinion that all further explanation is unnecessary.

The Central Powers have concluded to-day a peace with the representatives of the Central Rada, which they have recognized. The consequences for the Central Powers are obvious. At the present time, when the circumstances are such as we see them, we can not expect a practical result from our negotiations. The opinions concerning the rights pf the Ukrainian State and of its representatives, the reciprocal relations of it and of the Petrograd Government, they all are questions which do not concern us whilst we are concluding peace with Ukraine.

This is no hostile act against Russia. We have concluded with Ukraine no alliance, but only a peace treaty. Ukraine has not become to us an ally, but only a neutral State. If we could arrive at a peace with Russia, Russia would also become a neutral State. In such a case our relations to Russia would be the same as they are now to the Ukraine. There will be a difference, if we are unable to come to an agreement with the Government of the People’s Commissaries, because then, while we shall have to consider the Ukraine as a neutral country, those regions which submit themselves to the authority of the Councils of the People’s Commissaries we shall have to consider as regions against which we are in a state of war. We are willing to avoid that by a conclusion of peace with Russia.

If we had ignored the Rada, as M. Trotsky wished, that would have meant that we should have had to intervene in the internal life of Russia. And we will not do it. If we had not recognized the Ukraine, we had, in fact, recognized the Council of the People’s Commissaries as the only authority for the whole of the territories which composed the old Russian Empire, But we know that many countries are not willing to recognise the authority of the Council of the People’s Commissaries. We are not arbiters in questions which concern only Russia herself. Our attitude is nonintervention. We do not demand that the President of the Russian Delegation should renounce his claim for the authority of the Council for the whole of former Russia. We shall avoid the difficulties if we sign an eventual treaty concerning these regions which are under the authority of the Council of the People’s Commissaries. How many regions such treaty would concern we can not tell at the present. We know that such treaty could he concluded without knowledge for which regions exactly it would be valid. But nevertheless the situation which would be created would be more disagreeable for us than for the Government of the Russian Republic. Nevertheless, we agreed to do it for the sake of peace. Concerning the question of the President of the Russian Delegation upon the fate of the occupied regions, I refer him for a reply to my declaration, which was made in public before the last session of the Austrian Delegation, which perhaps is known by the gentleman, and to which I have nothing to add, because my point of view has not changed.”

A considerable portion of message here missing; the following section is taken from the conclusion of the W. T. B. wire, which was not to hand on Feb. 16:

“As regards the future lot of the peoples in the occupied border territories, despite the conception adhered to by the Central Powers, according to which the right of peoples to self-determination had already been exercised in these regions, the Allied Governments were ready, by a systematic extension of the existing representative bodies, to provide for the possibility of an expression of national will on the part of these States on the broadest possible popular basis. The determination of the time and form of this expression of the will of the peoples concerned would, however, have to be fixed in accordance with the existing representative bodies in those territories.

I can not give a categorical reply as asked for by the President of the Russian Delegation, but I gladly agree that a communication on this subject should be made to the Sub-Commission.”

Czernin. “I agree completely with the preceding speaker, namely, that this question needs to be discussed by the Allies, and that I do not see any reasonable objection why a reply could not be given to this question afterwards.”

Trotsky. “It has been said that there are not, and can not be, any reasonable objections to a statement concerning the frontiers projected for this part of Russia, which, thanks to the energy and decision of the Ukrainian workmen, is now under the authority of the Ukrainian Councils. It seems to me that there can be no objection to the creation of a military technical Sub-Commission which will have to examine the question of frontiers if the project is submitted to that Commission.

Kühlmann. I should be very much obliged to the President of the Russian Delegation if he would give his views upon the details of the creation of the Sub-Commission as proposed by me. Then we could decide who shall take part in this Sub-Commission at this session.”

Trotsky. “Before I give you a detailed reply I must have a consultation with my Deiegation, It will require but little time.”

Kühlmann. “I expect to have the reply to-day, because, as I have already said, we need this preparatory work complete for our session of to-morrow. The representatives of the Sub-Commission could then have a day at their disposal for their labors. Our proposal has been known a long time. All the questions concerned have been discussed in detail, and I firmly believe that all arguments have been already used, and that now we have to bring them to a conclusion with a view to making a decision concerning our peace negotiations. I have already stated our proposal, which could in a certain degree replace the second clause of the projected peace treaty. This formula is as follows:

Russia must agree to the following territorial changes, which will enter into force after the ratification of the peace treaty. The regions between the frontiers of Germany and Austria-Hungary and the indicated line will not be in the future a dependency of Russia. As a result of their former adhesion to the Russian Empire, no obligation will result to them toward Russia. The further destiny of these regions will be settled in agreement with the peoples concerned, namely, on the basis of those agreements which have been concluded between them and Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In handing over this formula to the President of the Russian Delegation, I state that an essential part of our proposal is in clause 1, which we have already sufficiently discussed, and during these discussions no insurmountable obstacles have appeared for the conclusion of peace. I will give my point of view in a few words. It is as follows:

The evacuation of certain regions was promised by us under the condition that at the same time the evacuation of regions taken from our allies will be carried out. At that time we considered as the nearest date when the evacuation by us was to begin, the date of the complete demobilization of the Russian Army. I state that concerning this date we are ready to compromise, and I must repeat what I have already stated. I declare that we can not accept a peace treaty, in which it is not diplomatically promised to evacuate the Provinces taken from our allies. In accordance with the explanation given by the People’s Commissary for Foreign Affairs, I think there is no ground for doubt that the troops which are in occupation, of Turkish provinces, and of which I think, in the first place, are under the authority of the Petrograd Government, I shall touch here also the second clause, which has been discussed hy us many times, namely, the question concerning the future of the Aaland islands. I must point out that the peace treaty must give us at least the same rights as we had before the beginning of the war, I shall also recall to you the most passionate wish of the Swedish people to reunite with these Islands, where they have, besides geographical and ethnographical considerations, the most vital interests.”

Trotsky. “Concerning the evacuation of the Turkish provinces, we find in our principles sufficiently weighty considerations for our declarations that the evacuation of the Armenian territories could not be considered simply as an exchange for the evacuation of the one of the other portions of the occupied Russian territories. As we are withdrawing our troops from Persia, we shall also withdraw them – we have already begun it – from Armenia. It is beyond doubt that we shall state that clearly in our peace treaty with Turkey, if our negotiations should advance so far. Concerning the Aaland Islands, I must say that I did not understand of what minimum of rights the Secretary of State was speaking. If he had in view the obligation of Russia not to fortify these islands, then, independently of the very essence of the question, the arguments of the Secretary of State appeared to me as being not entirely correct, so far as the rights of Germany created, and so far as Germany has not renounced, these rights. Perhaps the information in possession of the Secretary of State will help us to clear up this question from other points of view. As is known, we have in our possession documents which prove that, in 1907, Von Schoen, for Germany, and Gibastoff, for the Tsarist Russia, signed a treaty which can not be published, in which Von Schoen declared that Germany would not consider it as a breach of the Treaty of Paris if Russia fortified the Aaland Islands. Before this question can be discussed, my opinion is that it should be prepared, from a technical point of view, by the Military Commission.”

Kühlmann. “In remaining faithful to the statement at the beginning of this session, I will not discuss the importance of the document which the preceding speaker refers to. I shall again, once more, express my opinion in a few words, that the peace treaty must return us all those rights which we possessed before the war. As far as these islands are concerned, it is a demand of principle. If in the opinion of the President of the Russian Commission we did not possess any rights before the war, then such a demand must appear to him as one which can be easily agreed upon. I used the word “ minimum ” with the object of expressing exactly that our demand is, for us, a demand of principle. If somebody asked me of what I was thinking in using the word “ maximum," then I should reply, as I have suggested several times previously, that it means the neutralization of these islands by the consent of the peoples on the borders of the Baltic Sea.

For the further discussion we need some preparatory work done by the Sub-Commission. I regret that the Sub-Commission has been unable to finish its work for our meeting of to-day. All other matters have been finished. I have to state that I am expecting this evening from the Russian side, the creating of a Sub-Commission for the discussion of the frontiers. In any case, I propose to have our next session at 6 p. m. We shall discuss the report of the Sub-Commission. I shall not waste time, and I here give notice that I, from my side, shall send to this Sub-Commission, if it is created, von Rosenburg and General …. As also a naval specialist will take part, I shall send … von …

I declare the session closed.”

L. Karahan.