Leon Trotsky: Letter to the Council of Defence

Copy. True Copy. (From files “Secret outgoing papers from J.I to 17.IX.1919, No. 1 to No. 400”, part I, pages 10, 11, 12) The Trotsky Papers 1917-1922, edited and annotated by Jan M. Meijer, The Hague. 1964, Vol. 2., p. 241, 243, 245]

January 4, 1919

To: the Council of Defence.

The position in the Ukraine and our tasks.

The landing of the Entente on the Black Sea coast has begun on a comparatively large scale, according to information for the reliability of which it is impossible to vouch. It is proposed to dispatch 100-150 thousand soldiers into the south of Russia. This danger that is assuming concrete shape obliges us to arrive at a more precise and direct formulation of our policy in respect of the Ukrainian line of advance.

As before, the most important task, it stands to reason, remains that of clearing the Krasnov bands from the Don and proceeding with the concentration of the forces and technical materiel necessary for this purpose. We cannot, however, leave events in the Ukraine to pursue their spontaneous course. The taking of Kharkov by the Ukrainians raises the question of the Ukraine in the most acute and urgent way. If we were to consider it inexpedient and too risky to involve ourselves at this moment in the affairs of the Ukraine in a military sense, then the taking of Kharkov would have to be regarded as an act of criminal provocation. We would have to restrain the partisans and, moreover, seek a agreement with the Ukrainian Directorate.

Such an agreement is not feasible at the present moment. The Entente, inasmuch as it harbours serious military intentions, has not the least intention of basing its policy on the Kerenskys and Chernovs of the Ukraine. The case of Odessa, where the ultra-reactionary Grishin-Almazov was put in as Governor, has shown this.

Under the pressure of the spontaneous leanings of the Ukrainian workers and peasants towards the Soviet regime and confronted with the Anglo-French White Guard assault, the Directorate is at present inclined to seek support and backing from Soviet Russia. It would follow that one of the alternatives open to us lies in calling a halt to the partisan movement in the Ukraine, coming to an agreement with Petlyura’s people and concentrating all existing available forces on the Don Front.

Such a decision would, however, appear excessively abrupt. Our alliance with Petlyura’s people would, above all, baffle the Ukrainian workers’ masses and delay the development of the revolution in the Ukraine, In a military respect such a temporary agreement would yield us no benefit. The Petlyura “army” is powerless and insignificant. Its soldiers are deserting to our side. It constitutes no barrier against the Anglo-French expedition. In the event of any serious Anglo-French thrust Petlyura is capable of betraying everyone and everything and rushing into their arms.

Our policy in relation to the Ukraine must proceed, above all, from the need to forestall the possibility of an advance by the Anglo-French forces from the South, The more swiftly and resolutely we push our possible Ukrainian-Entente Front to the south, away from Moscow, the more advantageous it will be for us. In the event of a real attack in strength the greatest advantage for us would lie in establishing our line along the left bank of the Dnieper and destroying all lines of communication and bridges on the right bank. For this we need to advance to the Dnieper as soon as possible. This objective is at the present moment easily attainable as the fate of Kharkov has shown. The activity of the Anglo-French may show results within even a few weeks time. The White Guard elements will assist them. Once they are in possession of the railways, the Anglo-French forces can reach the Dnieper within a few weeks. And then they will impose a disadvantageous defensive line on us.

From the above there follows: 1) the necessity of creating a Ukrainian Front under a single command to deal not with the Petlyura units but with the Anglo-French regular troops; 2) a resolute policy of launching an offensive in the Ukraine with the aim of reaching at least the line of the Dnieper in the course of the next few weeks; 3) in this connection the extreme importance emerges of delivering a rapid and sharp blow at Kiev with the aim of gaining possession of the political centre of the Ukraine, which would equip us with a great moral superiority and render our enemies powerless. In a military respect such a task is feasible, given the assistance of the insurgent formations and of those immediate reserves which we are in any case obliged to station along the Ukrainian frontier in order to protect the flanks of our Southern Army and cover the roads from Kiev to Kursk and to Moscow. In the further advance southwards there need be no doubt that replacements for our units will be automatically forthcoming from the Ukrainian population and from the stocks of supplies available on the spot.

In view of the above it is requested that:

1. The above plan of operations be approved;

2. The opening of a Ukrainian Front to counter the Anglo-French Expedition be publicly proclaimed;

3. A formal agreement to provide for a single command be concluded with the Provisional Ukrainian Government and this be made known to the people’s masses of Russia and the Ukraine.

Signed: the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic, Trotsky