Leon Trotsky: Letter to Golman

July 13, 1927

[Leon Trotsky, The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1926-1927), New York 1980, p. 254-257, title: “To a Member of the 'Buffer Group'”]

NOTE: A “buffer group," which still believed in the possibility of reconciling the majority and the Opposition, circulated a statement in June-July 1927 and gathered forty signatures. A supporter of that position, a certain Golman, wrote to Trotsky. The Opposition leader’s reply follows.

By permission of the Harvard College Library.

Dear Comrade:

I read your letter with interest. You call yourself a member of the “buffer group.” That is apparently so, to judge from your letter. You raise a number of questions, which I will try to answer in brief.

1. You propose a theoretical debate on the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country. But immediately you say in advance, with regret, that our articles probably would not be printed and you add, “intolerance of honest self-criticism … has achieved the solidity of entrenched prejudice among virtually all the party editorial boards of our magazines.” But our editorial boards don’t make policy on their own, do they? The matter goes deeper. “Intolerance” is treated by you from rather a psychological than a political angle. When a policy line is incorrect, when the course of events and the development of class relations argue profoundly against this incorrect line, “intolerance” appears as a form of self-defense, i.e., the automatic elimination of any exchange of opinion whatsoever on fundamental questions of the revolution. The problem, then, is not the editorial boards and not intolerance but the basic political line.

2. You express your opposition to a splintered leadership (i.e., having only Stalin, Bukharin, and Rykov, on the one hand; or only Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Kamenev, on the other, as you put it). You assume that a united leadership would provide surer guarantees against mistakes. Least of all would I be inclined to object to that idea, which, as far as I can tell, coincides completely with Lenin’s recommendations for the future course of our party’s leadership. Despite the profundity and sharpness of the differences, I am completely and entirely willing to support any step that might contribute to the restoration of the basic group of Lenin’s leading center. But this does not exhaust the question. The personal composition of the leadership in the revolutionary party is a function of the line of the leadership. We now see the development of crass and shameless attitudes according to which criticism of the CC is viewed approximately the same way the monarchists used to view Ièse majesty. Such attitudes have nothing in common with Bolshevism. CC membership is not a hereditary or even a lifetime position. The CC is an authoritative body but it is still a party body. The party can replace the CC. And in order to do that, the party must be able to judge the CC. Criticism of the CC, especially on major questions of principle and especially in a pre-congress period, is the most legitimate right of every party member. To infringe on that right is to turn the party into a helpless chorus for the apparatus, with no will of its own. What kind of perspective this would open up can be understood by anyone with even the slightest knowledge of the mechanics of class relations.

3. You admit that “the line of the CC on the China question, beginning in March, has been crudely mistaken and led to the defeat of the Chinese revolution.” It is here, I think, that we must look for the key to the weakness in your “buffer” position. Revolution is politics and history in concentrated form. The test of revolution is a highly concentrated test. That is why the line on the “China question” cannot be regarded merely as an episode, even a “major” episode. In China, precisely because there was a revolution and because relations assumed a solidly tangible and massive form almost at once, it would have been the easiest thing in the world to avoid mistakes if the initial, fundamental positions had been at all correct. Just as there is no socialism for just one country, there is no revolutionary proletarian policy for one country. Policy in China is a continuation of policy inside the USSR. But the logical outcome of the continuation was demonstrated more vividly because of the turbulent pace of the events. …

5. Serf relations and semi-serf relations in the economy and social life of China are very strong. Partly their origins date back to feudal times. And partly this is new growth, i.e., the revival of old forms on the basis of the retarded development of the productive forces, surplus agricultural population, the operations of merchants’ and usurers’ capital, etc. But what decides the question is the kind of relations that are dominant in China. Are they “feudal” relations (more precisely, serf relations, and pre-capitalist relations in general)? Or are they capitalist relations? Undeniably the latter. Only because of the indisputably dominant role of capitalist relations throughout the economy of China is it possible to speak of the perspective of proletarian hegemony in the national revolution.

The productive role of the Chinese proletariat is already very great. In the coming years it can only become greater. Its political role could be colossal, as events have shown. The line of the leadership was aimed entirely against the perspective of the proletariat actually winning the leading role in the revolution.

6. You ask whether such expressions as “the CC’s policy of betrayal,” “treason,” etc., are permissible? Here you refer to the alleged fact that I allowed myself to make such an assessment. On what basis do you say this?

7. You express your apprehension over the possibility that the sharpening of the differences may lead to a split. I totally agree with you that a split would be a very great misfortune. The sharpening of the differences did not result from the ill will of the Opposition but from the sweep of events. The party regime will not allow the differences to be resolved through normal party channels. In turn, the abnormal character of the party regime is the inevitable result of the incorrect political line. This is the main source of danger. Only an open and audacious presentation of all the questions can give the party the incentive to approach them, not according to the official handbook cliches, but by dealing with the real issues. This is the only way to fight for unity on a revolutionary Bolshevik basis. Neither pathetic “buffer group” lamentations nor apparatus intimidation can preserve unity.

8. You ask, “What is the advantage of the ideological and organizational bloc with Fischer and Maslow?” To speak of an organizational bloc is absolutely incorrect. All assertions to that effect are fabrications. But ideological and political affinity undoubtedly exists, as far as I can judge from a number of publications of the group you mention. I think that this group has repudiated a lot and learned a good deal. To accuse it of counterrevolution, renegacy, etc., is absolutely incorrect and is no different from accusing the Opposition of “supporting” Chamberlain.

In conclusion allow me to thank you for sending me a copy of your book. I will not have a chance to acquaint myself with it right away — not before the plenum in any case. I hope that I can manage to read it after the plenum, at least the chapter you indicated.

L. Trotsky