Leon
Trotsky: Letter to the AUCP(B) Delegation
January
18, 1927
[Leon
Trotsky, The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1926-1927), New York
1980, p. 196-204, title: “Problems
of the Comintern”]
To
the AUCP(B) Delegation:
Bureaucratism
as a Source of Opportunism
1.
One of the main features of opportunism, especially its
centrist-diplomatic variety, is its readiness to adopt radical
resolutions in relation to other countries. In this way, opportunism
to some extent gratifies the revolutionary moods of the working
masses, without itself assuming any responsibilities. The entire
history of the working class movement is filled with expressions of
this kind of duplicity, especially in Great Britain. In Marx’s era
the trade unionists used to adopt radical resolutions in regard to
Poland, but put the question of Ireland and India quite differently.
In our day, the Independent Labour Party raises the question of a
merger between the Second and Third Internationals, while refusing to
engage in joint action with the British Communist Party. The General
Council of British Trades Unions concludes a bloc with the Soviet
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions with the aim of uniting the
world trade union movement, but during the general strike in Great
Britain refuses to accept financial aid from this same AUCCTU. Such
examples, large and small, can be multiplied without end.
2.
To the extent that opportunist tendencies make their appearance
within the Comintern, they display the same characteristic, that is,
a readiness to adopt radical decisions in regard to others,
mercilessly denouncing “rightist deviations” in all countries,
while being inclined at the same time to give way — especially at
the critical moment — before bourgeois public opinion in their own
country. It goes without saying that “radicalism” of this sort is
the deadly enemy of Bolshevism. The job of the Comintern is to
develop genuinely revolutionary parties, especially through
uncompromising struggle against every manifestation of sham
radicalism, political duplicity, etc. Everything depends upon the
degree to which the Comintern regime encourages this struggle.
3.
We absolutely must come to realize that one of the most important
present sources of opportunism in the Comintern-hidden and disguised,
but all the more virulent for that reason — is the bureaucratic
apparatus regime in the Comintern itself and in the Comintern’s
leading member party. There can be no doubt, after the experience of
1923-26, that in the Soviet Union, bureaucratism is both an
expression of, and a vehicle for, the pressure of non-proletarian
classes upon the proletariat. To the extent that the European
Communist parties — or most of their leaderships — have
organizationally paralleled the apparatus shifts and realignments in
the AUCP, the bureaucratism within the foreign Communist parties has
above all been a reflection and extension of the bureaucratism within
the AUCP. It is precisely here that the roots of the duplicity
mentioned above are to be found. The selection of leadership elements
in the Communist parties proceeded and still proceeds for the most
part on the basis of their readiness to accept and approve the latest
alignments in the AUCP apparatus. The more independent and
responsible elements in the leaderships of the foreign parties, who
would not submit to reshufflings of a purely administrative sort,
were either thrown out of the party altogether or were driven into
the right wing (often only seemingly a right wing), or, last of all,
found themselves in opposition from the left. Thus, the organic
process of selection and consolidation of revolutionary cadres on the
basis of the working class struggle was, under Comintern leadership,
cut short, changed around, distorted, and sometimes openly replaced
by bureaucratic administrative pressure from above, from Moscow. It
was natural if it happened that those leading elements in the
Communist parties who more willingly accepted ready-made decisions
and endorsed any and all resolutions — if such elements often
gained the advantage over more revolutionary elements, instilled with
a full sense of revolutionary responsibility. Instead of a selection
of tried and true revolutionaries, a selection of the
bureaucratically adaptable resulted.
4.
We have seen bureaucratic elements in the Communist movement (in
Germany, France, England, America, Poland, etc.) carry out
fantastically opportunist actions with total impunity, hiding behind
the protective coloring of their positions on general questions in
the Comintern and above all on the internal questions in the AUCP. On
the other hand we have observed, and this to a growing extent, the
phenomenon whereby political figures in the Comintern have publicly
and officially taken one position, and secretly, under the table and
behind the scenes, but the more strongly for that, held another
position, directly opposed to the official one. The so-called “double
bookkeeping” of the Maslow-Ruth Fischer group was emphatically
condemned at the [December 1926] enlarged plenum of the ECCI. But it
is quite obvious that a formal condemnation, however just it might
be, not only does not resolve but does not even pose the fundamental
problem: Why do the most responsible Communists, leaders of the
largest parties, resort to this kind of double bookkeeping? The
answer should be stated as follows: In the event of differences with
the AUCP CC, even temporary ones, the regime of apparatus omnipotence
confronts any of the foreign leaders with three possibilities: to be
immediately driven into the arms of the right wing of the party or
even expelled from the party; to immediately throw themselves into
opposition from the left; or to practice double bookkeeping for a
time while preserving their position in the party.
5.
It by no means follows from what has been said, of course, that the
right or left groupings in the Comintern are expressing a correct
line — in contrast to the official center. There is no question
that Social Democratic tendencies are strong in the right-wing
groupings and there is more than a little of the “infantile
disorder” in the left wing. It would also be incorrect to assume
that the official leading cadres consist of unthinking bureaucrats.
In fact a feeling of responsibility for the fate of the Soviet Union
keeps many true revolutionists within the confines of the dominant
regime despite the growing indignation against it. It follows from
that, however, that radical regroupments are necessary within the
Comintern with the aim of emancipating the Comintern from apolitical,
mechanical apparatus coercion, which in turn is a task bound up in
the most intimate way with that of changing the regime in the AUCP.
The
sooner, and the more widely and emphatically, this task is posed by
all viable elements in the Comintern — independently of the present
groupings, which to a great extent are artificial — the fewer the
shocks and convulsions when it is carried out.
The
USSR and the Comintern
1.
The theoretical untenability and practical danger of the theory of
socialism in one country is quite obvious, or at least is becoming
more and more obvious, to every revolutionist who has at all
assimilated the Marxist view of the fundamental problems of
historical development. Politically speaking, this theory is a
completely uncritical camouflaging of what exists in the USSR and of
everything that is coming into being, in all its contradictions and
in an elemental and chaotic way. In this sense the theory of
socialism in one country weakens and blunts" the vigilance and
alertness of the party in regard to capitalist tendencies and forces
in both domestic and world development. It nourishes a passive
fatalistic optimism, beneath which bureaucratic indifference to the
destinies of socialism and the international revolution is able to
hide more successfully than otherwise.
2.
No less fatal a role would be played by this theory, if it is
legitimized, in relation to the Comintern, If Soviet socialist
construction is viewed as an inseparable component of the world
revolution, as a process inconceivable apart from the world
revolution, then the relative importance of the Communist
parties, their role, their independent responsibility, would increase
and come more to the fore. If on the contrary the same old point of
view is upheld that Soviet power, resting on the alliance of workers
and peasants, will build socialism absolutely independently of what
occurs in all the rest of the world — on the one condition that the
Soviet Republic be protected from military intervention — then the
role and significance of the Communist parties is immediately moved
to the background.
The
assurance that socialism will be fully victorious in our country
regardless of the course of the revolution in other countries means
that the chief task of the European Communist parties in the
immediate historical period — a task that will be adequate for the
victory of socialism — is not to win power but to oppose the
interventionist attempts of imperialism. For it is quite obvious that
it would be enough to secure the victory of socialism in our country
to thereby assure its further spread to the whole world. The whole
perspective in this way is turned around.
The
problem of taking the fullest possible advantage of every genuinely
revolutionary situation is pushed into the background. A false and
consoling theory is constructed according to which time, in and of
itself, “works in our favor.” However, we cannot forget that we
are living in conditions where we have a chance to catch our breath
and by no means in conditions where the victory of socialism “in
one country” is automatically assured.
We
must take advantage of the breathing spell as fully as possible. We
must prolong it as long as possible. But to forget that what is
involved is precisely a breathing spell — i.e., a more or less
prolonged period between the 1917 revolution and the next revolution
in one of the major capitalist countries — means to trample
underfoot the worldwide laws of historical development; it means in
fact to renounce communism.
3.
The ultra-leftists charge that the united front policy means a
retreat by foreign parties from independent revolutionary positions
to the line of assisting
the Soviet state by building an imposing “left” wing within the
working class in each country. The theory of socialism in one country
meets the ultra-lefts’ criticism half-way, nourishes it, and within
certain limits justifies it. The left deviations, without ceasing to
be manifestations of “infantile disorders,” receive new
nourishment, for their leaders appear as defenders of the independent
revolutionary role of the Communist parties and of the responsibility
of those parties not only for the fate of their own country but also
for that of the Soviet Union, against the bureaucratic optimism
according to which the cause of socialism in the Soviet Union is
assured in and of itself, if only nobody ’’interferes” with it.
In this aspect, which will inevitably become a more and more
prominent one, the struggle of the left groupings becomes a
progressive factor and may accordingly transform the best elements
among them.
On
the Comintern Program
It
follows from the above that we now have a new and decisive
confirmation of the idea that a correct orientation, not only of the
policies of the USSR and of those of each Communist Party separately
but also of the Comintern as a whole, is only conceivable if it
begins with the world economy, which, in spite of its contradictions
and the barriers that divide it — in fact, to a significant extent,
because of them — is a single worldwide unit.
The
program of the Comintern cannot be designed on the model of an old
socialist program giving an abstract analysis of the economic,
social, and political development of individual capitalist countries.
What is needed is a concrete analysis of the complex of world
economic relations viewed as an internally coherent process, with an
indication of the interrelated perspectives for Europe, America,
Asia, etc. This is the only Marxist way to pose the question and
would in passing strike a deathblow at the anti-Marxist theory of
socialism in one country.
Problems
of the French Working Class Movement
1.
In France more than anywhere else the groupings in the party were
formed not so much on the basis of the French working class movement
as by way of reflection of the inner-party struggle in the AUCP.
French political questions stemming from the struggle to win over the
proletariat for the sake of taking power have been subordinated to
questions flowing from the difficulties of socialist construction in
the Soviet Republic.
2.
In 1923, during the struggle against so-called “Trotskyism,” the
struggle within the AUCP was openly placed at the center of the
formation of groupings in France. Now the Russian question has been,
as it were, removed from the agenda within the International.
Nevertheless, the groupings in the foreign parties, especially the
French, sure again following the line of the discussion within the
Russian party, but this time anonymously, mutedly, without an open
ideological struggle, thus fully revealing what it means to be
dependent solely on the apparatus.
3.
All this was inevitably bound to provoke a desire, by way of a
reaction, for greater independence from “Moscow” on the part of
the foreign Communist parties. This desire will be, and already has
been, expressed in the form of contradictory tendencies: (1) an
opportunist deviation, which everywhere leads to a weakening of
international ties; and (2) a proletarian revolutionary current,
which has arrived at the dear conclusion, on the basis of experience,
that it is a danger to have a bureaucratic regime in which the
leaders of the national parties are shuffled around from above like
so many officials in a hierarchy. There is no need to say that the
struggle against bureaucratic centralism cannot and should not make
any concessions to opportunist federalism. The increased independence
of the national parties in the Comintern, based on their establishing
more profound ties with the working class in each of their countries,
will inevitably mean the decline of the old groupings, which to a
significant extent were artificial and bureaucratic, and the
regroupment of their elements along new, more organic, vital, and
relevant lines.
4.
The objective political situation in France (the growth of
contradictions and the prospect of major upheavals) provides the
basic criterion for the regroupment within the party — based on the
tasks brought to the fore by the political developments in France —
in dose connection, of course, with the tasks of the Comintern as a
whole. Each of the old groupings and each member of each old grouping
that has not yet come to a realization of the necessity for, and
inevitability of, a radical regroupment of forces in the party will
inevitably be pushed aside by further developments.
5.
The most elementary criterion for a progressive grouping in the party
should be the desire for an honest recognition of what is, of the
real strength of the party, its actual numerical size, the real ties
of its members with the masses, the actual vitality of its factory
cells (the basic units for the reorganization of the party), the real
number of members of the unitary trade unions, their actual
participation in strikes, the real circulation of the Communist
press, etc. The fight against bureaucratism should begin with a
concrete clarification of what really is. Only through the ruthless
exposure of all fictions, all self-deception, can a serious, i.e., a
Bolshevik attitude toward problems of organization and an
understanding of the importance of organization as an instrument of
revolution be taught to the leading elements of the French party. A
chart of France showing the political parties and trade unions must
be drawn up, including all the data delineating the actual state of
the workers’ organizations and all branches of the working class
movement. On the basis of this chart we must come to a clear
realization of why we are strong in some regions and weak in others.
Such a businesslike and critical approach will be one of the most
important means for testing out our tactics, their revolutionary
relevance, and their capacity for capturing the masses. Basing itself
on such a chart, which must be regularly modified and supplemented
with accurately gathered, up-to-date information, the party should
set itself concrete tasks for winning leadership in the most
important proletarian centers and districts by concentrating its best
forces in those places and applying slogans and struggle methods to
the concrete situation.
6.
As important as it is for the party to attract the petty-bourgeois
elements of town and country who are being ruined by the big
bourgeoisie, it is quite obvious that if this task were undertaken by
the party to the detriment of the basic struggle to win over the
proletariat, that would, at a certain stage, create the threat of a
degeneration in the class character of the party itself. It is more
important for us to win over a hundred workers in the Département du
Nord [one of France’s chief industrial areas] than a thousand civil
servants or small shopkeepers in Paris or Marseilles. This should in
no way be understood as a desire to weaken our effort in the struggle
to influence the petty-bourgeois masses driven to desperation. But it
is necessary that this struggle be an auxiliary process in relation
to the basic work of strengthening and consolidating the proletarian
backbone of the party. At any rate, unless we have the proletariat,
which is capable of conquering power and transforming society, we
will sooner or later lose the impatient petty-bourgeois auxiliaries,
who will go rushing off toward fascism.
7.
The party’s conservatism in the area of the trade union movement is
of an absolutely ruinous kind. Bringing the trade unions closer to
the party at the price of separating the unions from the working
class can have no value whatsoever. The tendency toward making the
unions into slightly enlarged editions of the party must be
decisively rejected. The main criterion in evaluating the trade
unions is their ties with the mass movement, with strikes that are
actually under way, etc. Only on this basis can the strengthening of
the party within the trade unions be important and valuable.
8.
In Germany and England the reformist trade unions embrace millions of
workers. In France the reformist unions are as weak as ours. A
serious struggle for a united front in France therefore means first
of all extending the influence of the trade unions to the unorganized
masses: careful consideration of every strike, practical study of the
conditions of its rise and development, working to establish
connections with episodic organizations having the leadership of the
strike, etc., etc. The work of the trade unions should be based on a
painstaking inventory of all the expressions of economic struggle by
the working class, on a businesslike study of these, and on working
out methods for leading the day-to-day struggle of the masses.
9.
The inner-party slogan is the slogan “concentration of forces"
on the basis of the revolutionary tasks of the French proletariat. In
particular, a radical differentiation needs to be carried out within
the 1923 Opposition, based on the revolutionary way of posing the
tasks of the movement, genuinely casting aside opportunist elements
and building bridges to the revolutionary elements in the other
groupings.
10.
It is necessary to take a correct position in relation to the
Monatte-Rosmer grouping. The criminal expulsion of Monatte and Rosmer
from the party has led to a backward evolution on their part toward
syndicalism and has resulted in a new grouping of revolutionary
syndicalist elements around them. Pure-and-simple criticism of
syndicalism, all alone, without any change in the party’s trade
union work in practice, cannot accomplish anything. Regardless of the
extent to which the return of Monatte and Rosmer (or Rosmer only) to
the party in the near future is realizable or worthwhile, Monatte and
his group should be made to understand that they will inevitably be
on the same side of the barricades in the proletarian revolution as
the Communist Party and that they should make their politics
correspond to this fact. Only on the basis of such a general line can
the precious worker-revolutionists who support Monatte be won over.
11.
The rallying of the truly revolutionary elements must be supplemented
by a process of selection among them based on living experience. A
most important part in the formation of party cadres must be the
testing and checking of how party members conduct themselves in
strikes, in demonstrations, in conflicts with police, in clashes with
the fascists, etc. In the past it was often true that serious faults
in such matters were overlooked for the sake of apparatus
reliability. The greatest vigilance and irreconcilability in the
attitudes of party members on such questions must be developed.
12.
In the French party Marxism still remains to a considerable degree an
imported commodity. The party lives on echoes, often distorted ones,
of the theoretical and other struggles in the AUCP. The leading
elements of the French party must be helped to learn how to apply
Marxism to the clarification of the basic questions of economic and
political development in France in the present period. In particular,
collective work is needed on a book on “where France is headed.”
13.
It is necessary to win for the French party, as for every foreign
party, the possibility and the right to arrive at its own completely
free and independent judgment about the discussions in the AUCP. If
the foreign Communist parties do not find it easy to arrive at their
own correct opinion about the course and methods of the only
proletarian party in power, one should by no means conclude from
that, that the foreign Communist parties should not concern
themselves with the Russian discussion. This would only lead to a
situation in which, under a surface appearance of “neutrality,” a
muted apparatus selection of personnel, as we have said, would go on.
It
was absolutely correct to refuse to place the Russian question before
the enlarged ECCI plenum: a decision passed without serious
acquaintance with the question, without its having been predigested
in the parties, would have had a purely formal character, and would
have brought nothing to the AUCP or the International. All the more
important is it, then, to have a serious, rounded, well-documented
discussion of the present situation in the AUCP.