Leon Trotsky: Stalin Has Formed an Alliance with Schumann and Kerensky

Against Lenin and Trotsky

February 9, 1930

[Writing of Leon Trotsky, Vol. 2, 1930, New York 1975, p. 100-104]

In March 1929, the Dresden publisher Schumann came to Constantinople on his own initiative with a proposal to L. D. Trotsky to publish a number of his books. By way of an introduction for his publishing house, Schumann brought his old book about Karl Liebknecht, written in a spirit of honoring a great revolutionary. Before signing the agreement, Trotsky asked his friends in Berlin by telegraph if they had any information against Schumann. By an unfortunate chance, which is not worth talking about here, the reply telegram arrived very late (more than a week). The absence of a telegram was, by agreement, understood to mean the absence of objections. The agreement was signed.

After this, L. D. Trotsky received a report from Berlin that Schumann had some months previously published Kerensky's memoirs, containing blown-up detailed slanders about the Bolsheviks' links with the Hohenzollerns, about Lenin's trips to Berlin during the war for talks with Ludendorff, about how the Bolsheviks received money for corrupting the Russian army, and so forth.

Since Schumann had completely concealed this book from Trotsky during the talks and also concealed from him his brochure in which this book was advertised, with special raptures of the publisher about the ''unmasked" Bolsheviks, L.D. Trotsky, in view of the obvious deceit to which the publisher had had recourse during the talks, demanded the dissolution of the contract. Since the publisher did not agree, the matter was taken to court. Authoritative German jurists did not doubt that the court would dissolve the contract in view of the fact that the publisher had deliberately concealed a circumstance which could not help having for the author, from the whole character of his activity, decisive political and moral significance.

In view of the hopelessness of his position, Schumann began to postpone the hearing by continually bringing up new circumstances. Thus he declared in a document of December 18 to the Berlin court that Trotsky's rejection of the contract was the result of an ultimatum from Moscow, threatening him if he did not comply to stop payment of his fees from the State Publishing House [Gosizdat]. To prove this ridiculous assertion Schumann cited the head of the press department at the Berlin embassy and demanded that he be called as a witness.

L. D. Trotsky answered that he was not receiving any fees from Gosizdat, that Moscow had not and could not have sent him any ultimatum, and that Schumann's assertion to this effect was a pure invention, but that he, Trotsky, nevertheless did not object to the calling of the head of the Berlin press section, even though he had no knowledge of this person or his relation to the affair.

Even then it might have seemed strange that Schumann, who had just published an arch-slanderous book against Lenin, should have been able to cite as a witness against Trotsky an official of the Soviet embassy, who in his job could not but be a member of the Communist Party founded by Lenin. The affair seemed the stranger since the official named was in Berlin, and consequently Schumann or his lawyer could contact him by telephone at any moment. On the other hand, it remained unshakable that the assertion this witness was to be called to prove was 100 percent lies.

The riddle was, however, solved by a fresh document submitted to the Berlin court by the publisher Schumann on February 1.

The publisher states in this new document that he has concluded with the Soviet government in Moscow, in the person of the State Publishing House, an extensive agreement to publish a five-volume collection of Russian state documents. As always in such cases, this is certainly a publication heavily subsidized by the government. With understandable triumph, Schumann declares in his document that the Soviet government, which in his estimation is the "moral and political successor of Lenin" (Schumann's competence in this matter is obvious), does not, in contrast to Trotsky, encounter the least difficulty in collaborating with him, Schumann, publisher of Kerensky's book that characterizes Lenin as a hired agent of Ludendorff.

In Schumann's document of December 18 there was no mention as yet of the agreement with Moscow. There was only the bare mention about the head of the Berlin press section and of some testimony or other which might be obtained from him. It is clear that around that time Schumann was making some kind of link with an official of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, and it is just as clear that the agreement on the five-volume publication was concluded by Schumann after December 18, through the mediation of the Berlin embassy. Indubitable evidence of this is Schumann's first mention of Yakubovich, the secretary of the Russian embassy in Berlin. This point must be especially emphasized. Though on December 18 Schumann was only able barely to mention the press head, without even naming him, on February 1 he could already call as a witness such a responsible diplomatic official as the secretary of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, the communist Yakubovich.

What must the Soviet officials in essence testify to? They must testify in favor of the publisher of Kerensky's book. They must rehabilitate the political honor of Schumann. They must prove to the German court that Schumann is fully worthy of the trust of the people whom Schumann in his turn calls the "moral and political successors of Lenin."

There cannot, of course, be any talk of the state order having been awarded to Schumann by chance. In the past, Schumann never published anything for the Soviet government. If he could have hoped for such an order he would never have published Kerensky’s book, still less have decided to approach Trotsky. Only the break between Trotsky and Schumann created the new reason and possibility for Schumann to feel out the ground in the Soviet embassy. On the other hand, only the fact of the lawsuit between Trotsky and Schumann could have interested Moscow in this publication; but Stalin's interest took the form, not of discrediting Schumann, the distributor of a rotten book against Lenin and the Bolsheviks in general, but, on the contrary, in supporting Schumann against Trotsky. This is completely in Stalin's line, corresponding to his physiognomy and his methods, "rude and disloyal," as Lenin characterized them.

It may be asked what political goal apart from personal revenge Stalin is pursuing in this. The goal is completely clear, for it follows from all the circumstances. Schumann has the right to nine books from Trotsky. If he wins the lawsuit, the books will be at Schumann's disposal, and Schumann himself — at the disposal of Stalin.

It is fairly well known what efforts Stalin made not to let Trotsky into Germany. What did he wish to gain by this? He could not but understand that if Trotsky had got the right of political asylum in Germany he could not have taken part in active political work (going to meetings, taking part in organizations, etc.). The only possibility left to Trotsky would be open literary activity. Stalin tried to block or at least encumber this only path by all possible diplomatic means. He considered quite correctly that literary activity by Trotsky from Constantinople would be very much more difficult Nevertheless, Trotsky's works began to appear in various countries. We have very reliable evidence about the fury produced in Stalin's immediate circle by the appearance of Trotsky's autobiography [My Life] in Germany. At a series of meetings they discussed the most varied means to effect Trotsky's further isolation, and above all to hinder his literary activity. The autobiography appeared in Germany in the middle of November. In December there came the first responses in the press, then questions from Moscow to Berlin, replies from Berlin to Moscow. This period coincides with Schumann's first reconnaissance of the embassy, preparing for his obscure reference to the head of the press section. That the acquaintanceship grew, and not platonically, is proved, as we already know, by Schumann's receipt of an order - for his firm, which, like all state orders of this kind, is of course accompanied by a suitable subsidy. By covering Schumann before the court with the authority of the Soviet state, Stalin hopes to make it easier for him to win the suit, after which the person entitled to dispose of Trotsky's books in Germany will be Stalin — through the mediation of Schumann.

What this means is not hard to understand if we bear in mind that in the Soviet republic all of Trotsky's books without exception are banned from circulation, removed from bookshops and libraries, and almost all destroyed.

How Schumann himself understands a publisher's obligations was shown sufficiently clearly in his letter to L. D. Trotsky on the subject of Kerensky's book. He unceremoniously boasts that as a result of steps taken by him, Kerensky's book has not had and will not have the distribution it might perhaps have been able to expect. Dr. Frankfurter, the legal representative of Trotsky's interests, stigmatized with all possible force Schumann's cynical arbitrariness in respect to an author published by him (even though this author was Kerensky). Schumann can, of course, have no other moral rules in relation to Trotsky, especially in view of the new and completely specific orientation of Schumann toward Moscow.

The nature of the agreement between Schumann and Trotsky makes all this intrigue very much easier. According to the agreement, Schumann is obliged to commence publication of the succeeding volume only after selling 3,500 of the preceding volume. In complete contradiction to all this, said by Schumann at the time of the conclusion of the contract, he now insists that there is not and cannot be any hope of a wide sale for Trotsky's books in Germany. He says that these books could scarcely sell more than 3,000 copies. His interest in the books is purely "idealistic" (!!)• The same thought was developed by his lawyer in court. In other words, Schumann is preparing conditions for "idealistic" sabotage of Trotsky's books. It needs no proof that a publisher can always or almost always hinder the distribution of a book published by him. In this case, Schumann in no way risks suffering loss from such operations. On the contrary, the five-volume edition of documents may, with appropriate maneuvering by Schumann, easily turn into an eight-volume or ten-volume one. Such is the state of affairs now. There is no doubt: Stalin has entered into a bloc with Schumann — against Trotsky and against the historic memory of Lenin.

In the same document of February 1 in which Schumann informs the court of Stalin's so timely order, he introduces into the testimony the fact that Kerensky is fully prepared to appear before the court to prove the correctness of his assertions that Lenin was a hired agent of Ludendorff. Kerensky's "proof" is analyzed in chapter 25 of Trotsky's autobiography; it simply blows up after thirteen years what the old czarist counterespionage circulated through the petty rogue and drunkard, the corporal Yermolenko. There is no need to come back to this stupid tale here. In any case, in the lawsuit now going on, Schumann comes out against Lenin and Trotsky, with Kerensky on his right flank, on the left — Stalin, and, in reserve, the corporal Yermolenko of the czarist intelligence. Such is the political course of the trial.