Leon Trotsky: Success or Failure?

More on the Paris Conference

(September 10, 1933)

[Writings of Leon Trotsky, Vol 6, 1933-1934, New York ²1975, p. 79-83]

When a movement enters a new, higher stage, there are always elements who defend the past A wider perspective frightens them. They see nothing but difficulties and dangers.

Comrades who participated in one of the meetings of Bolshevik-Leninists communicated to me somewhat the following criticism by one of the participants: "We made no gains at the Paris conference; the whole matter came down to negotiations and agreements by the leaders; such a policy cannot have any revolutionary significance; the joint declaration signed by the leaders of four organizations signifies in reality a deviation towards the Social Democracy. …" Since this criticism reflects — it is true, in a very exaggerated form — the doubts and apprehensions of a certain number of comrades (according to all information, a small minority), it is necessary to examine seriously the above-enumerated arguments.

"The negotiations were carried on by the leaders." What does this argument mean? Conferences and conventions always consist of "leaders,” that is, of representatives. It is an impossible task to assemble in one place all the members of the Left Opposition, the SAP, RSP, and OSP. How can agreements between organizations be made without negotiations of the representatives, that is, "leader”? On this point the criticism obviously makes no sense.

Or does the author of the criticism mean that the representatives of the organizations that signed the joint declaration do not express the opinion of the rank and file? Let us examine this argument as well. With regard to the SAP, it is known to all that the rank and file of the party have been striving for a long time not only for a closer approach to us but also for a complete fusion with us, while, until very recently, the leaders evaded the issue and put brakes upon it, fearing a separation from possible allies of the right In this case, why did the leaders find themselves compelled to sign jointly with us a most important document? The answer is dear: the pressure of the rank and file toward the left, that is, toward us, became so strong that the leaders of the SAP were forced to turn to us. Those who know how to interpret political facts and symptoms correctly will say that this is a great victory. This conclusion retains its full force independently of how adroitly or skillfully the negotiations between the leaders were carried on. What decided the matter was not the negotiations but the whole preceding work of the Left Opposition.

With regard to the OSP, the situation is approximately the same. This organization was not connected with us at all. Two years ago it found itself in a bloc with Seydewitz and Rosenfeld. Now it has drawn nearer to us. It is clear that the leaders of this organization would have never made this step if there had not been a strong pull to the left on the part of the rank and file.

With the RSP (Sneevliet), the matter stands somewhat differently. Friendly relations existed here already for quite some time. Many comrades know what active support Sneevliet and his friends have rendered the Left Opposition during the Copenhagen conference and, especially, during the Amsterdam antiwar congress. The question of the Comintern prevented this political proximity from taking an organizational form.^* When we declared ourselves for a new International, the wall dividing us was broken down. Is it not clear that in this case our new orientation immediately brought a concrete and valuable result?

About three months ago, we wrote hypothetically that with a broad and decisive policy we could probably find a number of allies among left socialist groupings. A month or a month and a half ago, we voiced the conjecture that a break with the Comintern would greatly facilitate the influx to our side of revolutionary groupings of Social Democratic origin. Is it not clear that the Paris conference confirmed both these conjectures, and on a scale that we ourselves could not have expected two or three months ago? Under these conditions, to complain that everything came down to negotiations by the leaders and to assert that the new alliance has no revolutionary significance is to reveal a complete ignorance of the basic processes that are now taking place inside the proletariat.

But particularly strange (mildly speaking) sounds the argument that we are making a turn towards … reconciliation with the Social Democracy. The Stalinists slander us in this manner and not for the first time. What basis is there for carrying these "arguments" into our own organization? Let us, however, examine them somewhat more closely. The Paris conference was not called by us. We do not take the slightest responsibility for its composition and agenda. We came to this conference to present there our point of view. Possibly our declaration contained some concessions to the Social Democracy? Let someone get up courage to say it! The declaration signed by the four organizations, it is understood, does not contain our program. But it defines clearly the road of the Fourth International on the basis of an irreconcilable struggle with the Social Democracy, a complete break with bureaucratic centrism and a resolute condemnation of all attempts along the lines of the Two-and-a-Half International. Where in this are concessions to the Social Democracy?

The Declaration of Four does not give and, under the circumstances, could not give an answer to all the problems of program and strategy. It is clear that it is impossible to build a new International on the basis of this declaration. But we did not intend anything of the sort The declaration itself states clearly that the organizations that signed the declaration obligate themselves to elaborate, within a short time, a programmatic manifesto, which should become the fundamental document of the new International. All our sections, all the three allied organizations, as well as all sympathizing groups and elements, should be drawn to this work. Do we intend to make any concessions to the Social Democracy in this manifesto? The declaration of the Bolshevik-Leninists, made public at the conference, states clearly on what basis we propose to write the manifesto: the decisions of the first four congresses of the Comintern, the "twenty-one conditions," the "eleven points" of the Left Opposition. Only the future will show whether any serious disagreements will arise on this basis between ourselves and our allies. If disagreements should arise, we will seriously fight for our point of view. Until now we have not shown any excessive pliancy in questions of principle.

The same critics also add the following argument: the new International can be built only on the wave of the ascent of the revolutionary movement; now, however, in the atmosphere of decline, all attempts in this direction are doomed in advance to failure. This profound historic argument is borrowed as a whole from the sterile scholastic, Souvarine (who, alas, as far as I know, has meanwhile had time to make a turn of 180 degrees). The necessity of a break with the Second International and the preparation for the Third International was proclaimed by the Bolsheviks in the autumn of 1914, that is, in the atmosphere of a frightful disintegration of Socialist Parties. At that time also there was no lack of wise men who spoke of the "utopianism" (the word "bureaucratism" was not in such abuse then) of the slogan of the Third International. Kautsky went further in his famous aphorism: "The International is an instrument of peace and not of war." In reality the same idea is expressed by the critics quoted above: "The International is an instrument of ascent and not of decline." The proletariat has need of an International at all times and under all conditions. If there is no Comintern today, we must say so openly and immediately start the preparation for a new International. How soon we will be able to put it on its feet depends, of course, on the whole march of the class struggle, on the decline or ascent of the workers' movement, etc. But even in the period of the worst decline, it is necessary to prepare for a future ascent, giving our own cadres a correct orientation. Fatalistic complaints about the objective decline most often reflect a subjective decline

Let us take the conferences of Zimmerwald and Kienthal as a comparison. They consisted, necessarily, of the "leaders” (every conference consists of leaders). By the number of workers directly represented, they were weaker than the Paris conference. The majority in Zimmerwald and Kienthal consisted of right-centrist elements (Ledebour who could not resolve to vote against the war budget, Hoffmann, Bourderon, Merrheim, Grimm, Axelrod, Martov and others). Lenin found it possible to sign the manifesto of the whole conference despite the vagueness of this document.^**

As far as the Zimmerwald "left" was concerned, it was extremely weak. After the rout of the Bolshevik Duma fraction and of the local organizations, the Bolshevik Party was no stronger during the war than the present Russian Left Opposition. Other left groups were incomparably weaker than our three present allies. The general position of the workers' movement under the conditions of war seemed absolutely hopeless. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks, as well as the group of Nashe Slovo, took a course towards the Third International from the very beginning of the war. Without this course the October Revolution would have been impossible.

We repeat, Lenin found it possible under the then-existing conditions to sign, together with Ledebour, Bourderon, Grimm and Martov, a manifesto against the war. The Bolshevik-Leninists have not signed the resolution of the majority of the Paris conference and will, of course, take no responsibility for this majority. Perhaps the policy of Lenin at Zimmerwald and Kienthal was … a turn towards the Social Democracy? But the objection may be raised that now under the conditions of peace a stricter selection is necessary than in wartime. Correct! Ledebour and Bourderon endangered themselves by signing the manifesto of Zimmerwald, while Tranmæl and Co. carry on their maneuvers (giving the right hand to the Scandinavian Social Democracy and the pinky of the left to the Paris conference) without running any risk. It is precisely for this reason that we refused to sign the meaningless resolution of the Paris majority. Where in this are the concessions to the Social Democracy?

However, two of our allies — our opponents will say to us — have signed the resolution of the majority, showing, thereby, that they have not as yet made the final choice. Absolutely correct! But we do not take any responsibility for our allies, just as they take no responsibility for us. The terms of our agreement are clearly formulated and are now accessible to all. The future will show which side our allies will finally choose. We want to help them make the right choice. One of the most important rules of revolutionary strategy reads: watch your ally as well as your enemy. Mutual criticism on the basis of full equality — in this there is no trace of backstage diplomacy of the leaders; everything is done and will be done in full view of the masses, under their control, for the purpose of education of the masses. Other ways and means of revolutionary policy do not exist at all.

There are also other rules of revolutionary policy that it is advisable to recall: do not get frightened needlessly and do not frighten others without cause; do not make false accusations; do not look for capitulation where there is none; do not replace Marxist discussion with unprincipled squabbles. Long experience has shown that, precisely at the time when an organization is getting ready to get out of the narrow alley onto a wider arena, elements can always be found who have grown accustomed to their alley, know all their neighbors, are used to carrying all the alley news and rumors and are busy with the terribly important affairs of the "change of ministries" in their own alley. These conservative and sectarian elements are very much afraid that on a wider arena their art will find no application. They grab, therefore, the wagon by its wheels and try to turn it back, and they justify their, in essence, reactionary work by terribly "revolutionary" and "principled" arguments. We have tried above to weigh these arguments on the scale of Marxist dialectics. Let the comrades themselves decide what is their weight.