Leon Trotsky: Letter to All Members of the Greek Section

(April 5, 1934)

[Writings of Leon Trotsky, Vol 6, 1933-1934, New York ²1975, p. 279-284, title: “The Crisis of the Greek Section”]

To All Members of the Greek Section of the International Communist League (Bolshevik-Leninists)

Dear Comrades:

The conflict that brought the Greek section in opposition to all other sections of the International Communist League has led with iron logic to a sharp internal struggle in the Greek section itself. Because of the enormous importance of this question, I consider it my duty to present my point of view to you in full frankness.

From the very first, I was struck by the fact that for the past severed months your Central Committee had not replied to the letters of the International Secretariat, that it seemed to ignore all its requests for information and its proposals, in other words, that it behaved as if it had already broken de jure with the International League. Needless to say, I was overjoyed to receive the March 10 letter of the majority of your Central Committee because I hoped it would indicate the desire of Comrades Witte, Manos and others to reconstitute the international ties broken by them. To my great regret, the contents of this letter are disappointing to the highest degree. The letter is written with unheard-of animosity and extreme venom. The tone of the letter — thoroughly poisonous — would be understandable only if the majority of your Central Committee has decided to break with the International League of Bolshevik-Leninists. But I refuse to believe it The attempt of the majority of your Central Committee to make you believe that its blows are directed solely against the International Secretariat does not hold water. The International Secretariat is composed of the most important European sections. If the Greek section is not represented — which I personally regret very much — it is solely due to financial difficulties that do not permit your section to keep a representative abroad. We have the kind of International Secretariat that corresponds to our strength. The most important of our sections have in recent periods scored great successes in a series of countries. Great perspectives open up before us. It is clear, of course, that the International Secretariat does not claim infallibility; but there can be friendly criticism, the aim of which is the amelioration of the common work, and there can be hostile criticism, which injures all our sections and tends to destroy the organization.

Where does this animosity come from? Originally, as we know, the conflict started within the International Secretariat and the French section. The march of events was not tardy in throwing light upon the conflict Only after the French League purged itself of the decomposed elements did it become possible for it to broaden its mass work. Its successes in this field are very important; its influence on large sections of advanced workers grows constantly. And, on the contrary, the groups that broke off under the influence of Witte have already come to a split and continue to disintegrate. They do not carry on any political activity. Such are the facts. Against the facts abstract judgment is powerless.

And what about the International Secretariat? During a long period of time, all sections without exception complained of the passivity of the Secretariat, which, despite the presence of a permanent secretary, could not even cope with current correspondence. During the last months, despite the grave financial difficulties and the absence of a permanent secretary, the work is being done systematically. The International Secretariat not only carries on a regular correspondence with all sections but also has edited a series of issues of the Bulletin, worked out a draft of theses on the question of war, edited a manifesto, organized a conference of international youth, etc. Such are the facts. If these facts are considered honestly, without factional prejudice, without personal bitterness, one cannot but recognize that the International Secretariat has made a considerable step forward during the last six months.

The fact that Comrade Witte took a wrong position inside the International Secretariat and the French League does not, it is dear, constitute a crime in itself. Who does not make mistakes in political work? But after a wrong position was refuted by definite and indisputable facts, to insist on it any longer and to try to carry it over to other sections means to put one's personal ambitions above the interests of revolution and socialism. This is altogether inadmissible. In such cases, the rank-and-file militants must correct their leaders.

The second phase of the struggle has developed already inside the Greek section. In this it is much harder for me to give my opinion since I do not read Greek. But the majority of your Central Committee writes that in Greece it goes to the defense of the same "principles" that Comrade Witte practiced in the International Secretariat and in the French League. If this is so, there can be no doubt for me that these are the same principles that have suffered shipwreck. Of course, I do not speak of the time when Comrade Witte was in accord with our international leadership on all fundamental questions and did not pretend to any personal policy apart from it I speak of the recent period when Comrade Witte, starting with small and secondary questions, has set himself sharply in opposition to our general leadership and to all our most important sections. Here it is a question no longer of single mistakes but of the incorrect principled line of Comrade Witte. After the experience with the French League, for any Marxist acquainted with the facts there cannot be the slightest doubt of it

Trying to find an explanation for its hostile policy with regard to the International League, the majority of your Central Committee refers to the split of 1903 between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The odd group that detached itself from the French League under the leadership of Comrade Witte refers in its declaration (see International, No. 12 of November 11, 1933) to the year 1903. Thus, we have here a system of a sort that cannot be called anything other than a system of preventive splits, since those who refer to the year 1903 recognize by this very fact that the only way out is by a split. Are the members of the Greek section in accord with this conclusion?

The majority of your Central Committee says that the struggle concerns organizational principles. What are these principles? In France, in fact, Comrade Witte defended the right of every member not to submit to the discipline of his organization, the right of a member of the IS to carry on a policy behind the back of the Secretariat directed against the Secretariat itself, the right of the minority of the organization not to submit to the decision of the overwhelming majority of the conference — in a word, the worst principles of individualism and anarchism. In Greece, so far as I can judge, the majority of the Central Committee now defends and applies principles directly contrary in denying to the minority the rights and the possibilities of defending openly its position before all the members of the organization. Thus individualist anarchism transforms itself into the opposite, that is, into bureaucratic centralism. But the two extremes, which, in general, easily pass into each other, have nothing in common with Bolshevism, which builds an organization on the basis of the principles of democratic centralism not only on a national but on an international scale as well.

In the interpretation of the experience of the year 1903, the majority of your Central Committee errs completely. Organizational principles do not suffice in and of themselves. Through organizational forms policy makes its way; through policy a program reveals itself; in the program our theory finds its expression. However, it happens often that political and programmatic differences not yet developed, as yet unformed, manifest themselves in the beginning solely in the organizational field. Thus it was in 1903. But it is precisely for this reason that the Bolsheviks did not consider the split admissible. On the contrary, they demanded the maintenance of unity, of discipline, and a new congress honestly convoked. It was only after profound differences in policy and program manifested themselves that there began the real formation of two factions that led to a definite split in 1912, that is, nine years after the congress of 1903.

What is the conclusion from this? It is clear that by themselves organizational conflicts do not suffice to determine the depth of the differences; even less for a split Until deep political and programmatic differences clearly manifest themselves, it is the duty of every revolutionist to safeguard the unity of the organization on the basis of democratic centralism. It is precisely this that the International Secretariat urges.

The reference to the year 1903 — I must say again — is entirely to the disadvantage of the majority of your Central Committee. The Mensheviks started in 1903 with the defense of super-democratic principles sometimes approaching anarchism. I personally wrote in that epoch a series of erroneous articles against centralism, although I never went so far, for example, as Comrade Witte with regard to the French League But when the same Mensheviks took possession the following year, with the aid of Plekhanov, of the majority of the central institutions of the party, they immediately changed their course; they began by imposing orders on the party from above and opposed by every means the convocation of the congress of the party. After a few months of struggle, the Bolsheviks found themselves forced, outside of the Central Committee and against the Central Committee, to build their own center for the convocation of the congress. I firmly hope that the majority of your Central Committee will not take the road of the Mensheviks and will assure a single congress.

Thus, we see that in interpreting in a just and serious manner the lessons of the year 1903, we must arrive at the following conclusions:

a. At the present stage of the differences, that is, insofar as they have not transcended the field of organizational conflicts, one can as yet draw conclusions neither on the depth of the differences nor on their final outcome.

b. It is therefore necessary, on one hand, to guarantee the unity of the organization, on the other, to take all measures for a serious and honest examination of the differences not only in the sphere of organization but also in that of policy and program.

c. These two aims cannot be achieved otherwise than by the method of democratic centralism, that is, by means of the widest discussion, in a congress convened honestly and by the submission of the minority to the majority.

d. A discussion in a loyal party presupposes that the two groups under the same conditions submit to the knowledge of the whole party in writing and orally their points of view on the questions in dispute; every nucleus must have the possibility of hearing the representatives of the majority of the Central Committee as well as those of the minority of the Central Committee. This possibility must be assured by the Central Committee It was thus and in this invariable manner that matters were arranged in the Bolshevik Party before its bureaucratic degeneration.

e. The congress of the party must be the mirror of the party. This means that from the time that a discussion bearing on platforms has surged up in the organization a congress must be convoked on the basis of proportional representation. This is the ABC of workers' democracy that all honest revolutionists must keep in mind.

f. Our organization is not only nominally but also in essence an international organization. That means: it places not only national discipline above local discipline but also international discipline above national discipline From this follows particularly the necessity of submitting in time the theses of both groups that combat each other to all our sections to give them the opportunity to express their opinions before the congress.

So far as I can judge from letters, our International Secretariat is of the same opinion.

I do not doubt at all that an overwhelming majority of your section will keep its connection with the International League. The break of this link would signify a reversion to national cadres, the loss of an international horizon, the renunciation of an international division of labor in the field of revolutionary theory and of revolutionary practice. You will not allow your section to be brought to such a catastrophe, which would open up the road to your ruin. You will call upon your Central Committee to reconstitute the normal fraternal relations with the International Secretariat and to prepare with its aid the convocation of a democratically organized congress. It is only thus that you can get out of the crisis. In this work you can count without any hesitation on the warm support of all our sections. On this road I wish you all success with all my heart Long live the Bolshevik-Leninists of Greece!

Long live our International League!

Long live the Fourth International!

Yours,

G. Gourov [Leon Trotsky]