Leon
Trotsky: Summary of the Discussion
August
6, 1934
[Writings
of Leon Trotsky, Vol 7, 1934-1935, New York 1971, p. 58-64]
Our
group has appointed me to formulate certain general conclusions that
we have arrived at on the basis of the information in the internal
bulletin of the League and other documents.
1.
Are the divergences ones of principle or of a purely practical
nature? In this general form, the question is put incorrectly. The
divergences have arisen over a very important question of tactics,
but they have different roots in different comrades, springing from
different ideological premises. Thus, for example, we maintain that
the differences with Comrade Georges (to the extent that there are
differences) are of a purely practical character and should be
verified in the process of applying the common policy. The
differences with Comrade P. N. are differences of principle.
2.
Comrade Georges has undoubtedly presented the best paper on the
question. Nine-tenths of his letter consists of facts throwing light
on the real situation and not of general formulas that might be
applied equally well to Paris or Honolulu. Nevertheless, we feel that
in Comrade Georges's letter there is a grave error in evaluating the
dynamics and rhythm of the development. On the basis of a very
interesting analysis of the National Council of the SFIO, G. shows
that the majority of the Socialist Party is still reformist, that a
significant leftward trend may be found only in Paris and in the
Young Socialists and, therefore, that it would be "premature"
to enter the SFIO. In answer to these claims, we wish to say briefly:
a.
Paris
and the Young Socialists are today going through the stage that the
provinces will pass through tomorrow. There is no need for us to
guide ourselves by the situation in the provinces.
b.
Paris
and the Young Socialists are decisive
fields
for the League.
c.
The
party machine in the provinces (as in Paris) is the old one, i.e.,
reformist. Still, the machine found itself forced to break with
Renaudel and accept the united front with Moscow. It is precisely the
opportunist character of the SFIO apparatus that best indicates the
power of the pressure from below, that is, the dynamics of the
development. Comrade Georges is right when he says that entering the
party six days too soon would mean mishandling the situation. We must
merely add that entering six days too late would mean ruining it
entirely.
3.
How shall we determine the right moment for entry and the most
reasonable form? By political reconnoitering and by actively
establishing tie-ups with the Socialists, discussing political
questions with them, etc.
A
year has passed since we took the turn for a new
party. One
of the principal tasks assigned to the League was work on the inside
of the SFIO. What has been accomplished during the year in Paris?
Nothing. The comrades in charge of this work have not set up any
relationships, have made no preparations. On the contrary, they
have opposed the creation of a faction in the SFIO.
This fact is of major importance for an understanding of the present
difficulties, including even difficulties of discussion. These same
comrades who, during the past year, have opposed working inside the
SFIO are now opposed to our entering that body. In both cases they
repeat the same general talk about "independence" For them
the fundamental thing seems to be to remain independent of the
working class, the masses, the changes in the state of affairs, of
the whole reality. These comrades substitute a monologue for actual
political work among the masses. Their politics follows the line of
least resistance; it is politics of self-complacency disguised by
formulas of imaginary intransigence
We
must demand that these comrades give an accounting of the work they
were entrusted with doing in the SFIO and the results of this work.
The League and these comrades themselves need such a report, and not
general slogans! The report will show that these comrades are afraid
of the masses, are afraid of the difficulties connected with working
among the masses, that they want to preserve their "purity” by
a kind of self-isolation. That is why they remain unchanged through
all the changes in the political situation. The psychology of passive
waiting that existed before the proposal of entry into the SFIO was a
powerful brake on the development of the League, especially during
the past year. This psychology is now in glaring contradiction to the
whole situation in this country and in the working class.
4.
The only differences that are serious, important and fruitful are
those that arise from the pressure of major events and changes in the
state of mind of the masses. The same traits of abstract
propagandism, which were to a certain
extent
inevitable in the initial period of the League's development (before
the German catastrophe) and which have more and more checked the work
during these last years, have now definitely taken on a reactionary
character and in the present turmoil of events threaten to lead the
League to total ruin. It is particularly now that we must put up a
pitiless fight against abstract, passive propagandism, against a
policy of waiting. Along this line, the differences are certainly
differences of principle, although the exponents of the conservative
tendency have not yet drawn the necessary ideological conclusions
from their position.
5.
Comrades P. N., Bauer and certain others who think as they do assume
the cloak of "ideological intransigence." However in
actuality, in the present policy, things are quite different. Let us
consider the stand taken by La
Vérité
after February 6. During this entire time, La
Vérité
adapted itself politically to the SFIO. In his letter P. N. says:
"Several documents sent to the Central Committee indicate that
for the past six months we have been following a semi-socialist line.
… But here is the conclusion: since you have 'adapted' yourselves
so well to the SFIO, why not enter that group?”
Remarkable
logic!
This
declaration is the crux of P. N.'s letter. It throws a brilliant
light on the real progress of the preparation of the divergences and,
at the same time, reveals the non-dialectical, abstract, journalistic
thinking of Comrade P. N. Yes, in a whole series of letters and
conversations we did accuse Comrade P. N. and others of obscuring
(toning down, blurring) the differences with the SFIO, of not openly
stating the fundamental questions of the revolutionary struggle, of
risking the transformation of the League into a left wing of the
SFIO. We stand by this criticism without modification, even today.
Members who insist upon formal
independence are always inclined to capitulate before the reality
when it treads upon their toes. The adaptation of the League to the
SFIO has found symbolic expression in very recent happenings: in
reply to the proposal that we enter the SFIO, the Political Bureau
decided to make do by obtaining the floor for a representative of the
League at the National Council of the SFIO!! Here again they
displayed their penchant for purely diplomatic negotiations ‘with
the heads of the SFIO, without any serious attempt to penetrate the
mass base of the organization. (We are not speaking of the Young
Socialists; among them real work has been done.) We must carefully
consider what the intransigence of Comrade P. N. and the others has
consisted of during the past six months:
a.
external
weakening of criticism of the SFIO,
b.
diplomatic
maneuvers with the SFIO bureaucrats,
c.
refusal to create a faction inside the SFIO (because they did not
want to spoil their relations with the bureaucrats?).
There
you have the real picture of the relations of the "intransigents"
with the SFIO during the past six months, so crowded with events. No
general slogan, no gesture can change the political meaning of this
picture, which demonstrates the emptiness of an intransigence that is
factional or, worse still, literary. Until Comrade P. N. and the
others arrive at an understanding of their own history during the
last six months, they will not move one step forward in their
development.
6.
When we analyzed the rotten policy of the Anglo-Russian Committee,
the Stalinists said: "You are opposed to working in the unions!"
We replied: "We are opposed to adventurous maneuvering with the
leaderships, but in favor of working with the membership."
There, it is true, we were concerned with unions. But we can give a
similar illustration with regard to parties. We denounced Walcher for
his political complicity in the Tranmæl case. At the same time, we
said: "If any revolutionary group can enter the NAP for
revolutionary work among the masses, it is the duty of that group to
do so, and they will have our support."
We
have criticized passive adaptation to the official policy of the SFIO
and, at the same time, we have upheld active participation in the
internal life of that body, the building of an interned faction. In
principle that does not differ at all from entry into the SFIO.
Comrade P. N. sees a contradiction here. Isn't that absurd? Under the
influence of that false position he has taken, the perspectives and
retrospect are distorted for him, just as they always are in such
cases.
7.
It would, of course, be incorrect to attribute the "soft"
diplomatic line of La
Vérité
during the last six months of the year to an error on the part of a
few comrades. The truth of the matter is that the League has suddenly
come under the great pressure of events. The same causes that forced
the SFIO bureaucracy and the Stalinists to accept the slogan of the
united front have suggested to the leadership of the League,
consciously or unconsciously, the fear that they would find
themselves left quite outside of things, and since there was the
chance of getting the floor and selling their publications through
the SFIO, there arose the hope of managing the latter, of adapting
themselves to that body. The League's place in the working-class
movement was more clearly and seriously decided by this policy of La
Vérité
than by all the talk of imaginary intransigence. The unfortunate
thing is that the leadership yielded unconsciously to the events and
only gropingly adapted itself to the new situation. This experience
has clearly and forcefully shown up the fiction of organizational
independence and verbal intransigence in the face of great historic
developments, when the masses begin stirring.
8.
When we criticized Comrade P. N. and others for their adaptation to
the SFIO, we did not at all consider that we were confronted with
irreconcilable contradictions threatening a split. We do not think so
now, either. But the situation becomes tremendously more dangerous
inasmuch as Comrade P. N., growing convinced of the total failure of
passive
adaptation from without,
wishes at all costs to prevent
revolutionary work from within.
The progress of events now permits no delay to any of us, and
particularly not to Comrade P. N. We must boldly and resolutely judge
what our previous course was and start moving on the new road.
9.
It is true that now Comrade P. N. and others generously offer to
create a faction inside the SFIO while preserving their own
"independence." That means letting everything go on as
before. It means continuing to swim on the sand instead of venturing
into the water. There is only one way to save the "intransigents"
for the revolutionary movement: force them to get into the water up
to their necks.
10.
Is there not a danger that the comrades adapting themselves from the
outside to the SFIO policy will completely lose their political
identity if they enter the SFIO? The question cannot be put in that
general form. A certain differentiation will inevitably be produced;
a certain number of the comrades may abandon our ideas. The
experience of all countries shows that the ones who are most prone to
lose their identity in the opportunistic milieu are yesterday's
ultimatists. But it would be absolutely incorrect to extend this fear
to the League in its entirety or even to all our present opponents in
the League.
To
our mind, the very possibility of bringing up the question of entry
into the SFIO springs from the fact that in the body of the League we
have serious cadres. If we delay too long in applying the yeast to
the dough, it will go sour on us and be wasted. That is the danger
threatening the League.
Look
at the Bordigists with their famous Bilan
(Balance), which should really be named "Balance: Zero."
11.
Certain comrades are inclined to shift the center of gravity to the
question of the "declaration." Some of them have in mind a
declaration that would make entry into the SFIO impossible. Others
are inclined to see in the declaration a talisman that will protect
them from all dangers. In reality, the role of the declaration is
very modest. It must show:
a.
that
we are not giving up our ideas,
b.
that
we are ready to learn from joint activity,
c.
that we will fight for our ideas on the basis of democracy of the
party,
d.
that
we will maintain discipline.
The
declaration must be drawn up so as to win the confidence of Socialist
workers and make it very difficult for the reactionary SFIO
bureaucracy to decide on non-admission of the League.
12.
Aside from retaining our ideology, the only way we can keep the
Bolshevik-Leninists from dissolution once they are inside the SFIO is
by means of great cohesion, creation of a factional body, adaptation
to new working conditions and international control. We must direct
all our efforts to that end.
13.
International control must be understood in its broad sense, without
limiting it to the International Secretariat. The exchange of
publications and information, international discussion, should be not
weakened but developed and reinforced. It is true that Comrade P. N.
presents the matter as if the international organization had
prevented (!) the League from working, particularly during the
elaboration of the program of action. Comrade P. N. does not and
cannot bring forth the slightest proof of his assertion. We propose
to Comrade P. N. that he publish (only in the International
Bulletin,
if need be) all the correspondence devoted to the elaboration of the
program of action as well as the general policy of the League during
the last six months. A piece of work of this kind done in good faith
would show the enormous importance of our international organization
as such, and would, incidentally, refute the definitely incorrect and
prejudiced assertions of Comrade P. N.
14.
The lack of a real ideological position on the part of Comrades Bauer
and P. N. appears most plainly on the question of the ILP. Bauer was
in favor of the entry of the British section into the ILP from its
beginning. P. N. was against this, but after his trip to England,
having become aware of the actual situation at first hand, he
recognized the incorrectness of his original position. To set up an
ideological difference between the ILP and the SFIO, especially the
latter's Parisian organization and the Young Socialists, is simply
ridiculous. Neither P. N. nor Bauer has made any attempt to explain
the difference in their ideological stand with regard to England and
France.
However,
the experience of the British section, on a small scale, is highly
instructive. The "majority" maintaining its "organizational
autonomy" actually finds itself in a state of constant internal
strife and division. Certain leaders have left the organization
altogether. On the other hand, the "minority" that entered
the ILP has maintained its internal solidarity and its connection
with the international Bolshevik-Leninists, has made large use of the
publications of the League in America and has had a series of
successes inside the ILP. We must learn from the example.
15.
Certain comrades threaten a split in case the new line is adopted.
That shows their lack of seriousness with regard to the things that
unite us, the ideas and tactics we have in common, elaborated in the
course of eleven years of a great collective work on an international
scale. We must, of course, do everything possible to avoid a split,
even the withdrawal of a single group. Every comrade is valuable to
us, for he can and should become an officer in the proletarian army.
But it would be ridiculous and unworthy of us to be afraid of threats
of withdrawal. We have seen withdrawals of this kind before, and we
know how they have ended up. Dear as our comrades are to us, the
development of the organization is immeasurably dearer to us. There
is no room for hesitation!