Leon
Trotsky: The League Faced with a Decisive Turn
July
1934
[Writings
of Leon Trotsky, Vol 7, 1934-1935, New York 1971, p. 39-44]
For
several years the most active fighting slogan of the League was "The
United Front" Without a doubt this slogan was, in spite of its
"abstract" character for two or three years, the key to the
situation in Germany, then in France. The defeat of the German
proletariat, the Austrian catastrophe, the growth of fascism in
France and other countries were necessary before the Comintern
bureaucracy took a radical turn in the question of the united front.
The examples of earlier turns have only proven to us all too well
that without a critical overhauling
of the old position and without a theoretical foundation for the new
one a turn even formally progressive offers no guarantee for a
correct policy. On the contrary, it unavoidably bears within it a
chain of new vacillations and mistakes. Eloquent signs of the new
dangers are already there: the ultimatists become opportunists. For
this reason our whole struggle transfers itself to a new, higher
plane.
Social
Democracy on its part has trod the path of the united front with the
definite purpose of breaking off its revolutionary head. In the field
of the united front, the fight against the reformist bureaucracy must
be carried oh less noisily in form but in a more systematic and
concentrated way than ever.
Both
bureaucracies are united by their common interest against the growing
opposition that brings to expression or tries to express the tasks of
the hour. On the other hand, both bureaucracies inimically oppose
each other in a competition sharper than ever. For this reason, one
can differentiate in the policy of both bureaucracies: the conspiracy
against all who aim to encroach on their rule and the fear of each of
them becoming a victim of the ally. The result is the readiness to
break the united front at any time.
Only
a short time ago the lessons of the events, Marxist analysis, the
criticism of the Bolshevik-Leninists spoke for the policy of the
united front Now in France a mighty factor has added itself, the
active pressure of the masses themselves. Now
this factor is decisive. It expresses itself directly in the militant
demonstrations on the street and indirectly in the political turn of
both apparatuses. That is a tremendous step forward. But just because
the step is tremendous, it
changes the political situation
from top to bottom.
Only
yesterday the slogan of the united front was the sole monopoly of the
Bolshevik-Leninists. Today this monopoly has been taken from us. The
slogan has become common property. It expresses the deep, passionate,
but politically very nebulous longing of the masses to oppose the
forward march of reaction with the united forces of all the
oppressed. The presence of this longing creates the most important
condition, if not for a directly revolutionary situation, at least
for a prerevolutionary one. But, unfortunately, the existing
organizations see very poorly the real changes
in the mood of the working masses. To have an ear for the average
worker in the factory, on the street, in the streetcar, in the cafe,
in the family in order to know how he sees the situation, what hopes
he cherishes, what he believes in — to listen attentively to such a
worker — that is the first duty of a revolutionary organization,
above all in a critical period such as the present when the
consciousness of the masses literally changes every day. At the
moment one can judge the depth and the acuteness of the turn in the
consciousness of the masses, above all, by their sympathetic
expression, especially by the events that are taking place within
both parties (crystallization of a left wing within the Social
Democracy, the split of Saint-Denis, the turn of both bureaucracies
to the united front, etc.). The character of such symptomatic
expressions has certainly remained backward and is distorted;
nevertheless they allow the following conclusion: (1) the workers see
not only the danger but also the possibility of resistance; (2) they
see their salvation in the united front; (3) with a halfway correct
policy that reinforces the confidence of the workers in themselves,
the active defense can in a short time go over to a general attack.
The
task of the Bolshevik-Leninists does not now consist in the
repetition of abstract formulas on the united front (workers'
alliances, etc.) but in the formulation of definite slogans, concrete
activity and the perspective of the struggle on the basis of the
policy of a mass united front. It is the task of the defense to set
up soviets and to hasten their transformation into organs of the
struggle for power. The task of the League according to the present
situation does not diminish but, on the contrary, grows, shifts to
another plane and takes on another character. Not to understand that,
to occupy oneself with the reflection of what has already been
learned, would mean to lose the game.
Of
decisive significance for the fate of the League will be from now on
its relation to the united front, not as an abstract slogan, but as
the living reality of a mass struggle. The new situation expresses
itself most clearly in the example of Saint-Denis. Only yesterday
Doriot was the leader in the fight for the united front, which he, in
his own way, made a reality in Saint-Denis. Tomorrow, in case of an
agreement between the two bureaucracies, the masses will see in
Doriot an obstacle, a splitter, a saboteur of the united front. The
Stalinist bureaucracy will either press Saint-Denis to return to the
ranks of its old party (with or without Doriot?) or will smash
Saint-Denis.
The
policy of the League is naturally not exhausted with the abstract
idea of the united front, for this reason — historically
seen,
the course of the Bolshevik-Leninists cannot be liquidated by the
agreement of both bureaucracies. Should the League remain passive,
however, unable to adjust itself courageously and rapidly to the new
situation, the League can be for a long period cast back into the
void.
One
can object: the united front demands the participation of all
proletarian groupings and organizations, consequently the
participation of Saint-Denis as well as that of the League. But this
objection is only of formal significance. Decisive is the relation of
forces. If the League had been able at the proper time to take deeper
roots in the masses, if Saint-Denis had joined the League, if …
etc., then there would have been a third force
alongside of both bureaucracies whose participation in the united
front would have been necessitated by the situation itself. In the
field of the united front, this third force would have become
decisive. But that is not the situation. The League is
organizationally weak; Saint-Denis and other groups are politically
exceptionally weak. For this reason they are all, including the
League, threatened with the danger of actually having to remain
outside of the united front, in spite of the fact that it is the
tremendous merit of the League to have set it in motion.
If
the League remains on the outside and concentrates its efforts upon
criticism from
without,
it risks the danger of creating anger among the workers instead of
attention. Let us once more recapitulate: in the unity of the ranks,
the masses now see their only means of salvation. Everyone who
remains outside the common ranks, everyone who criticizes from the
sidelines, the masses look upon as an obstacle. Not to take this
mighty and, at bottom, healthy mood of the masses into consideration,
to work against it, that would be death. With the rise of a movement,
the task of the Marxists consists in, supported
by the wave,
bringing in the necessary clarity of thought and method.
The
League must take an organic place in the ranks of the united front It
is too weak to claim an independent
place. That is as much to say that it must immediately take a place
in one of the two parties that have negotiated the agreement For us
there is no principled difference between the two parties, or almost
none. Practically, however, only the entry into the Social Democratic
party is possible
What?
At once we hear a hail of objections, the League should go into Leon
Blum's party? It should capitulate before reformism? But we are for a
new party? We are for the Fourth International? How can we join the
Second? What will the Stalinists say? What will the workers say?
etc., etc. All of these arguments look very mighty, but in reality
they are superficial, for they make a leap over reality. They are
based on that which would
be desirable,
not on that which is.
Of
course, we are against reformism — in the present situation more
adamantly than ever. But one must know how to come nearer the goal in
the given, concrete situation. To renounce the principles or to
"provisionally" relinquish the struggle for them would be
open treason. But to bring the methods of struggle in congruence with
the situation and our own forces is an elementary demand of realism.
Bolshevism, represented by the Leninist leadership, did not betray
and renounce itself, but in 1905-06 the Bolsheviks were forced by the
pressure of the masses that longed for unity to coalesce themselves
with the Mensheviks. This coalition led progressively to a new split.
But in 1910 Lenin, under the pressure of the sentiment in his own
ranks, was himself forced to undertake an attempt at unity that was
in two years to lead to a final split. Irreconcilableness of
principle has nothing in common with sectarian ossification, which
heedlessly passes over the changes in the situation and the mood of
the masses. From the thesis that the proletarian party must be
independent at all costs, our English comrades concluded that it
would be impermissible to go into the ILP. Alas! They only forgot
that they were far from being a party, but were only a propaganda
circle, that a party does not fall from heaven, that the propaganda
circle must pass through a period of embryonic existence before it
can become a party. Our English comrades (the majority) doubtlessly
paid dearly for their mistake in perspective, and we with them. Let
us here recall the following: at the time we did not reproach Watcher
and Co. for entering the SAP, but, in doing so, for sheathing the
banner of Marxism. We will not do this.
Naturally
the League cannot enter the Socialist Party other than as a
Bolshevik-Leninist faction. It will maintain La
Vérité, which
will transform itself into a factional organ with the same rights as
Action
Socialiste,
etc. Openly posing the question of admission, the League will say:
"Our views have completely vindicated themselves. The united
front is getting under way on the rails of the masses. We want to
participate actively. The sole possibility for our organization to
participate in the mass united front under the given circumstances is
by entering the Socialist Party. Now as before we consider it to be
more necessary than ever to fight for the principles of Bolshevism,
for the creation of a truly revolutionary party of the proletarian
vanguard and for the Fourth International. We hope to convince the
majority of the Socialist as well as the Communist workers of this.
We will bind ourselves to pursue this task within the framework of
the party, to subject ourselves to its discipline and to preserve the
unity of action."
Naturally
the Stalinists will fly up in a furious howl or attempt to fly up.
But, in the first place, they themselves have undertaken a sharp turn
by their entry into a bloc with the "social fascists."
Secondly, in their campaign against us, they will encounter the
indignation of the Socialist workers. Thirdly, and that is at bottom
the only important consideration, it is not a question of what the
Stalinists will say but of how the League can become a serious force
in the labor movement. If it succeeds, by its entry into the
Socialist Party, in the course of a year or even in six months (all
processes evolve very quickly today) in rallying to its banner
several thousand workers, it will never occur to anyone to remember
the campaign of the Stalinists.
Several
comrades, I among them, accused the leadership of the League and La
Vérité
of insufficiency in the struggle against the Social Democratic
leadership. At first glance it might seem as though there lay an
irreconcilable contradiction between this criticism, which I still
maintain today in its full extent, and the proposal to enter the
Social Democratic party. In reality, that is not the case. To exist
as an independent organization and thereby not to demarcate oneself
sharply from the Social Democrats means to risk becoming an appendage
of Social Democracy. To enter openly (under
the given concrete conditions)
the Social Democratic party in order to develop an inexorable
struggle against the reformist leadership means to perform a
revolutionary act The critical examination of the policy of Blum and
Co. must be the same in both cases.
One
can make still another objection: Why begin with the Socialist Party?
Would it not be more correct to address oneself first to the
Communist Party? At any rate the question cannot become the object of
serious differences of opinion; it is clear that the appeal to the
Stalinists can only have the character of a demonstration. Is it
necessary? It is possible that it would be useful as regards a
definite section of Communist workers. The declaration of the League
could then have the following content: "We have fought against
the theory of social fascism, for the united front, etc. The latest
steps of the party are evidence of a certain turn in this direction.
For this reason we are ready to make a loyal attempt to work within
the party, naturally under the condition that it be possible for us
to fight for our ideas on the basis of party democracy." After
the inevitable refused, the League would have to address itself to
the Socialist Party. If the leadership of the Socialist Party refuses
to admit the League (and that is very well possible), then a broad
field would be opened for the fight against the leadership in the
lower bodies. The sympathies of the Socialist workers would in this
case undoubtedly be on the side of the League.
The
League is faced with the most serious turn in its whole history. The
success of this turn will only be ensured by boldness,
quickness and unanimity.
Loss of time, endless discussions and internal strife would mean
destruction.
First
the Central Committee, beginning with the Politburo, must establish
its position, naturally hand in hand with the International
Secretariat. Then the members of the Politburo must, on the spot,
prepare the opinion of the members. Because of the extraordinary
significance of the question, it would be necessary to summon a
conference
in order to pass a final resolution. In the face of this rapid course
of events, the conference should convene not later than the middle of
July, for example on the fourteenth of July. Only by observing this
tempo in deeds and by the character of the turn itself can one firmly
count not only on the League not running along behind the events but
also on it making a great stride forward on the road to the creation
of a really revolutionary party of the proletariat and the building
of the Fourth International.