Leon
Trotsky: The State of the League and Its Tasks
A
Contribution to the Discussion
June
29, 1934
[Writing
of Leon Trotsky, Vol. 14, New York 1979, p. 488-495]
1.
The year 1934 has been marked by a daily aggravation of the world
economic crisis. Instead of forming a horizontal line, the graph for
the first six months shows a decline (not very pronounced but
nevertheless a decline) toward the lowest point of the crisis. The
sharpness of inter-imperialist contradictions forecasts the imminence
of a world conflagration.
As
for France, all the statistics show that the French economy is
becoming increasingly affected. Through its policy of “collective
security” and its speedup in arms production, French imperialism is
openly making its preparations for the coming war. The increasingly
acute character of the economic crisis in France and the
corresponding struggle of the social layers to find a way out of this
situation — each at the expense of the other — determine the
tempo and ferocity of the struggle and the principal features of the
present deep political crisis in France. This
crisis no longer shares any of the aspects of the previous crises
since 1920.
The period of solutions through parliamentary debate is finished. The
February days — the violent offensive of the reactionary vanguard
and the furious and oft-repeated response of the proletarian vanguard
— have opened up the arena of decisive revolutionary struggles in
this crisis.
There
can be no question of prolonged stability for the present transitory
Bonapartist government, which is only the first form of Bonapartism
to follow the February events. A return to the “coalition” type
of government could come about only as the result of an
intensification of mass pressure, which would either pass beyond this
form of government or recede as the result of a reactionary victory
won, as always, on the extra-parliamentary field. Passage to another
form of Bonapartist government will have to be based on violent
repression of the proletariat.
The
reactionary forces, even though they advanced their position through
their February offensive, have not yet succeeded in making themselves
masters of the decisive layers of the nation. Their rise seems in
fact to have been checked among the poor peasantry, the petty
bourgeoisie, and the working masses — social layers for which the
“government of national reconciliation” has done nothing but
impose heavy taxes. The vast propaganda offensive of the reactionary
vanguard is notable more for its extent than for its results. The
furious replies of the organized working masses found an echo among
the intermediary social strata, providing a point of support for the
“left” in its convulsive attempts at resistance under the fierce
attack of the right during the period of reconciliation (Cudenet, the
measures taken by Doumergue, the threats of Daladier).
The
working masses, hard hit by the government of reconciliation, have
not been able to resist effectively on the economic field because of
the state of their organizations. But on the political plane their
ferment is clear. The battle tends to extend its scope at a rapid
pace. We have entered a period of intense prerevolutionary struggle
in which regroupments decisive for a whole period will take place
among the masses.
The
reaction of the organized masses and those layers of society
influenced by them reflects a deep-seated mood among the working
masses. A determination to unify their efforts has become manifest in
the character of their street demonstrations as well as in the
debates in their trade unions. The latest CGT conventions, involving
categories of workers considered to be conservative — postal
employees, government employees, railroad workers — have expressed
a growth in the desire for united action. The bureaucratic
leaderships have been forced to take this into account: the
180-degree turn of the SFIO in 1934 as compared to its positions of
1933; the speeches of Jouhaux; the radical turn of the Communist
Party following grave threats of split and disintegration
(Saint-Denis, the withdrawal of the boatmen and naval dock workers
from the CGTU). The lesson of Germany has hit home, although
belatedly. The
bureaucracies are seeking a foothold among the masses, the masses are
seeking a solution in action.
This convergence of the maneuvers made by the apparatuses will have
the
effect of pushing forward the masses who are already seething.
The political consciousness of important sections of militants will
rapidly become transformed in the course of action, the conservative
resistance of the bureaucracies will be weakened by action, and so
will their defensive arsenal. History is opening up its book; little
attention will be paid to the catechisms of the bureaucracies.
All
this creates an entirely new situation for our vanguard, one which
demands a serious examination of our tasks.
2.
Our situation. The very fact of our existence on an international
scale, our political homogeneity, the training of our cadres, such as
they are, constitutes a factor which may become decisive for the
revolutionary movement. Politically our ideas are victorious at the
present moment. But the disproportion between the potential strength
of our politics and our influence as an organization reappears with
even greater force. This disproportion is in large part a product of
the situation which created us. Our struggle was and remains “against
the stream,” but this is a stream that exploits all possibilities
of claiming credit for the October conquests. While holding our
ground, we have progressed little by little in the midst of a
terrible upheaval.
Our
League has made important progress in extending its political
influence; however in the field of organizational consolidation —
when measured by the favorable possibilities created for it by our
new orientation and by the development of the political situation —
the League has been marking time for more than a year. The League has
rooted our ideas in every part of France and its colonies. There are
no workers’ districts where we do not have a “receptive
audience.” But a receptive audience — that does not mean
“groups” working systematically, according to a plan and with a
coherent centralized direction, growing little by little through
systematic recruitment. Outside the Parisian district even an attempt
at this has hardly been made. The leading cadres of our organization
are weak, new people have not yet come to us, a new process of
selection is now taking place. But our ability to improve the old
cadres remains limited because of the lack of a mass base favorable
to their development.
The
League has not become a revolutionary pole of attraction, a force to
be reckoned with. The desire to gain a place in the present struggle
in France has been the driving force behind all our activity during
the whole past period. This was a step forward, but our organic
weakness arose as an obstacle at each stage, as did our social
composition. The united front with the SFIO (alliance committee, Père
Lachaise) appeared on these occasions and others as another
caricature of the united front, making us an appendage of Amsterdam,
a united front in which the SFIO pulled us out of their sleeves
whenever it suited their interests. The attempt to win over the
Saint-Denis militants resembled a patient and luckless courtship more
than a political struggle. La
Vérité
remains too caught up in the wake of other formations to tend to its
own affairs. (I limit myself to assertions here, but I am ready in
each case to amplify, if necessary.)
In
the revolutionary struggles that are beginning, our frail cruiser
will throw itself into battle — but in the wake of large political
formations, which are starting to put their ranks in battle order
through the united front. The maneuver itself absorbs the entire
attention of the crew, whose eyes are fixed anxiously on the horizon,
and the tougher the struggle becomes the more the respective general
staffs will be able to isolate our frail ship, even to sink it. That
is the real danger in the present situation:
we seem to be coming to these struggles from
the outside;
we have no corresponding organized forces in the mass organizations,
particularly in the trade unions; our permanent ties with the working
class are almost nil.
Nowhere
in the CGTU is there a solid fraction; only twelve members at the
most hold responsible posts in it.
There
is no fraction in the CGT.
There
is no nationally coordinated fraction in the SFIO although we have
members active in it.
In
general, there are no fractions at all in the mass organizations;
along with this goes an underestimation of this work and the
necessary attention to be given to isolated militants active in the
mass organizations and to their observations. (All this on a national
scale, in the case of the adult organization.)
Our
direct agitation among the masses is in its initial probing stage;
each militant feeling his way in this work realizes that we have not
yet hit on the proper “tone.” Often our agitation remains
superficial because our social composition cuts us off from the
workers of the locality after a meeting is finished. How many
courageous efforts have been made! Aren’t the participants
astonished at the feeble response to these efforts? In the sum total
causes of this disproportion, the mistakes, even the most serious
ones, can be considered only a small factor. It is possible to
coordinate our efforts better, to establish serious rules in our
organizational relationships, to modify the character of the paper,
to change this or that aspect, but
all this would continue within the limits of our original handicap.
To be sure, certain mistakes can be avoided, efforts can be made,
improvements can be achieved — but at what pace and in what
proportion to this sea that rises up and engulfs us?
What
sort of reception will our little organization get when all eyes are
fixed on the struggle, on the upheavals and the blocs of the old
established organizations? What chance will it have now that the
lever of the united front has been wrested from its hands? The broad
layers of the population will not judge us by the back issues of our
ever-so-valiant Vérité
Who can dare assert that in this new situation we can become the
decisive pole of attraction for these struggles without
a radical change of tactics? Hurled
from outside the battle, the slogan of a new party resembles a
medication more than a decisive weapon. It runs the risk of
attracting more intellectuals than fighters. The [German] Spartacus
League was crushed because it had insufficient ties with the masses.
What are we compared to Spartacus?
3.
The
problem of the new party is more urgently posed than ever before.
In this whole period of struggles of a revolutionary character, in
which all the problems of revolutionary strategy and of the conquest
of power (organs of power, etc.) have to be solved, the vanguard
party is the indispensable weapon for the victory of the proletariat.
The bureaucratic zigzags of the Stalinist party have nothing in
common with the tactics of such a vanguard party. Release the brake
of “socialism in one country” today and who can tell what will
happen tomorrow? The totally independent character of the proletarian
party has nothing in common with the Stalinist formation, which is
held in chains by the conservative interests of the Soviet
bureaucracy.
The
method by which cadres decide on a proposed course of action, through
Marxist analysis, has
nothing in common with the CP’s forced acceptance of the latest
turn.
Revolutionary workers tied down to a miserable centrist bureaucracy
by their attachment to the Russian Revolution — this is not the
party of the revolution. That
party has yet to be created. Not one whit of our ten years of
criticism, of our explanation of the defeats that have been suffered,
or of their meaning and the conclusions that they imply needs to be
softened or rejected.
Turns and zigzags of the centrist apparatus may contain elements that
are progressive or regressive, depending on the case at hand; but the
Comintern is no longer the guide of the proletariat. Today, just as
yesterday, in the face of the rising tide of revolution and the
threat of world war, the first point in our program remains: build
the revolutionary party, construct the Fourth International!
Nor
is there anything to retract in our analysis of the Second
International and of the SFIO’s role in the relationship of
classes. What is of interest to us in the differences between this
reformist party and the centrist Stalinist party is:
a.
The fact that the bankruptcy of the Comintern, instead of putting an
end to the Social Democracy, has permitted it to grow and regroup
among sections of workers who — under the impact of events in
Germany, Austria, and France — are becoming oriented toward
revolution and will not hesitate to enter into battle against their
own bureaucracy.
b.
The fact that the [SFIO’s] internal regime, in spite of the
bureaucracy’s power, has not yet straitjacketed the rank and file
and permits a certain freedom of movement among sections of the
workers.
In
the Stalinist party the rank and file is dependent on the
bureaucracy; but in the SFIO, up to now, the ranks have been
relatively independent of the bureaucracy. This form of internal
regime was the original form of the democratic party in the
democratic state and will suffer the consequences of the state
crisis; the present form is favorable for the rank and file in this
period of regroupment, so the bureaucracy may be in for a fight.
As
revolutionary parties, the SFIO and the CP are equally bankrupt. But
in this period of upheavals and readjustments it is our task to
adjust our tactics according to both our knowledge of the environment
and our opportunities for creating the new revolutionary party. We
must therefore observe that the internal political life of the
Stalinist party is nil and that the possibility of developing a
tendency in its midst must be excluded (the apparatus has just
undertaken a 180-degree turn in the orientation of the work of the
party members and Monmousseau is surprised that no one is surprised).
The Socialist Party, on the other hand, has preserved throughout this
whole period a relatively intense life, all proportions considered.
In this respect, the present period is comparable to that which
preceded the [1920] Tours congress.
All
these elements are important facts to be considered in connection
with the problem of the “new party.”
4.
What is the solution? Shall we continue along the path we have
followed — though improving our methods? My answer to that is
already given in section 2. No matter what path we choose, it
will be necessary to rearm our organization in all of its internal
life, in all of its organizational procedures. That is an urgent
task.
It means tempering our arms anew, but it does not mean making the
same use of them as before. It is apparent that with the present
state of our forces and maintaining our present positions we would
not be able to grow with sufficient rapidity to become a decisive
pole of attraction. On the contrary, we would be kept out of the
center of the struggles, to the detriment of their outcome. To
reserve the greater part of our forces for fractional work within a
mass organization would be to acknowledge the scanty returns we have
received from our independent work. But given our numerical weakness,
it would also mean not putting adequate forces in any one area. For
example, the militants of our League, scattered here and there in the
SFIO, would see their effectiveness decreased by the clandestine
character of the entry. This fractional work in the SFIO, which has
been neglected for more than a year, cannot suffice now even if it is
improved.
It
is necessary to take a decisive step, to bring ourselves closer to a
group of workers that is evolving toward revolutionary ideas, to
become its catalyst, thereby increasing our opportunities.
Without
renouncing any of our positions and without dissolving ourselves, it
is necessary to carry the fight into the very midst of a group that
is in the process of evolving. We have outlined our special
difficulties and weaknesses above, but
we must not underestimate the value of our propagandist nuclei and
their abilities.
It is enough to put them in the right place in order to transform
their slow advances into decisive leaps forward.
Where?
Access to the Communist Party is cut off to us because of its
internal regime. And a capitulation is totally out of the question.
There
remains the SFIO. Its internal situation permits the possibility of
our entering it under our own banner. The environment suits the aims
we have set for ourselves. What is necessary now is to act in such a
manner that our declaration will not in any way strengthen the
leading bourgeois wing, but
rather will support the progressive proletarian wing;
that its text and its distribution will allow us to hold our heads
high in case of acceptance
as well as in case of dilatory maneuvers or rejection.
There
is no question of dissolving ourselves. We
enter as the Bolshevik-Leninist faction, our organizational ties
remain the same, our press continues to exist just as do
Bataille Socialiste and
others.
There
are two things necessary for the success of this step, that can,
within a short period of time, completely transform the whole
political constellation in the labor movement: organizational
cohesion (through the steadfastness of each member) and promptness of
implementation. To drag out such decisions means to
lose the opportune moment for their implementation, that is, to put
ourselves at a disadvantage.
Further
on we shall examine some suggestions concerning the means of
implementation. The organization must take an inventory of its forces
and understand that in the present situation the means of increasing
them tenfold lie not in sticking to routine but in making a
courageous effort to win to revolutionary ideas the thousands of
workers whom the degeneration of the Comintern prevented from taking
the path of Bolshevism.
Before
proposing implementation I must emphasize that this whole orientation
is directly dependent upon the political characterization of the
present crisis and of the relationship of forces in the proletarian
movement.
It
would be useful to draw the membership’s attention to the necessity
that our debates on this question maintain the character of a serious
discussion carried on before the whole labor movement. Any empty
polemicizing could seriously hamper our ability to achieve the aims
we have set for ourselves.
How
are we to begin the orientation?
a.
Put this orientation on the agenda of the leading bodies — (1)
Political Bureau, (2) Central Committee, (3) regional committees —
and draft a resolution on it.
b.
Immediately publish an internal bulletin containing the resolution
drafted probably by the Central Committee, send it out to the groups,
assign a Central Committee reporter to each of them, and distribute
the bulletin in time to have an adequate discussion.
c.
Assign a comrade for “preparation” in the press (discussion
article presenting the orientation) to convince our circle of
sympathizers.
d.
Assign a comrade to meet with Georget and Danno for the purpose of
probing into the possibilities of one of the [SFIO] left-wing
factions (Just’s or another) issuing an appeal on our behalf.
e.
Prepare a draft declaration to the SFIO, to be presented by a
delegation. Publicize the text and the reply.
f.
Prepare a special number of La
Vérité
with the text of the declaration to the SFIO and of the program of
action that is to serve as the basis of our propaganda.
g.
Don’t neglect the “youth” aspect of the problem. On point a, it
is necessary to convince our national youth committee at the same
time as the Central Committee and to seriously consider with them the
“youth” aspect of the problem — perhaps the appeal (d.) can be
issued by the [Seine] Federation of Young Socialists. In any case,
this attitude may denote a slowing down (for the immediate period) of
the drive toward a split in the Young Socialists.
h.
Call a Central Committee meeting for the purpose of submitting our
declaration to the National Committee of the SFIO on July 15.