Leon
Trotsky: Letter to the International Secretariat
March
2, 1935
[Writings
of Leon Trotsky, Vol 7, 1934-1935, New York 1971, p. 210-218, title:
“The
Belgian Dispute and the De Man Plan”]
To
the International Secretariat
Dear
Comrades,
I
am absolutely in agreement with your appraisal of the dispute in our
Belgian section. After studying the documents concerning the crisis,
I would like to enlarge a little on my point of view.
On
January 15, 1935, Brussels wrote to all the members of the Belgian
section: "Our differences merely become intensified. … We
cannot as revolutionary militants share, even partially, in the
responsibilities.” This is the language of split If the attitude of
the national and international organization is so bad that it no
longer allows "revolutionary militants" to bear even a part
of the responsibility, nothing remains but split.
On
January 29, Vereecken wrote to the IS: "I am anxious to let you
know quite frankly that the 'non-entrist' comrades and myself
consider more and more that this radical step is most harmful and the
IS must not maintain the slightest illusions regarding an eventual
change in our political position. We consider it a political,
historical error of the greatest dimensions, and we shall continue,
in the interest of the revolutionary movement and the formation of
the Fourth International, to fight this tendency with all our
strength."
It
is the same language. If the Brussels comrades persuade themselves
"more and more" that our tactic is most harmful, if we must
have no illusions as to an eventual change in the ideas of the
Brussels comrades, this can only mean that Comrade Vereecken is
busying himself conscientiously and systematically with preparation
for a split.
"Our
differences merely become intensified." The degeneration of the
ICL becomes, for the critics of Brussels, "more and more"
obvious. But since the differences have taken on an open and acute
character particularly since the discussion on the entry of our
French section into the SFIO, we must wait until Comrade Vereecken
gives us an analysis of the experience in France since the entry. It
is evidently in the light of this experience that he has had to
convince himself "more and more" of our decadence. But this
is where the enigma begins. In all the documents available to me, I
find no analyses by Comrade Vereecken of the activity of our French
section. This may appear surprising.
Comrade
Vereecken predicted the absolute impossibility of the
Bolshevik-Leninists developing their ideas within the Social
Democratic party. He predicted the opportunist degeneration and the
complete discrediting of our tendency. Does he make any attempt to
analyze the real facts? Does he compare his predictions with the
living reality? No, not in the least He was implacable when it was a
question of predictions, of discussions, of preliminary questions,
but since it has become a reality, Vereecken has lost all interest in
the question. This fact characterizes perfectly the abstract manner
in which Vereecken approaches ideas and problems.
But
we Marxists are interested, above all, in facts. And on the basis of
the five months that have passed since the entry, we say: each day
and each new fact only give the lie to the purely negative and
sterile attitude of Vereecken at the time of the French discussion.
And if he is not capable of seeing it and admitting it openly, it is
not surprising if he travels farther and farther from Marxism in the
direction of Bordigism, that is, of nothing.
Vereecken
complains: "The discussion of the youth [was] carried out at a
racing speed" and also "the vote was taken in confusion,"
etc. … Vereecken's trouble is that he separates completely the
question of the Belgian youth and the question of the French entry
and the experience of the French League For him, political activity
is only a series of discussions. The French question was long and
bitterly discussed internationally and, above all, in Belgium. In the
light of these discussions and, above all, of the experiences that
followed them, the question of entry into the Belgian Young Socialist
Guard hardly demanded discussion for all Marxists concerned with the
facts of reality — but that, unfortunately, was not the case with
Vereecken. In turning his back on the French experience, which
pitilessly disowns him, he simply wishes to have a new "discussion"
and, especially, that it should last, since activity is for him
internal discussion.
"Our
differences merely become intensified." But what is the most
important point of these differences in Belgium? The question of the
de Man plan, which on its side has reduced itself to the question of
inflation. It is amazing to see the importance that Vereecken
attributes to this question. His bulletins are full of demonstrations
of the evil intentions of de Man, who aspires to inflation. Formalist
minds frequently seize upon altogether secondary questions to inflate
them out of all proportion. Are we, for example, knights of the
Belgian franc? Is the saving of the existing currency our way of
salvation? One cannot understand the anti-inflation fanaticism of
Vereecken. In this period of social crisis, of economic shocks,
inflation
and deflation are two complementary instruments for throwing on to
the people the cost of decaying capitalism. Bourgeois
parties organize formidable discussions on the question: is it better
to cut the workers' throats with the saw of inflation or with the
simple knife of deflation? Our struggle is directed with the same
energy against the saw and against the knife.
But
Vereecken steels himself, above all, against inflation. To expose the
plan of de Man, he has created a special aphorism: "nationalization
by means of buying back is a kind of inflation." It is the
buying
back
that must be countered without becoming embroiled in questions of
financial technique. But no, Vereecken is intent on showing that de
Man is an inflationist. He goes so far as to say that ”a campaign
in the paper on this question would have been most significant for
our tendency." But, if I am not mistaken, it is the Theunis
government that today starves the people, brandishing, meanwhile, the
fan of the inflationist plan of de Man. That helps in the best way
the knife of deflation. But since all that takes place in reality and
not in discussion, Vereecken remains indifferent. He demands from the
journal a special campaign against not the deflation of Theunis but
the problematic and, in any case, far distant inflation of de Man.
All of Vereecken's mentality is revealed in this instructive episode.
Vereecken
writes: "Since one knows, and one has agreed to write, that the
plan is a deception for the workers, and one knows besides that shady
negotiations are taking place in order to deliver a treacherous blow
against the toiling masses, Charleroi continues to leave the workers
to struggle in total darkness. One goes so far today as to confound
the plan with socialism in La
Voix. …
The editors of La
Voix
can no longer distinguish between a deception, a delusion, a treason
and socialism."
You
can see, comrades, the case is serious. Vereecken accuses La
Voix
not only of identifying deception and treason with socialism but,
moreover, of doing it with full knowledge of the fact. The editors of
La
Voix
know that it is a deception, but instead of unmasking it, Lesoil and
his friends cover it up, lead the workers into the trap, participate
in the treason. And our international organization? Let us read about
it in the letter of January 15: "We finish by accusing the IS
and Comrade Vidal of covering up the position of Charleroi and we
say: to each his responsibility."
You
see, the case is serious. The leaders of the Belgian section
consciously betray the proletariat, and the international leadership
covers them in this work.
But
do not hasten to become annoyed. It is not the bad faith of Vereecken
that is at stake; it is his anti-Marxist journalist thought that
flies from reality and concerns itself with phantoms.
To
show that the plan of de Man is a deception, Vereecken builds up a
complete Eiffel Tower of demonstrations of the inflationist danger
that interests us. De Man is for buying back, and buying back can
only be a terrific expense for the people. By what technical process
the buying back is effected, that is a question of tenth-degree
importance But, imitating Theunis, Vereecken brandishes the specter
of inflation. That is the deception, that is the treason of which
Lesoil is the accomplice and the IS the "fence." It would
be funny if it were not so tragic, at least for Comrade Vereecken.
The
criticism of the plan has been made many times; one can complete it
If we had to present a plan to the Belgian proletariat, this plan
would have had an altogether different aspect Unfortunately, the
Belgian proletariat gave this mandate not to us but to the Belgian
Labor Party [POB], and the plan reflects two facts: the pressure of
the proletariat on the POB and the conservative character of this
party.
In
what consists the deception of the plan? In the fact that the
leadership of the POB, de Man included, does not wish to lead the
masses into struggle, and without struggle this plan, inadequate as
it is, is completely unrealizable. Then, when we say to the masses
that to realize this imperfect plan it is necessary to struggle to
the end, we are far from covering up the deception; on the contrary,
we are helping the masses to expose it by their own experience.
But
you identify the plan with socialism, writes Vereecken. He merely
forgets that in the mouth of de Man the word socialism means the same
deception as the plan. And for the same reason, the leaders of the
POB do not want a struggle. But they are caught in the wheels of the
crisis of capitalism and of reformism. They were forced to proclaim
the plan and even to make of it the platform of the Belgian
proletariat It is a fact. What is our task? To help the workers to
turn the wheels into which the opportunist leaders have been forced
to thrust their hands.
Allow
me, comrades, to recall a classic example. The Russian Social
Revolutionary Party formulated in May 1917 its "plan," that
is to say, its agrarian program, basing itself on hundreds of peasant
demands. The program contained the expropriation of private landed
property, the periodic redistribution of the land among the peasants,
the abolition of wage-labor in agriculture, etc. … In all, the
democratic-revolutionary slogan (expropriation of the landed gentry)
was linked to utopian demands, to petty-bourgeois prejudices. The
party of Kerensky-Chernov that had launched this "plan"
remained in governmental coalition with the gentry and the
capitalists.
What
was the attitude of the Bolsheviks? They criticized the internal
contradictions and inadequacies of the program. But, before all, they
recognized that the realization of this program would mean an
enormous advantage for the peasants, for the whole people. However,
the program could not be realized in collaboration with the
exploiters. The Bolsheviks did everything to draw the peasants into
the struggle for their plan. They even finished by inscribing the
plan into their program of action. They declared to the peasants the
faults of your program — we will correct them together with you in
the light of common experience, when we have gained power. However,
your leaders, Kerensky, Chernov and the others do not want a
struggle. Therein lies their deception. Try to draw them into the
struggle, and if they are obstinate, drive them out!
This
policy was neither trickery nor treason. It was the true policy of
Marxist realism. Without this policy, the October Revolution would
have been impossible.
The
revolutionary task consists in demanding that the POB take power in
order to put its own plan into effect. Vereecken replies to this: No!
It is necessary to demand a workers' government and not simply a
socialist government. We must not forget the Stalinist workers, and
besides, the plan is no good — it threatens us with inflation. I,
Vereecken, I will propose a better plan. Is this serious? No, it is
ridiculous. Vereecken sets himself outside of reality. He constructs
in his imagination a united front that does not exist in Belgium. For
this imaginary united front he proposes an imaginary program, that
is, Vandervelde and Jacquemotte ought to fight together for the
perfect plan dreamed up by Vereecken. In this way matters will be
splendidly arranged.
Vereecken
tries to quote Gourov in favor of his point of view on the campaign
around the plan. This is at least an unfortunate misunderstanding.
Gourov's letter recognized the necessity of taking a position on the
basis of the campaign, in favor of the socialist party [POB] taking
power to carry out its own plan. That's all. Gourov insisted only on
the necessity of a sharp criticism of the left socialists. At least
nine-tenths of the Gourov letter coincided with the Charleroi
position, whereas Vereecken previously was characterizing the de Man
plan as an expression of social fascism.
Seizing
upon some insufficiently precise formulations in La
Voix,
Vereecken accuses its editors of being subservient to the general
staff of the POB and the unions and of renouncing Marxist criticism.
This new betrayal is committed as the purchase price for the
possibility of entering the POB. Take note of the heinousness of the
accusation. The startling disproportion between the facts, that is,
the quotations, and the accusation reaches the level of a slander. I
take up the issue of La
Voix that
I have just received. I read there: "The victory won by the
government on February 4 — and this with the aid of the leaders of
the POB and the CS [union federation]." The same article says
that the leaders of the POB have reaffirmed with all "the
declared enemies of the working class their attachment to the
bourgeois regime," and so on and so forth. Really, you do not
use such language when you are trying to sell out to the bureaucracy
of the POB and the CS. In the same issue there is a criticism of
l'Action Syndicate [Union Action], which advises the government to
bend under the "pressure^ of the demonstration. "Those who
speak like this to the workers deceive them," says La
Voix.
No, La
Voix
is not vassalized to the union chiefs; it does not deceive the
workers, whatever it otherwise does, or whatever errors it sometimes
commits. But these mistakes of La
Voix
pale into insignificance alongside the mountains of errors,
distortions, unwarranted accusations and complete misconceptions of
reality on the part of Comrade Vereecken.
The
gravest mistake for which La
Voix
can be reproached — here I am in complete accord with Comrade
Martin — is that our Belgian friends identify the revolutionary
struggle too much with the general strike. Just as a simple strike
has need, above all in this epoch, of a picket line, so a general
strike needs a workers' militia, which in the last analysis is
nothing else but a generalized picket line. The general strike poses
the problem of power, but does not resolve it What is always involved
at bottom is the question of armed force. The fascists penetrate
everywhere, in the barracks, through the officers on active duty as
well as those in the reserves. The proletarian vanguard should step
up their efforts to strengthen their moral ties with their brothers
in the barracks. Thus the struggle for power requires not only
preparation of the general strike but also education of the will of
the vanguard to pass from the defensive to the offensive, to set
about creating a workers' militia and to win over the workers in the
army. But it is very significant that Vereecken doesn't breathe a
word about this. He condemns La
Voix
only when it is perfectly correct.
Vereecken's
general attitude resembles that of Bauer, but with a certain time
lag. The conservatism of both is offended by the fact that we are
passing from the stage of individual propaganda to systematic action
among the masses. This transition, which was made inevitable by the
logic of things and was foreseen by us a long time ago, seems to them
an abnegation of principles, a surrender, a betrayal. If there really
has been an abandonment of the most fundamental Marxist principles,
it has been by Bauer, by Vereecken, by the unavowed Bordigists and
Hennautists.
The
stage of individual educational propaganda was inevitable. When the
centrists accused us of sectarianism, we answered them: without a
minimal Marxist cadre, principled action among the masses is
impossible. But that is the only reason we form cadres. To one of the
French opportunists who often spoke of our sectarianism, the
Biulleten
replied in
June 1929:
Yes, "among us there are elements who remain satisfied to sit at
home and criticize the mistakes of the official party, without
setting themselves any broader tasks, without assuming any practical
revolutionary obligations, converting the revolutionary opposition
into a title, something akin to an Order of the Legion of Honor.
There are, in addition, sectarian tendencies that express themselves
in splitting each hair into four parts. It is necessary to struggle
against this. And I am personally ready to wage a struggle against
it, and not to be deterred, if need be, by old friendships, personal
ties, and so forth and so on." These lines were written,
comrades, almost six years ago. It is therefore not at all a question
of an unexpected turn, provoked by some exceptional circumstances. It
is a case of the growth of our tasks and obligations determined by
all of our preceding work. The exceptional circumstances only give an
extraordinary sharpness to our new tasks.
In
Engels's correspondence with Sorge, which went on for several
decades, on almost every page we can find remarkable observations on
the question that concerns us here. In England, as in the United
States, Marxism remained for too long a time at the level of a
propaganda society. Engels never tired of repeating that Marxism is
not an academic doctrine or a sectarian profession of faith but an
instrument for systematic work among the masses. In 1886, Engels
said:
"If
they succeed in the Socialist League in educating a nucleus of people
who understand things theoretically, a great deal will have been
gained for the launching of a real mass movement …"
You
see that Engels well understood the importance of a nucleus of
theoretically educated people. But this was not for him an end in
itself. That same year he wrote about the German Marxists in the
United States:
"The
Germans have not understood how to use their theory as a lever which
could set the American masses in motion; they do not understand the
theory themselves for the most part and treat it in a doctrinaire
and dogmatic way as something that has to be learned by heart, which
then will satisfy all requirements forthwith. To them it is a credo
and not a guide to action"
(emphasis added).
I
ask you, isn't this the case with Bauer and Vereecken, who have
learned by heart the abstract definitions of reformism and of the
Second International, etc., which serve them not to accelerate but,
on the contrary, to check our revolutionary activity among the
masses?
One
month later Engels wrote again about the pseudo-Marxists who in the
face of a real mass movement have tried to make of the "not
always understood [Marxist] theory a kind of Salvationist dogma, and
thereby to keep aloof from any movement that did not accept that
dogma." Isn't this the case with Vereecken in the face of the
mass movement favoring the plan?
In
February 1887 Engels wrote: "That great national movement, no
matter what its first form, is the real starting point of American
working-class development If the Germans join it in order to help it
or to hasten its development in the right direction, they may do a
great deal of good and play a decisive part in it If
they stand aloof, they will dwindle down into a dogmatic sect and be
brushed aside as people who do not understand their own principles"
(emphasis added).
Isn't this a mirror created for the Bauers, Vereeckens and others?
Two
years later, in April 1891, Engels cited an example in order to draw
this conclusion from it "It demonstrates how very useless a
platform that is largely theoretically correct can be, if it does not
know how to link itself with the real needs of the masses."
Finally, a year before his death, Engels castigated the English and
American Marxists "that have managed to reduce the Marxian
theory of development to a rigid orthodoxy which the workers … have
to gulp down … as an article of faith." I could multiply these
quotations endlessly. You will find without difficulty the same ideas
adapted to different conditions by Lenin, whose revolutionary
intransigence, we know, had nothing in common with sectarian
sterility.
What
are our conclusions? Vereecken now represents a reactionary
tendency in our ranks. His acts of indiscipline may become very
important in and of themselves, but they have in this situation for
us only a secondary importance. We should unreservedly condemn his
false and sterile conceptions, which, if they won over the
leadership, could only reduce our tendency to the pitiful role of the
Bordigists, Hennautists, etc. … It is necessary to declare openly
that we
cannot and will not accept the slightest responsibility for the
Bauer-Vereecken tendency.
Does
this exclude common work in the future, even tomorrow, even today?
For my part, no. If Bauer, after his unfortunate experience, which
has isolated him completely in Germany as well as in the emigration,
should return to our ranks, he will be welcome. Nobody would impose
humiliating conditions on him in the Stalinist manner. It is not
possible to act without making mistakes. The crime begins when one
refuses to correct mistakes proved by experience.
If
Comrade Vereecken knew how to overcome his capricious and anarchistic
individualism, if he will strive to orient himself not in accord with
his own texts but in accord with the reality of the struggle, he has
only to reenter the ranks that he deliberately broke away from. On
our part he will find the most sincere wish to collaborate. Decisive
are not the unfortunate episodes of internal struggle but the
revolutionary conception and methods. Do we have these in common or
not? That is the question Vereecken should answer if he is to regain
his place in our ranks.
Crux
[Leon Trotsky]