Leon
Trotsky: The Twin Stars: Hitler-Stalin
December
4, 1939
[Writings
of Leon Trotsky, Vol 12, 1939-1940, New York ²1973, p. 113-124]
When
Hitler invaded Poland with lightning speed from the west, Stalin
cautiously crept into Poland from the east. When Hitler, having
subjected 23,000,000 Poles, proposed to end the "useless"
war, Stalin through his diplomatic channels and his Comintern praised
the advantages of peace. When Stalin occupied strategic positions in
the Baltic, Hitler readily transferred his Germans elsewhere. When
Stalin attacked Finland, Hitler's press, alone in the world,
proclaimed its own complete solidarity with the Kremlin. The orbits
of Stalin and Hitler are bound together by some internal attraction.
What kind of attraction? How long will it last?
Twin
stars are "optical," that is, apparent; or "physical,"
that is, true twins, forming a pair in which one star revolves about
the other. Do Hitler and Stalin represent true or apparent twin stars
in the present bloody sky of world politics? And if they are true
twins, who revolves about whom?
Hitler
himself speaks reservedly about the durable, "realistic"
pact. Stalin prefers to smoke his pipe in silence. The politicians
and journalists of the hostile camp represent Stalin as the main star
and Hitler as the satellite in order to foment a quarrel between
them. Let us attempt to analyze this by no means simple question, not
forgetting that the orbits of world politics cannot be determined
with such precision as the orbits of celestial bodies.
Having
arisen much later than the Western powers, capitalist Germany
constructed the most advanced and dynamic industry on the European
continent; but it had been passed by in the previous division of the
world. "We will divide it again," proclaimed the German
imperialists in 1914. They were mistaken. The aristocracy of the
world united against them and triumphed. Now Hitler hungers to repeat
the experiment of 1914 on a more grandiose scale. He cannot help
hungering for this. German capitalism is suffocating within the
confines of her boundaries. Nevertheless Hitler's problem is
insoluble. Even if he wins the war, the redivision of the world in
favor of Germany cannot take place. Germany came too late. Capitalism
is stifling everywhere. The colonies don't want to be colonies. The
new world war will give a tremendous invigorating impulse to the
movement for independence among the oppressed nations.
Hitler
switches "friendships," changes evaluations of nations and
governments, breaks agreements and alliances, dupes enemies and
friends; but all this is dictated by one sole objective: redivision
of the world. "Germany is not a world power at the present
time," Hitler wrote in his book. But "Germany will become a
world power or cease to exist." To convert united Germany into a
base for European domination; to convert united Europe into a base
for the struggle for world domination, consequently for confining,
weakening, and reducing America -this task remains unchanged for
Hitler. This end is for him the justification for the totalitarian
regime which suppressed the class contradictions inside the German
nation with an iron hoop.
Completely
contradictory features characterize the USSR. Czarist Russia left a
heritage of misery and backwardness. The mission of the Soviet regime
is not that of securing new areas for the productive forces but that
of erecting productive forces for the old areas. The economic tasks
of the USSR do not necessitate the extension of her borders. The
level of her productive forces forbids a major war. The offensive
power of the USSR is not considerable. Her defensive power consists,
above all, in her vast spaces.
Since
the latest Kremlin "successes," it has become fashionable
to compare the present Moscow policy with the traditional policy of
Great Britain, who, preserving her own neutrality, maintained a
balance of power in Europe and at the same time retained the key to
this balance of power in her own hands. According to this theory the
Kremlin moved over to the side of Germany as the weakest power only
in order to shift over to the hostile camp in the event the German
successes were too great. Everything in this theory is topsy-turvy.
Britain's traditional policy was possible thanks to her tremendous
economic preponderance over all the European countries. The Soviet
Union, on the contrary, in economic respects is the weakest of all
the great powers.
Last
March, after many years of extravagant official boasting, Stalin for
the first time spoke at the congress of the Russian Communist Party
on the comparative productivity of labor in the USSR and the West.
This excursion into the sphere of world statistics was made in order
to explain away the poverty in which the peoples of the USSR still
live. In order to catch up with Germany in the production of pig
iron, the USSR in relation to its population would have to produce
45,000,000 tons a year instead of the 15,000,000 of today; in order
to catch up with the United States, it would be necessary to raise
the yearly production of pig iron to 60,000,000 tons — that is, to
quadruple it. The same is true, and even more unfavorably, of all the
other industries. Stalin, in conclusion, expressed the hope that the
Soviet Union would catch up with the advanced capitalist countries
during the next ten to fifteen years. Naturally, this time limit is
questionable. But the involvement of the USSR in a major war before
the end of this period would signify in any case a struggle with
unequal weapons.
The
subjective factor, not less important than the material, has changed
in the last years sharply for the worse. The tendency toward
socialist equality proclaimed by the revolution has been stamped out
and defamed. In the USSR there are twelve to fifteen million
privileged individuals who concentrate in their hands about one half
of the national income, and who call this regime "socialism."
On the other hand there are approximately 160,000,000 people
oppressed by the bureaucracy and caught in the grip of dire poverty.
The
relations of Hitler and Stalin to the war are completely
contradictory. The totalitarian regime of Hitler arose out of the
fear of the possessing classes of Germany before a socialist
revolution. Hitler was mandated by the owners to save their property
from the menace of Bolshevism at any cost, and to open up a
passageway to the world arena. Stalin's totalitarian regime arose out
of the fear of the new caste of revolutionary parvenus before the
strangled revolutionary people.
War
is dangerous for both of them. But Hitler is unable to carry out his
historic mission by any different means. A victorious offensive war
would secure the economic future of German capitalism and, along with
this, the National Socialist regime.
It
is different with Stalin. He cannot wage an offensive war with any
hope of victory. In case the USSR enters the war, with its
innumerable victims and privations, the whole fraud of the official
regime, its outrages and violence, will inevitably provoke a profound
reaction on the part of the people, who have already carried out
three revolutions in this century. No one knows this better than
Stalin. The fundamental thought of his foreign policy is to escape a
major war.
Stalin
engineered an alliance with Hitler, to the surprise of all the
diplomatic routinists and pacifist simpletons, because the danger of
a major war could come only from Hitler, and because, according to
the Kremlin's evaluation, Germany is mightier than her possible
enemies. The protracted conferences in Moscow with the military
delegations of France and England last summer served not only as a
camouflage for the negotiations with Hitler but also as direct spying
for military information. The general staff of Moscow became
convinced, evidently, that the Allies were ill-prepared for a major
war. A thoroughly militarized Germany is a formidable enemy; it is
possible to buy her benevolences only by cooperating in her plans.
Stalin's
decision was determined by this conclusion. The alliance with Hitler
not only eliminated for the time being the danger of involving the
USSR in a major war but also opened up the possibility of gaining
immediate strategic advantages. In the Far East, Stalin retreated
again and again for a number of years in order to escape war; on the
Western border the circumstances were such that he was able to escape
war by fleeing — forward; not through giving up old positions but
through taking new ones.
The
press of the Allies pictures the situation as if Hitler were Stalin's
prisoner, and exaggerates the gains that Moscow made at the expense
of Germany — half of Poland (according to population about
one-third), plus domination of the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea,
plus an open door to the Balkans, etc. The advantages won by Moscow
are undoubtedly considerable. But the final score has not yet been
settled. Hitler started war on a worldwide scale. From this struggle
Germany either will emerge master of Europe and all the European
colonies, or will founder. To safeguard his eastern flank in such a
war is a question of life or death for Hitler. He paid the Kremlin
with provinces of the former czarist empire. Is this payment too
high?
The
argument that Stalin duped Hitler with his invasion of Poland and his
pressure on the Baltic countries is completely absurd. It is much
more probable that Hitler himself inspired Stalin to occupy Eastern
Poland and to lay hands on the Baltic states. Inasmuch as National
Socialism grew out of a crusade against the Soviet Union, Stalin
naturally could not depend upon Hitler's word of honor. The
negotiations were carried out in a "realistic" tone. "You
are afraid of me?" Hitler asked Stalin. "Do you want
guarantees? Take them yourself." And Stalin took them. To
picture it as if the new Western boundary of the USSR were a
permanent barrier to Hitler's road eastward violates all proportion.
Hitler solves his tasks by stages.
On
the order of the day now is the crushing of Great Britain. For the
sake of this objective it is possible to sacrifice something. The
march eastward presupposes a major war between Germany and the USSR.
When the time comes for this war, the question as to what meridian
the struggle will begin upon will have only secondary significance.
The
attack upon Finland seems at first glance contrary to Stalin's dread
of war. But the matter in reality is different. Beside the blueprints
there is an objective logic in the situation. In order to escape the
war, Stalin made an alliance with Hitler. In order to safeguard
himself against Hitler, he. occupied a series of bases on the Baltic
coast. However, Finland's resistance threatened to reduce all these
strategic advantages to zero and even to convert them into their
opposite. Who will settle accounts with Moscow if Helsinki refuses?
Stalin, having read off "A," is compelled to read "B."
Then follow the other letters in the alphabet. Stalin seeking to
escape a war does not mean that war will permit Stalin to escape.
Germany
obviously pushed Moscow against Finland. Each step Moscow takes
westward brings closer the involvement of the Soviet Union in the
war. If this objective were gained, the world situation would change
considerably. The Near and Middle East would become the arena of the
war. The question of India would arise at once. Hitler would breathe
with relief and, in case of an unfavorable turn of events, gain the
possibility of concluding peace at the expense of the Soviet Union.
Moscow undoubtedly gnashed its teeth upon reading the friendly
articles in the German press. But gnashing one's teeth is not a
political factor. The pact remains in force. And Stalin remains
Hitler's satellite.
The
immediate advantages to Moscow in the pact are indisputable. So long
as Germany is occupied on the Western front, the Soviet Union feels
much more free in the Far East. This doesn't mean that offensive
operations will be launched there. It is true that the Japanese
oligarchy is even less capable of waging a war than the one in
Moscow. However, compelled to face the West, Moscow cannot have the
slightest motive for expanding in Asia. Japan, for her part, must
consider that she could expect a serious and even annihilating
resistance from the USSR. Under these conditions Tokyo must prefer
the program of her navy — an offensive not to the West but to the
South, toward the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Borneo, French
Indochina, British Burma… An agreement between Moscow and Tokyo on
this basis would constitute a symmetrical supplement to the pact
between Moscow and Berlin. The question as to how this would
influence the situation of the United States does not enter into the
scope of this article.
Referring
to the lack of raw materials in Russia itself, the world press
insists upon the insignificance of the economic help which Stalin can
render Hitler. The question, however, is not so simple. The lack of
raw materials in the USSR has a relative, not an absolute character;
the bureaucracy in its drive for a high tempo of industrial
development cannot maintain a proper balance between different
sections of the economy. If the tempo of growth in various sections
of industry is lowered for a year or two from 15 percent to 10 or 5
percent, still more if industrial production is maintained at the
level of the preceding year, a significant surplus of raw materials
immediately appears. The absolute blockade of German foreign trade
will, on the other hand, inevitably divert a considerable amount of
German exports to Russia in exchange for Soviet raw materials.
Moreover,
it must not be forgotten that the USSR has stocked and is still
stocking immense reserves of raw materials and foodstuffs for
defensive military purposes. A significant part of these reserves
represents a potential source of supplies for Germany. In addition to
this, Moscow can turn over to Hitler gold, which in spite of all the
efforts to establish a closed economy remains one of the important
sinews of war. Finally, the friendly neutrality of Moscow
extraordinarily facilitates Germany in exploiting the resources of
the Baltic countries, Scandinavia, and the Balkans. "Together
with Soviet Russia," not without foundation wrote the
Voelkischer
Beobachter
[People's Observer], Hitler's organ, on November 2, "we dominate
the sources of raw materials and foodstuffs of the whole East."
Several
months before the conclusion of the pact between Moscow and Berlin,
London evaluated more soberly than now the importance of the economic
assistance that the USSR could give Hitler. A semi-official
investigation conducted by the Royal Institute o f International
Affairs on the "political and strategic interests of the United
Kingdom" (the introduction is dated March 1939) declares in
relation to the possibility of a Soviet-German rapprochement: "The
danger to Great Britain of such a combination might be very great. It
is questionable," continues the collective author, "how far
Great Britain could hope to reach a decisive victory in any struggle
with Germany unless the German eastern frontier could be blockaded by
land." This evaluation deserves the most careful attention. It
would not be an exaggeration to state that the alliance with the USSR
diminishes the effectiveness of the blockade against Germany by at
least 25 percent and perhaps considerably more.
To
material support it is necessary to add — if this word is in place
— moral support. Up to the end of August the Comintern demanded the
liberation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Abyssinia, and was
silent about the British colonies. Now the Comintern is silent about
Czechoslovakia, supports the division of Poland, but demands the
liberation of India. The Moscow Pravda
attacks the suppression of liberties in Canada but is silent about
the bloody executions of Czechs by Hitler and the tortures of Polish
Jews. All this means that the Kremlin still has a high appraisal of
Germany's strength.
And
the Kremlin is right. Germany happened to be, it is true, incapable
of launching a "lightning" war against France and Great
Britain — but not a single serious person believed in such a
possibility. However, the international propaganda which tries to
picture Hitler as a lunatic driven up a blind alley is extremely
light minded Hitler is still far from that. Dynamic industry,
technical genius, the spirit of discipline — all this is present;
the formidable German military machine will yet reveal itself. At
stake is the fate of the country and the regime.
The
Polish government and the Czechoslovakian semi-government are now in
France. Who knows whether the French government will not have to seek
refuge in Great Britain together with the Belgian, Dutch, Polish, and
Czechoslovakian governments? I do not believe for a moment, as I have
stated, in the actual realization of Hitler's plans concerning a Pax
Germanica
— that is, world domination. German imperialism arrived too late;
its military fury will end in a tremendous catastrophe. But before
that catastrophe occurs many things will topple in Europe. Stalin
doesn't want to be among them. Above all, he safeguards himself from
breaking with Hitler too soon.
The
press of the Allies searches for symptoms of "coolness"
between the new friends and every day predicts a rupture. It is
impossible, indeed, to deny that Molotov does not feel too happy in
Ribbentrop's embrace. For several years all internal oppositionists
in the USSR were branded, hounded, and executed as agents of the
Nazis. Having finished this work, Stalin joined Hitler in a close
alliance. Throughout the entire country there are millions of people
intimately connected with those who were executed or imprisoned in
the concentration camps because of their alleged alliance with the
Nazis, and these millions are now cautious but extremely effective
agitators against Stalin. To this it is necessary to add the covert
complaints of the Comintern — the unfortunate foreign agents of the
Kremlin do not feel at ease. Stalin is undoubtedly attempting to
leave open the other possibility. Litvinov was unexpectedly present
on the tribune of Lenin's mausoleum on November 7. In the parade,
portraits of the secretary of the Comintern, Dimitrov, and the leader
of the German Communists, Thälmann, were carried.
All
this, however, is the decorative side of politics, not its substance.
Litvinov, as well as the demonstrative portraits, was necessary above
all for satisfying the Soviet workers and the Comintern. Only
indirectly Stalin thus lets the Allies know that under certain
circumstances he can change horses. But only visionaries could
imagine that a reversal of the Kremlin's foreign policy is on the
order of the day. So long as Hitler remains strong — and he is very
strong — Stalin will remain his satellite.
All
this may be true, an attentive reader can say, but what about
revolution? Doesn't the Kremlin reckon with its possibility,
probability, even inevitability? And doesn't speculation on
revolution reflect itself in Stalin's foreign policy? The objection
is legitimate. Moscow is the last to doubt that a major war will
provoke revolution. But war does not begin, it ends with revolution.
Before revolution broke out in Germany in 1918, the German army had
succeeded in delivering mortal blows against czarism. In the same
way, the present war can crush the Kremlin bureaucracy long before
revolution breaks out in some capitalist country. Our evaluation of
the Kremlin's foreign policy consequently preserves its force
independently of the perspective of revolution.
However,
in order to orient oneself correctly in the future maneuvers of
Moscow and in the evolution of its relations with Berlin, it is
necessary to answer the question: Does the Kremlin propose to utilize
the war in order to further world revolution, and if so, then how? On
November 9 Stalin considered it necessary to reject in an extremely
blunt fashion the supposition that he wishes "the war to be
prolonged as long as possible until its participants are completely
exhausted." In this case Stalin spoke the truth. He does not at
all wish a prolonged war, for two reasons: first, it would inevitably
draw the USSR into its vortex; second, it would inevitably provoke
revolution in Europe. The Kremlin quite legitimately dreads both.
"The
internal development of Russia," declare the investigators for
London's Royal Institute, "is tending to throw up a
'bourgeoisie' of managers and officials who possess sufficient
privileges to make them highly content with the status quo… It is
possible to regard the various purges as part of a process by which
all . who desire to change the present state of affairs are being
rooted out. Such an interpretation lends color to the belief that the
revolutionary period in Russia is over, and that henceforward her
rulers will only seek to conserve the gains which the revolution has
brought them."
This
is really well said! Over two years ago I wrote in Liberty:
"Hitler is fighting against the Franco-Soviet alliance because
he wants a free hand for agreement with Moscow against Paris."
At the time these words were interpreted as a prejudiced opinion.
Events corroborated it.
Moscow
realizes very well that war on a major scale will bring an era of
immense social and political repercussions. If those in Moscow could
seriously hope to control the revolutionary movement and subordinate
it to their own interests, Stalin naturally would welcome it. But he
understands that revolution is the antithesis of bureaucracy and that
it mercilessly sweeps aside the privileged, conservative apparatus.
What miserable defeats the bureaucratic clique of the Kremlin
suffered in the Chinese revolution of 1925-27 and in the Spanish
revolution of 1931-39! On the wave of a new revolution a new
international organization would inevitably arise which would wipe
out the Comintern and deal a mortal blow to the authority of the
Soviet bureaucracy in its national entrenchment in the USSR.
The
Stalinist faction came to power in the struggle against so-called
"Trotskyism." Up to now all the purges, all the staged
trials, and all the executions were carried out under the label of
the struggle against "Trotskyism." Fundamentally, Moscow
expresses in this designation the fear of the new oligarchy before
the masses. The label of "Trotskyism," conventional in
itself, has however taken on an international character already. I
cannot help mentioning three recent incidents, because they are very
symptomatic of all the political processes engendered by the war, and
at the same time clearly disclose the source of the Kremlin's fear of
revolution.
In
the French yellow book, a conversation is reported between the French
ambassador, Coulondre, and Hitler, on August 25, nine days before
diplomatic relations were severed. Hitler sputters and boasts about
the pact which he concluded with Stalin: "not only a theoretical
pact but, I would say, a positive one. I will vanquish, I believe,
and you believe you will vanquish; but what is sure is that German
blood and French blood will flow," etc. The French ambassador
answers: "If I actually believed that we would be victorious, I
would also have the fear that as a result of the war, there would be
only one real victor — Mr. Trotsky." Interrupting the
ambassador, Hitler shouted: ''Why do you then give Poland a blank
check?" The personal name, here, of course bears a purely
conventional character. But it is not accidental that both the
democratic diplomat and the totalitarian dictator designated the
specter of revolution by the name of the man whom the Kremlin
considers its enemy number one. Both participants in the conversation
agree, as if it were self-evident, that revolution will develop under
a banner hostile to the Kremlin.
The
former Berlin correspondent of the French semi-official paper Temps,
writing now from Copenhagen, reports in his dispatch of September 24
that under cover of the darkness prevailing in Berlin's black-outs,
revolutionary elements have been posting placards in the workers'
section with the following slogans: "Down with Hitler and
Stalin! Long Live Trotsky!" In this way the most courageous
workers of Berlin express their relation to the pact And revolution
will be led by the courageous and not the cowards. Fortunately Stalin
is not forced to black-out Moscow. Otherwise the streets of the
Soviet capital would be plastered with no less significant slogans.
On
the eve of the anniversary of Czech independence, the Protector Baron
von Neurath and the Czech government severely banned all
demonstrations — "labor agitation in Prague, particularly the
threat of a strike, has been branded officially as the work of
'Trotskyite Communists'" (New
York Times, October
28). I am not at all inclined to exaggerate the role of "Trotskyites"
in the Prague demonstrations. But the very fact itself that their
role was officially exaggerated explains why the Kremlin rulers are
afraid of revolution no less than Coulondre, Hitler, and Baron von
Neurath.
But
the sovietizing of the Western Ukraine and White Russia (Eastern
Poland), like the present attempt to sovietize Finland — are they
not acts of socialist revolution? Yes and no. More no than yes. When
the Red Army occupies a new province, the Moscow bureaucracy
establishes a regime which guarantees its domination. The population
has no choice but voting yes to the effected reforms in a
totalitarian plebiscite. A "revolution" of this kind is
feasible only on army-occupied territory with a scattered or backward
population. The new chief of the "Soviet government" in
Finland, Otto Kuusinen, is not a leader of revolutionary masses, but
an old Stalinist functionary, one of the Comintern secretaries, with
a rigid mind and a flexible spine. This "revolution" can
indeed be accepted by the Kremlin. And Hitler has no fear of it.
The
Comintern apparatus, composed without exception of Kuusinens and
Browders, that is, of careerist functionaries, is absolutely
incapable of leading a revolutionary mass movement. But it serves to
camouflage the Stalin-Hitler pact with revolutionary phrases in order
to dupe the workers in the USSR and abroad. And later it can be
utilized as a weapon to blackmail the imperialist democracies.
It
is surprising how little the lessons of the Spanish events have been
understood. Defending himself from Hitler and Mussolini, who strove
to utilize the civil war in Spain in order to construct a bloc of
four powers against Bolshevism, Stalin set himself the task of
proving to London and Paris that he was capable of eliminating
proletarian revolution from Spain and Europe with much greater
efficiency than Franco and his backers. Nobody strangled the
socialist movement in Spain more mercilessly than Stalin, in those
days an archangel of pure democracy. Everything was put into motion:
a frenzied campaign of lies and frame-ups, legal falsifications in
the spirit of the Moscow trials, systematic assassination of
revolutionary leaders. The struggle against the seizure of land and
factories by the peasants and workers was conducted, naturally, under
the name of the struggle against "Trotskyism."
The
civil war in Spain deserves minutest attention, as in many respects
it bore the aspects of a rehearsal of the incipient world war. In any
event, Stalin is completely ready to repeat his Spanish performance
on a worldwide scale, with the hope of better success this time in
buying the friendly attitude of the future victors through having
proved that no one better than he can curb the Red specter which for
terminological convenience will again be labeled "Trotskyism."
For
five years the Kremlin conducted a campaign in favor of an alliance
among the democracies in order to sell to Hitler at the last moment
their love for "collective security and peace." The
functionaries of the Comintern received their order, "left
face,"' and immediately dug out of the archives old formulas
about socialist revolution. The new "revolutionary" zigzag
will probably be shorter than the "democratic" one because
war-times accelerate the tempo of events enormously. But Stalin's
fundamental tactical method remains the same: he converts the
Comintern into a revolutionary menace to the enemies of to morrow in
order to exchange it at the decisive moment for a favorable
diplomatic combination. There is not the slightest reason to fear
resistance from the Browders or from people of his type.
Through
its docile correspondents, the Kremlin threatens that in case Italy
or Japan joins England and France, Russia will enter the war on
Hitler's side, striving at the same time to sovietize Germany. (See,
for example, the Moscow dispatch in the New
York Times,
November 12.) Astonishing confession! Through the chain of its
"conquests" the Kremlin is already so tied to the chariot
of German imperialism that the possible future enemies of Hitler
automatically become enemies of Stalin. His probable participation in
the war on the side of the Third Reich, Stalin promptly covers with a
promise to "sovietize" Germany. After the pattern of
Galicia? To accomplish this it would be necessary to occupy Germany
with the Red Army. By means of an insurrection of the German workers?
But if the Kremlin enjoys this possibility, why does it wait for
Italy and Japan to enter the war?
The
motive of the inspired correspondence is too clear: to frighten on
the one hand Italy and Japan, and on the other England and France —
and thereby escape the war. "Don't push me to extremes,"
Stalin threatens, "or I will commit terrible deeds." This
is at least 95 percent bluff and perhaps 5 percent nebulous hope that
in case of mortal danger revolution will bring salvation.
The
idea of Stalin's sovietizing Germany is as absurd as Chamberlain's
hope for the restoration of a peaceful conservative monarchy there.
Only a new world coalition can crush the German army through a war of
unheard-of proportions. The totalitarian regime can be crushed only
by a tremendous attack on the part of the German workers. They will
carry out their revolution, surely, not in order to replace Hitler
with a Hohenzollern or Stalin.
The
victory of the popular masses over the Nazi tyranny will be one of
the greatest explosions in world history and will immediately change
the face of Europe. The wave of awakening, hope, enthusiasm will not
stop at the hermetic borders of the USSR. The popular masses of the
Soviet Union hate the greedy and cruel ruling caste. Their hate is
only dampened by the idea: imperialism is watching us. Revolution in
the West will deprive the Kremlin oligarchy of its sole right to
political existence. If Stalin survives his ally Hitler, it will not
be for long. The twin stars will fall from the sky.