Leon
Trotsky: Soldiers' and Workers' Juntas
March
13, 1931
[The
Spanish Revolution (1931-39).
New York 1973, p. 92 f.]
A
few words on the soldiers' juntas. Would you like to see them arise
as independent
organizations? This is a very serious question for which a definite
line of conduct must be marked out at the very outset, leaving open,
of course, the right to introduce corrections if experience indicates
the need.
In
Russia in 1905, matters did not reach the point of soldiers' soviets.
The appearance of soldier deputies in the workers' soviets had an
episodic character. In 1917 the soldiers' soviets played a gigantic
role. In Petrograd the soldiers' soviet was combined with the
workers' soviet from the very beginning. Moreover, the soldiers were
the overwhelming majority. In Moscow, the workers' and peasants'
soviets existed independently. But this was essentially for
organizational reasons: the immense army consisted then of some ten
to twelve million peasants.
In
Spain we have a peacetime army inconsequential when compared with the
population, or even when compared with the proletariat. Is the rise
of independent soldiers' soviets inevitable under these conditions?
From the standpoint of proletarian policy, we are interested in
drawing the soldiers' delegates into the workers' juntas to the
extent that the latter are created. Juntas composed only of soldiers
could arise only at the culmination of the revolution, or after its
victory. Workers' juntas might (and should!) arise earlier, on the
basis of strikes, the boycott of the Cortes, or later, on the basis
of participation in elections. We can therefore draw the soldier
delegates into the workers' juntas long before soldiers' juntas can
be created. But I go further: if we take the initiative in time and
create workers' juntas and assure their influence on the army, then
perhaps in consequence we will be able to prevent the rise of
independent
soldiers' juntas in danger of falling under the influence of
careerist officers rather than of revolutionary workers. The small
size and importance of the Spanish army speaks in favour of such a
perspective. But, on the other hand, this small army has its
independent revolutionary political traditions — more than in any
other country. To a certain degree, this may interfere with the
soldiers' representation through the workers' juntas.
You
see that on this question I have not decided to express myself
categorically; and I doubt if the comrades who are close to the
situation can render a categorical decision here. I would rather put
the question up for consideration; the sooner the broad circles of
advanced workers begin to discuss the key questions, the easier it
will be to solve them. At any rate, the course taken should be
towards incorporating the soldiers' delegates into the workers'
councils. If it should be only partially successful, even that much
would be good. But precisely with this aim in mind, the moods in the
army and in the various branches of service, the different types of
arms, all should be studied in time and in great detail.
In
conclusion, it would be a good idea to attempt collectively to make
up a political chart of Spain with the aim of determining more
precisely the relationship of forces in each region, and the
relationship among the regions. Such a chart should also have the
workers' districts, the revolutionary centres, the trade union and
party organizations, the garrisons, the relationship of forces
between the Reds and the Whites, the districts of peasant movements,
etc. No matter how few in numbers the Oppositionists may be,
nevertheless they can take the initiative in various places for such
a study, collaborating with the best representatives of other
workers' groups. Thus, the elements of the general staff of the
revolution would be created. The central nucleus would give this work
the necessary unity and cohesion. This preparatory, at first
seemingly "academic," work will acquire a tremendous,
perhaps even a decisive, significance in the future. In an epoch such
as the one Spain is now passing through, the greatest of sins is to
waste time.