Leon
Trotsky: The question of trade union unity
March
25, 1931
[Leon
Trotsky: Trade
Unions in
the Epoch of Imperialist Decay. New York etc. 1990, p. 48-58]
The
question of the unity of the workers’ organizations is not subject
to a single solution suitable for all forms of organization and for
all conditions.
For
the party the question resolves itself in most categorical fashion.
Its complete independence is the elementary condition of
revolutionary action. But even this principle does not give in
advance a ready-made reply to the question: When and under what
conditions must a split or, contrariwise, a unification be made with
a neighboring political current? Such questions are settled each time
on the basis of a concrete analysis of the tendencies and political
conditions. The highest criterion, in any case, remains the necessity
for the vanguard of the organized proletariat, the party, to preserve
its complete independence and autonomy on the basis of a distinct
program of action.
But
precisely such a solution of the question with regard to the party
not only admits but, as a general rule, renders indispensable a quite
different attitude with regard to the question of the unity of other
mass organizations of the working class: trade unions, cooperatives,
soviets.
Each
one of these organizations has its own tasks and methods of work —
and, within certain limits, independent ones. For the Communist
Party, all these organizations are first of all the arena of
revolutionary education of broad sections of the workers and
recruitment of the advanced workers. The larger the mass in a given
organization, the greater are the possibilities it offers the
revolutionary vanguard. That is why, as a rule, it is not the
Communist wing but the reformist wing that takes the initiative in
splitting the mass organizations.
It
is enough to contrast the conduct of the Bolsheviks in 1917 to that
of the British trade unions in recent years. The Bolsheviks not only
remained in the same trade unions with the Mensheviks, but in certain
trade unions they tolerated a Menshevik leadership even after the
October revolution, although the Bolsheviks had the overwhelming
majority in the soviets. The British trade unions, on the contrary,
upon the initiative of the Labourites, not only drive the Communists
out of the Labour Party but, so far as it is possible, out of the
trade unions as well.
In
France the split in the trade unions was also the consequence of the
initiative of the reformists, and it is no accident that the
revolutionary trade union organization, compelled to lead an
independent existence, adopted the name unitary.
Do
we demand today that the Communists quit the ranks of the CGT? Not at
all. On the contrary, the revolutionary wing within Jouhaux’s
confederation must be strengthened. But by that alone we show that
the splitting of the trade union organization is in no case a
question of principle for us. All the ultraleftist objections in
principle that may be formulated against trade union unity apply
first of all to the participation of Communists in the CGT. Yet every
revolutionist who has not lost touch with reality must recognize that
the creation of Communist fractions in the reformist trade unions is
an extremely important task. One of the tasks of these fractions must
be to defend the CGTU in discussions with members of the reformist
trade unions. This cannot be accomplished except by showing that the
Communists do not want the trade unions to be split but, on the
contrary, are ready at any moment to reestablish trade union unity.
If
one believes for an instant that the splitting of the trade unions is
imposed on Communists by their duty to counterpose a revolutionary
policy to the policy of the reformists, then one cannot limit oneself
to France alone. One must demand that the Communists, regardless of
the relationship of forces, break with the reformist trade unions and
also set up their own trade unions in Germany, in Britain, in the
United States, and so on. In certain countries Communist parties have
actually taken this road. In specific cases the reformists really
leave no other way out. In other cases the Communists commit an
obvious mistake by responding to the provocations of the reformists.
But up to now Communists have never and nowhere motivated the
splitting of the trade unions by the inadmissibility in principle of
working with the reformists in the organizations of the proletarian
masses.
Without
stopping to deal with cooperatives — the experiences in which
will add nothing essential to what has been said above — we will
take soviets as an example. These arise in the most revolutionary
periods, when all problems are posed with the keenness of a blade.
Can one, however, imagine even for a moment the creation of Communist
soviets as a counterbalance to Social Democratic soviets? This would
mean killing the very idea of the soviets.
At
the beginning of 1917 the Bolsheviks remained within the soviets as
an insignificant minority. For months — and in a period when
months counted for years, if not for decades — the Bolsheviks
tolerated a conciliationist [Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary]
majority in the soviets, even though they already represented an
overwhelming majority in the factory committees. Finally, even after
the conquest of power, the Bolsheviks tolerated the Mensheviks within
the soviets so long as the Mensheviks represented a certain part of
the working class. It was only when the Mensheviks had completely
compromised and isolated themselves, by being transformed into a
clique, that the soviets threw them out of their midst.
In
Spain, where the slogan of soviets may in the near future be put
practically on the order of the day, the very creation of soviets
(juntas) — provided there is an energetic and bold initiative of
the Communists — is not to be conceived of otherwise than by way
of a technical organizational agreement with the trade unions and the
Socialists on the method and the intervals of the election of
workers’ representatives. To advance, under these conditions, the
idea of the inadmissibility of working with the reformists in the
mass organizations would be one of the most disastrous forms of
sectarianism.
★
How
then is such an attitude on our part toward the proletarian
organizations led by the reformists to be reconciled with our
evaluation of reformism as the left wing of the imperialist
bourgeoisie? This contradiction is not a formal but a dialectical
one, that is to say, one that flows from the very course of the class
struggle. A considerable part of the working class (its majority in a
number of countries) rejects our evaluation of reformism; in other
countries, it has not as yet even approached this question. The whole
problem consists precisely in leading these masses to revolutionary
conclusions on the basis of our common experiences with them. We say
to the non-communist and to the anticommunist workers: “Today you
still believe in the reformist leaders whom we consider to be
traitors. We cannot and we do not wish to impose our point of view
upon you by force. We want to convince you. Let us then endeavor to
fight together and to examine the methods and the results of these
fights.” This means that within united trade unions, where union
discipline applies to all members, groupings must enjoy full freedom.
No
other principled position can be proposed.
★
The
Executive Committee of the Communist League [Left Opposition in
France] is at present correctly giving first place to the question of
the united front. This is the only way that one can prevent the
reformists, and above all their left-wing agents, the Monattists,
from counterposing to the practical tasks of the class struggle the
formal slogan of unity. [CP leader Albert] Vassart, as a
counterbalance to the sterile official [Communist Party] line, has
put forward the idea of the united front with the local trade union
organizations. This way of posing the question is correct, in the
sense that during local strikes it is primarily a question of working
with local trade unions and specific (national] federations. It is
equally true that the lower levels of the reformist apparatus are
more sensitive to the pressure of the workers. But it would be wrong
to make any kind of principled difference between agreements with the
local opportunists and those with their chiefs. Everything depends
upon the conditions of the moment, upon the strength of the pressure
of the masses, and upon the character of the tasks that are on the
order of the day.
It
is self-evident that we never make agreement with the reformists,
whether locally or centrally, an indispensable and preliminary
condition for the struggle in each specific case. We orient ourselves
not according to the reformists but according to the objective
circumstances and the state of mind of the masses. The same applies
to the character of demands put forward. It would be fatal for us to
commit ourselves in advance to accept the united front according to
the conditions of the reformists, that is, upon the basis of minimal
demands. The working masses will not rise in struggle for demands
that seem unrealistic to them. But on the other hand, should the
demands be too limited in advance, the workers may say to themselves,
“Why bother, it’s not worth the trouble.”
On
each occasion, the task consists not in proposing the united front
formally to the reformists but in forcing them to accept conditions
that correspond as well as possible to the situation. All this calls
for an active strategy, one of maneuver. In any case, it is
incontestable that only in this way and by it alone can the CGTU
mitigate, up to a certain point, the consequences of the division of
the masses into two trade union organizations, throw the
responsibility for the split onto those on whom it really belongs,
and advance its own militant positions.
★
The
singularity of the situation in France lies in the fact that two
trade union organizations have existed there separately for many
years. In the face of the ebb of the movement in recent years, people
have accustomed themselves to the split; very often it has simply
been forgotten. However, one could foresee that the revival in the
ranks of the working class would inevitably revive the slogan of the
unity of the trade union organizations. If one takes into account
that more than nine-tenths of the French proletariat is outside the
trade unions, it becomes clear that, as the revival steps up, the
pressure of the unorganized will increase. The slogan of unity is
nothing but one of the first consequences of this pressure. With a
correct policy, this pressure should be favorable to the Communist
Party and the CGTU.
Even
if, for the next period, an active united front policy were the
principal method of the French Communists’ trade union strategy, it
would nonetheless be quite wrong to counterpose this policy to that
of unity of the trade union organizations.
It
is entirely incontestable that the unity of the working class can be
realized only on a revolutionary basis. The policy of the united
front is one of the means of liberating the workers from reformist
influence and even, in the last analysis, of moving toward the
genuine unity of the working class. We must constantly explain this
Marxist truth to the advanced workers. But a historical perspective,
even the most correct one, cannot replace the living experience of
the masses. The party is the vanguard, but in its work, especially in
its trade union work, it must be able to lean toward the rear guard.
It must, in fact, show the workers — once, twice, and even ten
times if necessary — that it is ready at any moment at all to
help them reconstitute the unity of the trade union organizations.
And in this field we remain faithful to the essential principles of
Marxist strategy: combining the struggle for reforms with the
struggle for revolution.
★
What
is the attitude today of the two trade union confederations toward
unity? To the broad circles of the workers it must appear entirely
identical. In truth, the administrative stratum of each organization
has declared that unification can only be conceived of “from below”
on the basis of that organization’s principles. By covering itself
with the slogan of unity from below, borrowed from the CGTU, the
reformist confederation exploits the forgetfulness of the working
class and the ignorance of the younger generation, which knows
nothing of the splitting work of Jouhaux, Dumoulin, and company. At
the same time the Monattists assist Jouhaux by substituting for the
fighting tasks of the labor movement the single slogan of trade union
unity. As honest brokers they direct all their efforts against the
CGTU in order to detach from it the greatest possible number of trade
unions, to group these around themselves, and then to enter into
negotiations with the reformist confederation on an equal footing.
As
far as I am able to judge here from the material I have, Vassart has
expressed himself in favor of the Communists themselves putting
forward the slogan of a unification congress of the two trade union
confederations. This proposal was categorically rejected; as for its
author, he was accused of having gone over to Monatte’s position.
Lacking data, I am unable to express myself thoroughly on this
discussion. But I consider that the French Communists have no reason
to abandon the slogan of a fusion congress. On the contrary.
The
Monattists say, “They are both, one as much as the other,
splitters. We alone are for unity. Workers, support us.” The
reformists reply, “As for us, we are for unity from below.” That
is, “we” will generously permit the workers to rejoin our
organization. What must the revolutionary confederation say on this
subject? “It is not for nothing that we call ourselves the unitary
confederation. We are ready to effect the unity of the trade union
organization this very day. But to accomplish that, the workers have
no need whatsoever of questionable brokers who have no trade union
organization behind them and who feed upon splits like maggots on a
festering wound. We propose the preparation and, after a specified
period, the convening of a fusion congress on the basis of trade
union democracy.”
This
manner of posing the question would immediately cut the ground from
under the feet of the Monattists, who are a completely sterile
political grouping but are capable of bringing great confusion into
the ranks of the proletariat. But will not elimination of the group
of brokers in this way cost us too dearly? It will be objected that
if the reformists consented to a unity congress, the Communists would
be in the minority there and the CGTU would have to give way to the
CGT.
Such
a consideration can appear persuasive only to a left trade union
bureaucrat who is fighting for his “independence” while losing
sight of the perspectives and tasks of the movement as a whole. The
unity of the two trade union organizations, even if the revolutionary
wing remains in the minority for a time, would very quickly be
revealed to be favorable precisely to communism and to it alone. The
unity of the confederations would bring in its train a great influx
of new members. Thanks to this, the influence of the [economic]
crisis would be reflected within the trade unions in a more profound
and more decisive fashion. The left wing would be able, within the
rising new wave, to begin a decisive struggle for the conquest of the
unified confederation. A preference for an assured majority in a
narrow and isolated trade union confederation rather than
oppositional work in a broad and real mass organization, is the mark
only of sectarians or officials and not of proletarian
revolutionists.
For
a thinking Marxist it is quite evident that one of the factors
contributing to the monstrous mistakes of the CGTU leadership
resulted from a situation where people like Monmousseau, Semard, and
others, without theoretical preparation or revolutionary experience,
immediately proclaimed themselves the “masters” of an independent
organization [in 1922] and consequently had the possibility of
experimenting with it under the orders of [Comintern leaders]
Lozovsky, Manuilsky, and company. It is incontestable that if the
reformists had not at some point brought about the split in the
confederation, Monmousseau and company would have had to reckon with
broader masses. This fact alone would have disciplined their
bureaucratic adventurism. That is why the advantages of unity would
have been immeasurably greater at present than the disadvantages. If,
within a unified confederation embracing about a million workers, the
revolutionary wing remained in the minority for a year or two, these
two years would undoubtedly be more fruitful for the education not
only of the Communist trade unionists but of the whole party than
five years of “independent” zigzags in a CGTU growing constantly
weaker.
★
No,
it is not we but the reformists who should fear trade union unity. If
they consented to a unity congress — not in words but in deeds —
that would create the possibility of bringing the labor movement in
France out of its blind alley. But that is just why the reformists
will not consent to it.
The
conditions of the crisis are creating the greatest difficulties for
the reformists, primarily in the trade union field. That is why they
find it so necessary to take shelter behind their left flank; it is
the brokers of unity who offer them this shelter.
To
unmask the splitting work of the reformists and the parasitism of the
Monattists is now one of the most important and indispensable tasks.
The slogan of the unity congress can contribute greatly to the
solution of this task. When the Monattists speak of unity, they aim
this slogan against the Communists; when the CGTU itself proposes a
road to unity, it will deliver a mortal blow to the Monattists and
will weaken the reformists. Isn’t this quite clear?
It
is true that we know in advance that, thanks to the resistance of the
reformists, the slogan of unity will not yield the great results at
present that would be obtained in the case of a real unity of the
trade union organizations. But a more limited result, provided the
Communists follow a correct policy, will undoubtedly be achieved. The
broad masses of workers will see who is really for unity and who is
against it, and will become convinced that the services of brokers
are not required. There is no doubt that in the long run the
Monattists will be reduced to nothing, the CGTU will feel itself
stronger, and the CGT weaker and more unstable.
But
if that is how matters stand, does this policy not boil down simply
to a maneuver rather than to the achieving of effective unity? This
objection cannot frighten us, This is precisely the way that the
reformists evaluate our whole policy of the united front. They
declare that our proposals are a maneuver only because they
themselves do not want to lead the struggle.
It
would be entirely false to differentiate in principle between the
policy of the united front and that of the fusion of the trade union
organizations. Provided that the Communists preserve the complete
independence of their party, of their fraction in the trade unions,
of their whole policy, the fusion of the confederations is nothing
but a form of the policy of the united front, a more extended and
broader form. In rejecting our proposal, the reformists transform it
into a “maneuver.” But on our part, it is a legitimate and
indispensable “maneuver”; it is such maneuvers that train the
working masses.
★
The
Executive Committee of the Communist League, we say again, is
entirely correct when it urgently repeats that unity of action cannot
be postponed until the unification of the trade union organizations.
This idea must be developed as has been done heretofore, explained,
and applied in practice. But this does not exclude the duty of posing
boldly, at a definite and well-chosen moment, the question of the
fusion of the [CGT and CGTU] confederations or even of individual
[union] federations.
The
whole question consists in knowing if the Communist leadership is now
capable of effecting such a bold maneuver. The future will show. But
if the [Communist] Party and the leadership of the CGTU refuse to
follow the advice of the [Communist] League today — which is most
probable — it may well be that they will be obliged to follow it
tomorrow. It is superfluous to add that we make no fetish of trade
union unity. We postpone no question of struggle until unity. It is
not a question for us of a panacea, but of a lesson in specific and
important things that must be taught to the workers who have
forgotten or who do not know the past.
★
For
participation in the unity congress, we do not of course set any
conditions of principle.
When
the unity brokers, who are not ashamed of cheap phrases, say that the
united confederation must base itself upon the principle of class
struggle, etc., they are doing verbal acrobatics in the interests of
the opportunists. As if a serious man could ask Jouhaux and company,
in the name of unity with the Communists, to tread the road of the
class struggle, which these gentlemen have deliberately abandoned in
the name of unity with the bourgeoisie. And just what do these
brokers themselves, all these Monattes, Zyromskys, and Dumoulins,
understand by the “class struggle’? We are ready at any moment to
stand on the grounds of trade union unity, but not in order to
“correct” (with the aid of quack formulas) the mercenaries of
capital. No, we take this stand in order to tear the workers away
from their traitorous influence. The only conditions that we set have
the character of organizational guarantees of trade union democracy,
first of all the freedom of criticism for the minority, naturally on
the condition that it submits to trade union discipline. We ask for
nothing else, and on our part we promise nothing more.
★
Let
us imagine that the [Communist] Party — even if not immediately
— follows our advice. How should its Central Committee act? It
would first of all be obliged to carefully prepare within the party
the plan of campaign, to discuss it in all the trade union fractions
in the light of local trade union conditions, so that the slogan of
unity might be effectively directed simultaneously from above and
from below. Only after careful preparation and elaboration, after
having eliminated all doubts and misunderstandings within its own
ranks, would the leadership of the CGTU address itself to the
leadership of the reformist confederation with concretely elaborated
proposals: to create a parity commission for the preparation, within
a period of two months for example, of the trade union unification
congress to which all the trade union organizations of the country
must be admitted. Simultaneously, the local CGTU organizations
address themselves to the local CGT organizations with the same
proposal, formulated with precision and concreteness.
The
Communist Party would develop a broad agitation in the country,
supporting and explaining the initiative of the CGTU. The attention
of the broadest circles of workers, and primarily that of the CGT
workers, must for a certain time be concentrated on the simple idea
that the Communists propose to achieve immediately the organizational
unity of the trade union organizations. Whatever the attitude of the
reformists may be, whatever may be the ruses to which they resort,
the Communists will come out of this campaign with profit, even if
their proposal comes to no more, in this first attempt, than a
demonstration of their attitude.
The
struggle in the name of the united front does not cease, during this
period, for a single minute. The Communists continue to attack the
reformists in the provinces and in the center, basing themselves upon
the growing activity of the workers, renewing all their offers of
fighting actions on the basis of the policy of the united front,
unmasking the reformists, strengthening their own ranks, and so on.
And it may well happen that in six months, in a year or two, the
Communists will be obliged to repeat their proposal of fusion of the
trade union confederations and thus put the reformists in a more
difficult position than the first time.
A
genuinely Bolshevik policy must have precisely this character. It
must boldly take the offensive while conducting a maneuver. It is
only on this road that the movement can be preserved from stagnation
and purged of parasitic formations, and the evolution of the working
class toward revolution can be accelerated.
★
The
lesson proposed above has no meaning and cannot succeed unless the
initiative comes from the CGTU and the Communist Party. The task of
the league naturally does not consist of independently advancing the
slogan of a unity congress, pitting itself against the CGTU as well
as against the CGT. The league’s task is to push the official party
and the CGTU onto the road of a bold united front policy and to
stimulate them, on the basis of this policy, to carry out at a
propitious moment — and in the future there will be many such
moments — a decisive offensive for the fusion of the trade union
organizations.
In
order to fulfill its tasks toward the party, the league — and
this is its first duty — must align its own ranks in the field of
the trade union movement. It is a task that cannot be postponed. It
must and will be solved.