Leon Trotsky: Very Significant Facts

Published September 1931

[Writing of Leon Trotsky, Vol. 3, 1930-1931, New York 1973, p. 299 f.]

Even bureaucratic shifts can be of great significance. When Ordzhonikidze was transferred to the Supreme Council of National Economy, Yaroslavsky undoubtedly expected to be appointed chairman of the Central Control Commission. But the appointee was Andreyev, who was much younger and who, it would seem, "earned" it incomparably less. There were even whispers in Moscow, half in earnest, half serious, that Yaroslavsky was going over to the Opposition.

As a matter of fact, direction of the GPU has been concentrated in the hands of Yagoda in recent years. He seemed to be the natural successor to Menzhinsky. Suddenly Yagoda is demoted to second assistant, and the little-known Akulov is advanced to first place.

What does this mean? Yaroslavsky and Yagoda are two figures on the same order, of the same type, as if made for the same jobs. Closely tied to each other, they performed through the two bodies of apparatus repression — the Central Control Commission and the GPU — Stalin's most delicate assignments in the struggle against his opponents and even in matters of personal revenge against all who at any time, in any way, brushed up against him.

These two, Yaroslavsky and Yagoda, could be given any kind of assignment, without risk of their refusal. Who but Yaroslavsky could be commissioned to bring about the suicide of the faultless Glazman? Who but Yagoda would have been capable of starving out the innocent Butov? What other pair could better carry out "the Soviet and party order" — the shooting of Blumkin? It can be considered quite probable that the alleged article by Trotsky on the five-year plan was suggested third-hand to the reactionary press by Yagoda, and that Yaroslavsky, involved in this with him, then exposed Trotsky's counterrevolutionary crusade against the Soviets in Pravda. We do not claim that this is exactly the way it happened, but every informed member of the apparatus admits that it might be. In the past there were hundreds of such exploits carried out under Stalin's direct instructions or in hope of his approval.

Who, then, should be put at the head of the Central Control Commission, if not the incomparable Yaroslavsky? And who is more qualified to head the GPU and carry out Stalin's most "intimate" assignments than Yagoda?

Why, therefore, was the very picturesque Yaroslavsky pushed aside by the colorless, though zealous, Andreyev? And why did Yagoda, who is ready for anything, have to yield his place to Akulov? These are interesting questions.

The fact that it is impossible for Stalin to appoint his emissaries to the most important posts is an expression of the unarticulated, almost anonymous, yet insurmountable resistance of the apparatus against the recent consequences of the Stalinist system. On the whole the Stalinists will accept Stalin and all that he implies. But now we see that Yaroslavsky and Yagoda stick in their craw. Stalin has to make extraordinary efforts to retain even in secondary and tertiary positions the people he needs the most.

This is a symptom, one of many, that Stalin, who was raised up by the apparatus, is in continual silent struggle with the apparatus, which somehow feels the pressure of the party on it. The rejection of Yaroslavsky and the demotion of Yagoda is a singular warning to Stalin on the part of the apparatus, one could almost say a secret vote of lack of confidence.

Such symptoms, and even more expressive ones, may be expected in the future in greater number. A growing alarm of the apparatus precedes the inevitable awakening of the party. In the future we should expect more and more "very significant facts."