Leon
Trotsky: A Conversation with Trotsky
August
25, 1932
[Writing
of Leon Trotsky, Vol. 4, 1932, New York 1973, p. 176-179]
Trotsky:
You come from Germany? What party are you in?
Bergmann:
I'm in the SAP.
T.:
That's bad!
B.:
I came here with the Walcher-Frölich group.
T.:
That's worse! A party should be evaluated from two standpoints:
national and international! Internationally the SAP links up with all
the doubtful elements in the whole world. In Germany it makes the
wrong decisions on every important question. Take the presidential
elections. It was correct to put up Thälmann. A joint candidacy of
Löbe is impossible.
I
cannot ask workers to vote for Löbe, Le., for the Social Democratic
program. Certainly I have many differences with Thälmann, but
he does represent a program, a Communist program.
But the Social Democracy is a capitalist party.
B.:
And if Hitler had been elected like Hindenburg in 1925, i.e., with a
margin smaller than Thälmann's total vote? You have to take that
into account, and then the Communists would have been responsible
before the whole working class for the direct results of Hitler's
election.
T.:
You can't please everybody. It's enough for me if I can take on the
responsibility for my own party. The Seydewitz stuff about putting
the interest of the class before the interest of the party is
nonsense. That comes from wanting to be a big party all at once, and
not having the patience to build up slowly and systematically. A
revolutionary must have patience. Impatience is the mother of
opportunism.
B.:
Do you think that a party which is led by such leadership can carry
through the proletarian revolution in a country like Germany, with
such a strong bourgeoisie?
T.:
In some situations, yes! Circumstances may prove stronger than human
incapacity. The German Communist Party contains many revolutionary
elements, including ones who more or less know what the October
Revolution was and what the dictatorship of the proletariat is. Of
course not every Communist bureaucrat will turn out to be a hero, not
every reformist bigwig will be a top-notcher. … But in the fight
with the fascists in the working-class districts it will be the
Communists who will be in the front line. The situation in Germany
leaves many possibilities open. It may be that the Communist Party
will take over the leadership.
B.:
What do you think, Comrade Trotsky, about the slogan
"self-determination" up to separation? Is there not a
danger that in the event of a revolution the bourgeoisie of a
province will hide behind this slogan and carry on propaganda for
independence or union with a neighboring reactionary country?
T.:
The danger exists, but it becomes greater with every ambiguity on the
question. We say to the masses of that province: If you want to
leave, go ahead, we won't restrain you by force; but what will you do
with the big estates? and what about the factories? That's all that
interests us — when by our generosity in respect to nationality
we put the social
question
into the foreground, then we will drive a wedge between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat; otherwise we would weld them
together. Look, the Russian Bolsheviks said: "Right of
self-determination including separation." And Russia has become
a block despite its forty languages and nations. The Austrian Social
Democrats, like a true copy of their bourgeoisie, tried to solve the
question by a compromise, and Austria-Hungary has fallen apart That
is history's biggest lesson in this field.
B.:
Another question: Is it conceivable for a socialist state to wage war
along with a capitalist state against another capitalist state? For
example, Russia with America against Japan? What would the attitude
of the American Communist Party have to be then?
T.:
The concrete case of a war of Russia plus America against Japan is
extremely improbable. The American bourgeoisie is the legitimist one
among the bourgeoisie, I would say. The above case is conceivable,
however, though not for a long time. Since in consequence of a defeat
of the third power revolutionary movements will break out in it, an
alliance of the two states which had just been fighting each other
against the revolutionary proletariat would immediately be formed.
B.:
And the tactics of the CP of the country concerned up to that point?
T.:
Extreme mistrust of the government; for example, no approval of the
budget, but no strikes in the munitions industry, etc. This attitude
to continue, of course, only as long as the CP is not strong enough
to undertake serious actions to overthrow the bourgeoisie.
B.:
If I can put it this way: mistrust and propaganda against the
government, gathering of forces for a decisive blow, but no direct
sabotage of the war.
T.:
Yes, something like that! But I emphasize that this cannot possibly
be a prolonged state of affairs. It would come to an end after a
short time because of the rupture of the alliance between the
socialist and the capitalist state.
B.:
What do you think about the possibility of a Japanese-American war,
Comrade Trotsky?
T.:
It has moved some years off. America cannot wage war against Japan
without a base on the East Asian mainland — and arming the
Chinese people with the perspective of creating a colonial war as in
India would be an experiment with unforeseeable consequences for
America and the world. China is a nation, India was a collection of
provinces. Now it is becoming a nation, and therefore English rule in
India is coming to an end. The arming of the Chinese people by the
USSR for a fight against foreign rule, that opens a big revolutionary
perspective in the Far East
B.:
How do you evaluate China's internal development?
T.:
That depends on the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to link up
the peasant struggles with the fight of the urban proletariat. The
main failing of the Chinese CP consists in its excessive weakness.
You will find more details on this in our latest literature
B.:
Now the last question. To what do you attribute the faults of the
Comintern, bureaucratization, etc., to internal Russian or to
extra-Russian causes?
T.:
In the first place to internal Russian ones.
B.
:
Does that mean that the cure must also come from Russia?
T.:
That is not necessary! It can also come from outside
B.:
That means — for some time at least — the destruction of the
Comintern in the present sense
T.:
Not necessarily. You must not forget that a new fourth international
is only possible after a great historic event. The Third
International arose from the Great War and the October Revolution.
The worker thinks slowly, he must mull everything over in his mind, I
would say. He knows that the party has enlightened him and trained
him as a conscious worker,
and therefore he does not change as easily as the intellectual. He
learns not from discussions but from historical events. Such an event
would be the victory of fascism in Germany. But the victory of
fascism in Germany does not only mean in all probability the collapse
of the Comintern, but also includes the defeat of the Soviet Union.
Only if that takes place — it need not necessarily take place, it
can still be prevented, and every effort must of course be made to
prevent it — only then will we have the right to talk about a new
party, about a fourth international.
[At
his request, the conversation was sent to Trotsky before publication.
He sent it back with the following accompanying note:)
October
24, 1932
Dear
Comrade:
There
has been some delay in my reply, since my time was very taken up with
other things.
Your
note gives our conversation broadly correctly. I should just like to
add a few things. Insofar as your manuscript concerns my evaluation
of the SAP, the impression may arise that I condemn the SAP so
sharply mainly because of its international connections with hopeless
splinter organizations. That impression would be false, since it
would be one-sided. The connection with the ILP, etc., is only the
international extension of the internal "line." The SAP has
decided fully in favor of the Ledebour policy.
You
ask whether the centristic bureaucratization of the Comintern is to
be attributed to internal Russian or to extra-Russian causes.
Immediately to the Russian ones, as the answer recorded by you
states. But one should not forget here that internal Russian
development was shaped by the isolation of the Soviet Union, i.e., by
extra-Russian causes.
Such
additions require many answers. However, I believe that your reader
(if you publish the "interview") will be clever enough to
draw out from it for himself what is necessary.
Friendly
greetings,
L.
Trotsky