Leon
Trotsky: Leninism and Stalinism
Answers
to Views of Louis Fischer
October
1932
[Writing
of Leon Trotsky, Vol. 4, 1932, New York 1973, p. 255-290]
Question:
"Lenin and all his followers were convinced at that time [in
1917] that only a revolution abroad could save them from certain
doom. … They did not hope to survive unless revolutions in Europe
and Asia weakened external hostility and gave Red Russia a breathing
space for domestic entrenchment," says Mr. Fischer. Was Lenin
speaking only in an immediate military and political sense of saving
Russia from defeat and subjugation, or did he have in mind the whole
perspective of Russia's developing on its own soil through the
dictatorship of the proletariat to the ultimate Communist goal?
Answer:
That affirmation of Mr. Fischer's, like a series of others, proves
his lack of familiarity with the theory and the history of
Bolshevism. In 1917 there was not a single Bolshevik who considered
possible the realization of a socialist society in a single country,
and least of all in Russia. In the appendix to my History
of the Russian Revolution
I give a detailed and documented study of the ideas of the Bolshevik
Party on the October Revolution. This study, I hope, will make it
impossible in the future to ascribe to Lenin the theory of socialism
in a single country. Here I will limit myself to a single quotation,
which in my opinion has a decisive character. Lenin died in January
1924; three months later Stalin expounded in writing Lenin's
conception of the proletarian revolution. I quote word for word: "…
to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to establish the power
of the proletariat in one country still does not signify the full
victory of socialism. The main task of socialism — the
organization of socialist production-remains still in the future Is
it possible to fulfill this task, is it possible to achieve the
definite victory of socialism in one country
without the combined efforts of the proletarians of several advanced
countries? No,
it is impossible.
For the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the efforts of one country are
sufficient — for this we have the testimony of the history of our
revolution. For the definitive victory of socialism, for
the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country,
especially of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient
— for that are required the efforts of the proletarians of several
advanced countries… Stalin closes the exposition of these ideas
with the words: "Such are in general the characteristic features
of Lenin's conception of the proletarian revolution" (Problems
of Leninism,
emphasis mine).
Only
in the fall of 1924 did Stalin discover that it is especially Russia,
as distinguished from other countries, which can by its own forces
build up a socialist society. "… After having established its
power and assumed the leadership of the peasantry," he wrote in
a new edition of the same work, "the victorious proletariat can
and must build up socialist society." Can and must' The
proclamation of this new conception is closed by the same words:
"Such are in general the characteristic features of Lenin's
conception of the proletarian revolution." In the course of a
single year Stalin ascribed to Lenin two directly opposed conceptions
of the fundamental question of socialism. The first version
represents the real tradition of the party; the second took shape in
Stalin's mind only after the death of Lenin, in the course of the
struggle against "Trotskyism."
Q:
Is there reason to believe that the world revolution, or a series of
social upheavals on the Eurasian continent, "ceased to be an
immediate possibility" by 1921?
A:
What shall we call an "immediate possibility"? In 1923 the
situation in Germany was profoundly revolutionary, but what was
lacking for a victorious revolution was a correct strategy. At that
time I wrote a study about this question, Lessons
of October,
which served as a pretext for my elimination from the government. In
1925-27 the revolution in China was destroyed by the false
revolutionary strategy of the Stalinist faction. To this last
question I consecrate my book, Problems
of the Chinese Revolution.
It is quite clear that the German and Chinese revolutions in case of
victory would have changed the face of Europe and Asia, and perhaps
of the whole world. Once again, he who ignores the problems of
revolutionary strategy would do better not to talk about revolutions
at all.
Q:
Is it true that "a revolution germinates only in national soil,
that it does not result from imported money or pamphlets or
agitators, and that the capitalists will do more than the Communists
to undermine capitalism"? Is it true that "by its very
existence a truly Soviet, near-socialist system … must further the
cause of revolution in other countries," and that "a strong
socialist Soviet Union is the most effective stimulus to world
revolution"?
A:
The
statements quoted in this question contradict each other. That the
existence of the Soviet Union has an international revolutionary
significance is a commonplace equally recognized by friends and foes.
In spite of the existence of the Soviet Union, however, the
proletarian revolution during the past years has not recorded a
victory in any other country. In Russia itself the proletariat
conquered in spite of the fact that there was no Soviet state in
existence at die time elsewhere. For the victory are necessary, not
only certain objective conditions, internal as well as external, but
also certain subjective factors — the party, the leadership, the
strategy. Our differences with Stalin are entirely of a strategical
character. Suffice it to say that if we had carried through, in 1917,
the policy of Stalin, the Soviet state would not be in existence
today. It is therefore not true that the mere existence of the Soviet
Union is capable of assuring the victory of the revolution in other
countries. But it is also false that the revolution ripens and comes
to development only on national soil. Otherwise what purpose is
served by the Communist International?
Q:
Granting that a capitalist economy, the more highly it is developed,
becomes the more dependent on other countries, is it less true of the
Soviet Union because it is developing toward a socialist economy?
A:
National
self-sufficiency or "autarchy" is the ideal of Hitler, not
of Marx and Lenin. Socialist economy cannot reject the huge
advantages of the world division of labor; on the contrary, it will
carry it to the highest development. But in practice, it is not a
question of the future socialist society, with an established
internal equilibrium, but of the given technically and culturally
backward country which in the interests of industrialization and
collectivization is forced to export as much as possible in order to
import as much as possible.
Q:
Is it true that the theory of the permanent revolution, which is the
platform on which you have fought Stalin since 1924, was "born
in a time of Bolshevist mental depression" caused by "a
series of failures both at home and abroad," or does this theory
represent a consistent line found in all your "political
writings and actions after 1903"? Mr. Fischer makes both
statements.
A:
The theory of the permanent revolution, in contradiction to the
theory of socialism in one country, was recognized by the entire
Bolshevik Party during the period from 1917 to 1923. Only the defeat
of the proletariat in Germany in 1923 gave the decisive push to the
creation of Stalin's theory of national socialism. The downward curve
of the revolution gave rise to Stalinism, not to die theory of the
permanent revolution, which was first formulated by me in 1905. This
theory is not bound to a definite calendar of revolutionary events;
it only reveals the worldwide interdependence of the revolutionary
process.
Q:
The statement is made that "Trotsky would not have neglected
Soviet home industry any more than Stalin would ignore the usefulness
of the Third International." Do you agree with the conclusion
that "There are no whites and blacks in this picture. It is a
matter of proportion and shade"?
A:
Such an affirmation is possible only because of lack of familiarity
with the history of the struggle between the Stalinist faction and
the Left Opposition. The initiative for the five-year plan and the
accelerated collectivization belongs entirely to the Left Opposition,
in uninterrupted and sharp struggles with the Stalinists. Not having
the possibility of occupying myself here with long historical
research, I will limit myself to a single illustration. The
Dnieprostroi is rightly considered the highest achievement of Soviet
industrialization. Yet Stalin and his followers (Voroshilov, Molotov,
and others), a few months before the beginning of the work, were
decided opponents of the Dnieprostroi plan. I quote from the
stenographic report the words spoken by Stalin in April 1926 at the
plenum of the Central Committee of the party against myself as head
of the Dnieprostroi commission. "There is talk … of our
constructing Dnieprostroi through our own means. But the sums here
are large, several hundred million. How can we avoid falling into the
position of the peasant who had saved up some money, but instead of
repairing his plough and renewing his equipment, bought a phonograph
and went bankrupt? (laughter)
… How can we not take into account the congress resolution that our
industrial plans must correspond to our resources? But Comrade
Trotsky does not take this congress decision into account"
(stenographic report of the plenum, p. 110).
Simultaneously
the Left Opposition for several years carried on a struggle against
the Stalinists in favor of collectivization. Only when the kulak
refused to deliver grain to the state did Stalin, under the pressure
of the Left Opposition, accomplish a sharp turn. Being the empiricist
that he is, he moved to the opposite extreme, and set as a task for
two or three years the collectivization of all the peasantry, the
liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and the compression of the
five-year plan into four years. The Left Opposition declared that the
new tempos of industrialization were above our forces, and that the
liquidation of the kulaks as a class in the course of three years was
a fantastic task. If one wishes to say so, we find ourselves this
time "less radical" than the Stalinists. Revolutionary
realism
tries to draw the maximum advantage from every situation — that
is what makes it revolutionary — but at the same time it does not
permit us to set ourselves fantastic aims — that is what makes it
realistic.
Q:
If we accept the views that the policy of Stalin has a purely
empirical character, is determined by the circumstances of the moment
and is incapable of seeing far ahead, how can we explain the victory
of Stalin's faction over the Left Opposition?
A:
Above, I emphasized the significance of revolutionary strategy. Here
I must come back to the decisive importance of objective conditions.
Without a correct strategy victory is impossible. But even the most
correct strategy cannot give victory under unfavorable objective
conditions. The revolution has its own laws: in the period of its
culmination it pushes the most highly developed, determined, and
farseeing stratum of the revolutionary class to the most advanced
positions. Yet the proletariat has not only a vanguard, but also a
rearguard, and besides the proletariat there are the peasantry and
the bureaucracy. Not one revolution up to now has brought all that
was expected of it by the masses. Hence the inevitability of a
certain disillusionment, of a lowering of the activity of the
vanguard, and consequently of the growing importance of the
rearguard. Stalin's faction has raised itself on the wave of reaction
against the October Revolution. Look back at history — those who
guided the revolution in the time of its culmination never kept their
leading positions long after the turning point. In France, the leader
of Jacobinism perished on the guillotine; with us, the change of
leadership was achieved by means of arrest and banishment. The
technique of the process is gentler, but its essence is the same.
Q:
How do you reconcile your criticism of the Soviet Union in the
capitalist press with your revolutionary sympathies? Is it true that
you are "turning the thinking youth away from Russia,"
"offering enemies of the Soviet regime the best possible
arguments and material," and giving "ex-radicals and
near-Communists an excuse for maligning Moscow and abstaining from
participation in revolutionary action"?
A:
The Soviet state does not need either illusions or camouflage. It can
claim only that world authority which is confirmed by the facts. The
more clearly and deeply the public opinion of the world, in the first
instance the opinion of the working masses, will understand the
contradictions and the difficulties of the socialist development of
an isolated country, the more highly will it appreciate the results
achieved. The less it identifies the fundamental methods of socialism
with the zigzags and errors of the Soviet bureaucracy, the less will
be the danger that, by the inevitable revelation of these errors and
their consequences, the authority not only of the present ruling
group but of the workers' state itself may decline. The Soviet Union
needs thinking and critical friends, such as are capable not only of
singing hymns in the hours of success, but of not shrinking in the
hour of defeat and danger. Journalists of the type of Fischer
accomplish a progressive work in defending the Soviet Union from
calumnies, malicious inventions, and prejudices. But these gentlemen
overstep the limits of their mission when they attempt to give us
lessons of devotion to the Soviet state. If we fear to speak of
dangers, we shall never conquer them. If we close our eyes to the
dark sides of the workers' state which we have helped to create, we
shall never reach socialism.