Leon Trotsky: The State of the Left Opposition

Excerpt, December 16, 1932

[The Spanish Revolution (1931-39). New York 1973, p. 187-190]

The most important result of the trip to Copenhagen was undoubtedly the coming together of Oppositionists from many countries. The original intention was to call together a dozen comrades from the areas nearest to Denmark in order to take the necessary safety measures. In point of fact, however, twenty-four comrades (of whom two were delayed) arrived, among them the most responsible functionaries of several sections. Including sympathizers, there was a total of thirty people.

If Stalin informed the capitalist police by radio of a "Trotskyist conference" meeting in Copenhagen, that was a lie. Since it came about by accident, the trip to Copenhagen necessarily caught the Left Opposition by surprise. The preparatory work for the conference was still in the early stages. There could be no question of accepting a platform of programmatic theses in Copenhagen. Even the European sections were far from completely represented, and not all the comrades who arrived had plenary powers. Unfortunately a conference did not take place and in the course of events could not have taken place.

Needless to say, however, the comrades who came took full advantage of the opportunity to get to know each other and to discuss in informal consultations the most urgent and burning problems. The unforeseen, hastily improvised meeting of two dozen Bolshevik-Leninists from seven European countries will undoubtedly be recorded as an important achievement in the history of our international faction.

The Left Opposition has grown considerably. The cadres of functionaries know the history of the Left Opposition in the various countries, orient themselves freely in theoretical and political questions, and both together and separately embody a considerable political experience. The consultations, which lasted several days, solidly fused the comrades together, a fact that will have fruitful effects on our entire future work. Without falling victim to official optimism, we can say with assurance that all the participants in the consultation left it with a new supply of confidence.

The Spanish Opposition

One question threw a shadow over the consultation: the situation of the Spanish Opposition. If we could observe certain nuances within the International Left Opposition with regard to the sicknesses and mistakes of the Spanish Opposition, these nuances were thrust completely into the background in the course of the consultation, before the feeling of common concern. All the participants were completely in accord with the view that we must have an open and complete discussion with the Spanish comrades, and that this discussion must not be limited this time to the leaders of the Opposition; only if all the members of the sections are made familiar with the questions in dispute can the Spanish Opposition be brought onto the right road.

It would be criminal to close our eyes any further before the real situation or to palliate it; if we do not succeed in clarifying completely and in time through an open discussion all disputed questions — and too many of them have piled up — then the pressure of events may divide us into different camps.

Unfortunately the Spanish section was not represented at the consultation. At the last minute certain obviously accidental circumstances proved an obstacle, but I take the liberty of expressing my certainty that the leading Spanish comrades, if they had locked themselves less into their environment and had shown more interest in their international organization, would have found their way to the Copenhagen consultation without difficulty.

But that is precisely the chief misfortune of the Spanish Opposition, that its leaders have persistently kept their organization away from the internal life and the internal struggles of the other sections, and thereby have shut it off from access to an irreplaceable international experience. But insofar as the Spanish section through its official position was after all compelled to mix into international questions, its leaders, influenced neither by the experience of the other sections nor by the public opinion of their own organization, let themselves be guided by personal connections, sympathies, or antipathies. For a Marxist analysis of the situation and of the differences of opinion, they substituted all too often — we must say it openly — a petty-bourgeois psychologising and sentimentalizing. So it was in the case of the Catalan Federation (Maurín), where several Barcelona comrades' confidence in "friendly personal relations" for a long time took the place of principled struggle against petty-bourgeois nationalism and thereby put a brake on the development of the Left Opposition in the most decisive period. So it was in the case of Landau, whom Comunismo surprisingly listed as a collaborator after Landau had shown his utter inadequacy, remained in the minority, and finally left the Left Opposition. So it was in the differences of opinion within the French section, where the Spanish comrades privately agreed that Rosmer's ideas and methods were worthless, but in public supported Rosmer, indirectly if not directly, on the ground that Rosmer "appealed to them" more than his opponents. So it was in the question of Mill, whom the leading Spanish comrades thought it possible to choose as their representative on the International Secretariat, after Mill's political worthlessness had been completely exposed. In all these cases, we have not heard from Madrid or Barcelona even a hint of principled grounds or political explanation.

The same features revealed themselves in no less sharp and painful a form in the inner life of the Spanish organization. The crisis that broke out in the leadership caught not only the International Opposition but also the Spanish section by surprise. The members of the Central Committee resigned, one after the other. The whole leadership was concentrated de facto in the hands of Lacroix alone. Then, just as surprisingly, it appeared that Comrade Lacroix was outside of the Central Committee, in fact for a time outside of the Opposition, while the leadership went over to Barcelona. Why? What do the differences of opinion consist of? What are the grounds of the crisis? Nobody knows, at least nobody outside of the narrow circle of the initiated. Such a regime is absolutely impermissible in a revolutionary organization, and can bring it only defeats. By refraining from participation in the struggle over principled questions, by substituting personal evaluations for political differences of opinion, the Spanish comrades themselves fall victim to inevitable personal conflicts and "palace revolutions."

Such subjective arbitrariness in politics would be completely impossible if the Central Committee of the Spanish section worked under the control of its own organization. But this is not the case. In their own defense, several leaders of the Spanish Opposition pointed more than once to the insufficiently high theoretical and political level of the Spanish Oppositionists. Obviously an objection that will not hold water! The level of a revolutionary organization rises all the faster, the more it is brought into the discussion of all questions, the less the leaders try to think, act, and behave as guardians for the organization.

The first condition for party democracy consists of providing all-sided information. The beginning must be the international documents on the Spanish Opposition; the Spanish Central Committee must obligate itself to communicate these documents to all members of the Opposition; every Spanish Bolshevik-Leninist must study, think through, and judge not only the experience with Mill but also the essence of the crisis of the Spanish Central Committee itself. Through this the Spanish Oppositionists will learn much more than through a dozen abstract articles on democratic centralism and the correct relation to "human beings. …"